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Introduction and Overview
Susan Houseman
W.E. Upjohn Institute
Alice Nakamura
University of Alberta

This is the second of two volumes of selected papers presented at
the conference “Changes in Working Time,” which was jointly sponsored by the Canadian Employment Research Forum (CERF), the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, and Statistics Canada in
Ottawa, Ontario, June 13–15, 1996. The chapters in the first volume
focus on the weekly hours that individuals work. These chapters
examine recent changes in the distribution of weekly working time in
Canada and the United States, the implications of the changing distribution of hours worked for earnings inequality, and efforts to reduce
unemployment through mandated hours reductions.
The chapters in this volume study an expanded set of working-time
issues, which may be loosely grouped under two topics: working time
over the life cycle and nonstandard work arrangements. While the distribution of weekly work hours for the population has changed, so too
has the amount that individuals work at various points in their life.
Most notably, women with small children have increasingly joined the
workforce, while labor force participation among older workers has
declined. In addition, a growing number of adults are interrupting their
careers to go back to school. Two of the chapters in this volume
present an overview of life cycle working patterns and trends in Canada and the United States. Several other chapters study the decision to
work at key points in the life cycle: one chapter looks at the payoffs to
education among adults who have returned to school; two chapters
examine the decision to work by mothers; and two chapters focus on
retirement and work patterns among older adults.
Often individuals trying to balance school or family responsibilities with a job are part-time, temporary, self-employed, or home-based
workers. These nonstandard employment arrangements may allow
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them greater flexibility in scheduling to accommodate workers’ other
responsibilities. Similarly, older workers who have left a full-time,
career job often work in a nonstandard employment arrangement as a
transition to retirement. While many older workers seek part-time or
temporary jobs as a bridge to retirement, many prime-age workers take
on secondary part-time or temporary jobs, typically to meet special
financial needs. Evidence that most types of nonstandard employment
arrangements have been growing in Canada and the United States has
led to concern about the implications for workers and firms.
Various nonstandard work arrangements are the focus of the last
four chapters in this volume. Two chapters look at self-employment
and home-based work as mechanisms for achieving greater scheduling
flexibility among women. Another chapter compares moonlighting in
Canada and the United States, describing the characteristics of workers
who moonlight and offering explanations for the higher levels of
moonlighting in the United States. The final chapter draws upon a survey of large companies to explain why employers are expanding their
use of temporary help workers.
To help readers better understand the issues addressed in this volume and utilize the information contained in it, we provide a synopsis
of each of the chapters below. For each chapter, we summarize the
study’s main objectives, the databases used, and the nature of some of
the key findings. The chapters are organized into three groups by the
aspects of working time that they consider.
The chapters in Part I examine general patterns and trends in
working time over the life cycle for the United States and Canada, and
they also introduce a number of the basic terms and concepts used in
the rest of the volume.
In “The Life Cycle of Working Time in the United States and Canada: Long-Term Evidence,” John D. Owen considers changes over the
life cycle for working time in the United States and Canada since 1920.
He notes that there have been important changes in weekly hours, in
participation and employment rates, and in wages. The purpose of this
chapter is to examine the relationship between changes in wage and
life cycle labor supply patterns in the two countries.
Owen notes that a simple theory in which labor supply at each age
is determined solely by contemporary conditions, without concerns
about the future, does not explain life cycle variations in labor supply
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very well. Owen contrasts the implications of the simple model with
the “life cycle theory” of Ghez and Becker. In their model, a young
person’s lifetime wealth is given by the initial stock of wealth that that
person possesses plus the present value of all future income streams,
including those from earnings. Owen also makes the important point
that life cycle theory is not a theory about cross sections; rather, it is a
theory about how the behavior of individuals changes as they age, and
hence is a theory better examined with cohort data.
These insights provide the motivation for the empirical portions of
this study, which study life cycle employment in the United States and
Canada since 1920. The empirical work is based on a number of different data sources for both the United States and Canada that are
detailed in a data appendix to the chapter. Owen concludes that the life
cycle of working time has been remarkably similar in Canada and the
United States, but that each country has experienced important changes
in its life cycle patterns of employment. In particular, the level of male
labor supply has declined over time, at first because of decline in the
number of hours worked, but more recently because of decline in labor
force participation. The decline in labor force participation has been
especially large among young and older workers. Over the period
studied, real wage growth slowed. Life cycle theory would predict that
if workers anticipated the stagnation of wage growth, they would supply more labor in their early years. No support for this hypothesis was
found, however.
In “Perspectives on Working Time over the Life Cycle,” Michael
Wolfson and Geoff Rowe utilize a new longitudinal microsimulation
model developed by Statistics Canada—the LifePaths model—to
examine statistical patterns of working time over the life cycle. LifePaths provides a means for blending data on both cross-sectional timeuse patterns and longitudinal labor force dynamics. It can be used to
produce multistate life tables that relax some of the restrictive assumptions that underlie conventional working life tables, and it can be used
to conduct a wide range of policy-related analyses as well.
The LifePaths model constructs estimates of birth cohort life
cycles by synthesizing samples of hypothetical but realistic individual
life histories. It therefore generalizes a variety of more traditional life
table analyses, including working life tables, and affords a much wider
variety of “views” of working time over the life cycle. More recent
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work has extended LifePaths from a single “period” cohort to a
sequence of overlapping historical birth cohorts. This makes it possible to use the model to address questions of the intergenerational
equity of public pensions, as well as issues of income adequacy, health,
and the use of nonwork time.
One of the most striking results to emerge from the LifePaths representation of time use is a greater recognition of how our impressions
of the importance of paid work over the life cycle are affected by the
“granularity” of the time accounting that is used. Conventional
approaches tend to go year by year, in which case a typical working
lifetime can be expected to extend over 20–40 years of the life cycle.
However, when finer units of time (e.g., hours and days) are used, the
proportion of unit time intervals over the typical life cycle that are
dominated by market work becomes a much smaller fraction.
Part II contains five chapters that examine individuals’ work decisions at key points in the life cycle. In “Adults Returning to School—
Payoffs from Studying at a Community College,” Duane E. Leigh and
Andrew M. Gill examine the choices of and the returns to different
fields of study for returning adult students versus those who proceed on
to college directly from high school. They use National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth data through 1993 for respondents who were between
28 and 35 years of age. Leigh and Gill find substantial evidence that
returning adults comprise a substantial share of those in postsecondary
education. For instance, students in their thirties comprise 10 percent
of those in two-year colleges and 37 percent of those in vocational or
technical institutions. Sixteen percent of all BA degrees were earned
by respondents classified as returning adults.
Leigh and Gill find that the size of the college earnings premium
varies substantially by field of study, with the highest paying fields
being engineering/computer science and social science/public service
for men and nursing for women. Moreover, they find evidence, particularly for men, that returning adults are more sensitive to market wage
differentials in choosing fields of study than are ones who continue on
directly from high school.
In “Children’s Effects on Women’s Labor Market Attachment and
Earnings,” William E. Even and David A. Macpherson attempt to
explain significant changes since the 1970s in the labor force attachment and earnings among women of childbearing age. Using data
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from the March Current Population Surveys over the 1976–1995
period, the authors document the dramatic rise in employment rates
and the dramatic decline in the exit rates among civilian women aged
21 to 40. Not surprisingly, the exit rate among women with infants is
the highest and among women with no children the lowest throughout
the period. However, the differential in the exit rates across these
groups narrowed dramatically over time: among women with some
work history during the previous year, the exit rate among women with
infants declined by 25.7 percentage points, whereas the exit rate among
women with no children declined just 5.4 percentage points from 1976
to 1995. Even and Macpherson also find a convergence of exit rates by
marital status. Interestingly, compared to previously married and never
married women, married women were the most likely to exit employment in 1976, but by 1995 they were the least likely to exit employment.
Even and Macpherson try to explain this sharp decline in the exit
rates among married women. By estimating probit models of exit
behavior among married women over the 1976–1979 period and over
the 1992–1995 period, however, they find that changes in observed
characteristics explain only a small share of the large decline in exit
rates between the two periods. The most striking finding in these probit models is that the presence of infants had a much smaller effect on
the probability that a married woman would exit the labor force in the
1990s than in the 1970s. This finding indicates that the behavior of
women, not their characteristics, has fundamentally changed over the
period.
In wage models, the presence of children has a negative effect on
women’s earnings, a finding that is consistent with both theories of
human capital and statistical discrimination. According to human capital theory, women who expect to exit the workforce when they have
children would invest in less human capital. According to theories of
statistical discrimination, employers would discriminate against hiring
or promoting women of childbearing age into jobs that require large
investments of human capital on the grounds that they are more likely
than men to quit. Even and Macpherson, however, find that the adverse
effect of children on women’s wages has declined over time, especially
among married women, which is consistent with the decline in their
exit rates.
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In the chapter “U.S. Health Policy and Mothers of Children with
Disabilities,” Janet Hunt-McCool examines the effects on the labor
supply of mothers whose children suffer from disabilities or physical
limitations. The health insurance options facing these mothers include
no insurance; Medicaid (a free state/federal program for very lowincome households); employment-based insurance, often conditional
on full-time work and relatively high wages; and, if married, possible
coverage by the spouse’s employer-provided insurance policy. She
notes that just under 60 percent of the U.S. population receives coverage from private carriers, while 18 percent have no insurance coverage,
either private or public. Only 40 to 60 percent of the low-income population in each of the U.S. states is covered by Medicaid.
The data used in this study are from the 1987 National Medical
Expenditure Survey (NMES), which collected information on medical
care use and expenditures, health insurance coverage, and employment
and hours worked in the United States. This analysis employs a subset
of families with children between 1 and 17 years of age. These data are
for 3,069 two-parent and 1,590 single-parent families in which the
mothers were present. The sample of married mothers was further
restricted to households in which husbands were employed full time as
wage and salary workers. Multinomial logit estimates of the choice of
usual hours of work per week are used to estimate the effects of child
health status and the availability of private and public insurance on
maternal labor supply. They are estimated separately for married and
single mothers. The choices considered are no work, part-time hours
(less than 35 hours per week), or work at full-time hours.
One of the main findings is that potentially chronic illnesses in
children deter both single and married mothers from full- or part-time
employment. This result differs from many previous studies that find a
response only among married women. Women who do work are found
to be more likely to choose limited hours or part-time work. Another
main result is that health insurance on the job matters. These empirical
results indicate that the odds of a woman opting for full-time work versus not working rise as the chance of being offered insurance increases.
When the husband holds insurance, the mother is more likely to choose
part-time work over full-time work, or, more often, to choose no work
at all.
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Hunt-McCool concludes that there are many reasons why the U.S.
system of health insurance provision, in which coverage is tied to jobs,
is inefficient or inequitable. She notes that the zero-sum alternative of
Medicaid has its own set of disadvantages, including that lifetime
income and wealth must remain very low to maintain this coverage,
and market skills may depreciate with the limitations this imposes on
work. She concludes that women will particularly suffer from the
problems created by the employment/health insurance nexus since they
routinely provide a large part of the nonmarket time their families
require.
In “Early Retirees of a Telecommunications Firm—Patterns of
Employment and Working Time,” Gangaram Singh and Anil Verma
investigate bridge employment among older workers, using data from
the Survey of Work and Lifestyle Activities, a survey of former Bell
Canada employees. In July 1995, a survey questionnaire was sent by
mail to a sample of 3,614 individuals who had left the company
between 1985 and 1995. This survey group consisted of all eligible
individuals ages 45–50, and a randomly selected 50 percent of the
over–50 age group. All of those aged 45–50 were included to try to
ensure enough respondents from the “younger retirees” group. The
response rate was 60 percent. This is a survey of persons who voluntarily retired from a long-term career job with what was Canada’s largest telecommunications company. The majority of those included left
Bell with a special financial settlement, and all of them were entitled to
a private pension from Bell Canada at the time that the survey was conducted.
Singh and Verma find that 39 percent of the respondents had
returned to work after their initial retirement from Bell and were still
working, 2 percent were unemployed, and the remaining 59 percent
were out of the workforce and hence still retired. For those who had
returned to work, 82 percent reported having gone back to work in
some form of nonstandard employment, while 18 percent had gone
back to standard employment. In addition to providing descriptive statistics, the authors use a multinomial logit model to help explain the
choices that these early retirees made between remaining retired, working in standard employment arrangements, and working in nonstandard
employment arrangements. Most interestingly, they find that pension
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schemes that “clawback” benefits when retirees earn income reduce
employment, particularly in full-time jobs.
Michael Baker and Dwayne Benjamin examine the effects of public pension schemes on retirement behavior in “Working Time Over the
Life Cycle: Do Public Pensions Matter?” They point out that in 1980,
over 60 percent of Canadian men between age 60 and 64 were working, whereas by 1994, this figure had fallen to 50 percent. Also, in the
intervening years, early retirement provisions had been introduced into
the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP), which governs pensions in all provinces besides Quebec, and into the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). They
examine whether there was any causal relationship between the change
in pension policy and the increase in retirement rates. The approach
they take is to make use of the difference in the time of introduction for
the early retirement provisions in the CPP and the QPP. They rely primarily on time series evidence from the Canadian Labour Force Survey
data. For portions of the study, they also utilize individual-level panel
data from the Labour Market Activity Survey. Their analysis uncovers
no strong evidence to suggest that major changes to the public pension
schemes in Canada can explain the sharp decline in retirement age.
The chapters in Part III focus on various forms of nonstandard
employment. The first three of these have to do with worker behavior
and employment patterns. The fourth examines employer hiring practices.
In introducing her chapter, “Self-Employment and Schedule Flexibility for Married Females: Evidence for the United States from SIPP,”
Theresa J. Devine notes that as the employment rate for prime-age
married women in the United States rose through the 1980s, their selfemployment rate rose by more. She also points out that the findings to
date on self-employment for married women suggest that many may be
using this as a way to exercise more control over work schedules than
is typically possible in the wage-and-salary sector. Her chapter presents new evidence on this work schedule hypothesis from the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
Devine calls attention to a number of reasons why the SIPP data
are particularly useful for investigating this work schedule hypothesis
for the self-employment of married women. She points out that each
SIPP interview collects relatively detailed information on job characteristics and work schedules (weeks worked, usual hours, and devia-
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tions from usual schedules of work). As well, SIPP is longitudinal, so
changes in usual schedules and self-employment status can be measured, and SIPP interviews are just four months apart, which means
that short-term changes can be measured quite accurately. SIPP also
collects detailed information on business characteristics including husband/wife business ownership, legal status, and number of employees,
all of which make this a rich data source for the study of self-employment in the United States.
Consistent with her hypothesis, Devine finds that the selfemployed and wage-and-salary women report very different usual
hours of work. Self-employed women rarely report 40 hours as their
usual per week, while 40 is the number reported most often by wageand-salary women. Usual hours of the self-employed are much more
varied, both from one woman to another and over time for all individuals. Self-employed women also deviate from or change their own
usual schedules more frequently than wage-and-salary women.
Women who are only self-employed are less likely than wage-and-salary women to report that their part-time hours or the variability in their
work schedules is due to insufficient work.
The data also suggest that the self-employment decisions of married women often depend on the employment circumstances of their
husbands. Usual hours of self-employed women are more correlated
with the usual hours of their husbands, particularly when their husbands are also self-employed. Additionally, more than half of the
women who report self-employment during the period of a year had
self-employed husbands.
In the chapter “Work Site and Work Hours: The Labor Force Flexibility of Home-Based Female Workers,” Linda N. Edwards and Elizabeth Field-Hendrey examine the hypothesis that fixed costs of work
play an important role in determining the probabilities of whether
women work at home (home-based work), or out of the home (on-site
work), or not at all. The data for their study are from the 5 percent
Public Use Microdata Sample of housing units from the 1990 Census
of Population of the United States. Identification of home-based workers is derived from answers to the journey to work question, which
asks, “How did this person usually get to work last week?” The persons who responded that they “worked at home” are regarded as homebased workers. The sample was limited to those 25–55 years of age to
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avoid the years when large numbers of women either are still attending
school or are retired.
Home-based women are found, on average, to differ greatly from
on-site workers in both their personal characteristics and in the nature
of their work. For example, 62.9 percent of the former are selfemployed compared with 3.3 percent of the latter. Home-based workers are also found to have much more variety in their work schedules,
both with respect to weekly hours and weeks worked per year. The
authors conclude that their findings support the hypothesis that homebased work gives women greater flexibility in scheduling work and
increases the labor force participation among women with high fixed
costs of working, such as those with young children, with elderly relatives living in their home, with disabilities, and with long commutes to
on-site work locations.
In “A Comparative Analysis of Moonlighting in Canada and the
United States,” Jean Kimmel and Lisa M. Powell provide a wealth of
information for the United States and Canada about multiple job-holders and the jobs they hold. Their descriptive analysis provides information about differences across gender, age, education, marital status,
region, and other characteristics. Separate information is provided
about the primary jobs (PJ) versus the secondary jobs (SJ) that are held
by multiple job-holders. They estimate PJ and SJ wage equations for
each country and then use these to compute predicted wages that are
included in probit models for the probability of moonlighting.
For the United States, the data are drawn from the May Current
Population Survey (CPS), which contains a special supplement with
information on multiple jobs. The CPS is a randomly drawn U.S. sample of households. The Canadian data are drawn from the Survey of
Work Arrangements (SWA), which is a supplement to the November
1991 Canadian Labour Force Survey. While the Labour Force Survey
does flag multiple job-holders, the SWA supplement provides additional information on work patterns, primary job union membership,
occupational and industrial distributions of secondary jobs, secondary
job wages, and the reason for moonlighting.
Kimmel and Powell find that moonlighting rates rise with the level
of education, that unmarried females and married males are the most
likely to moonlight, and that the total hours of work per week are much
higher for moonlighters than nonmoonlighters. Although about two-
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thirds of moonlighters give financial reasons for taking a second job,
moonlighters are not predominantly lower-income workers. Moonlighting rates are higher in the United States than in Canada, which
Kimmel and Powell ascribe to the higher divorce rates and the lower
unemployment rates in the United States.
In “Large Companies and the Changing Use of Temporary Workers: Trends and Impacts on Financial Measures of Performance,” Shulamit Kahn, Fred Foulkes, and Jeffrey Heisler report findings from indepth interviews with human resource executives at 35 large U.S. companies. They correlate changes in the way these companies use temporary workers with various financial measures of profitability. They also
examine detailed case study results for selected firms in a narrowly
defined manufacturing industry.
The authors find that many large companies are hiring more temporaries and are using them differently than in the past. For instance,
temporary hiring is being used increasingly as a recruiting and screening mechanism for permanent employees. In addition, temps are
increasingly being used as a way of dealing with variability in demand
for labor that is both foreseen and unforeseen. The authors also look
for correlations between use of temporary help agencies and financial
performance, but find conflicting evidence in their cross-sectional and
time-series analyses. However, as they note, it is difficult to tease out
any causal relationship given their small sample size and the fact that
human resources policies tend to be overshadowed by other factors in
determining a company’s financial performance.
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Part I

1
The Life Cycle of Working Time
in the United States and Canada
Long-Term Evidence
John D. Owen
Wayne State University

This chapter will discuss long-term changes in the life cycle of
working time in the United States and Canada since 1920. The past 75
years have seen important changes in both weekly hours of work and in
participation rates. These changes have been associated with equally
remarkable movements in wages. This chapter will examine the relationship between these wage changes and the life cycle of labor supply
in the two countries.
An international comparison can help us understand the extent to
which labor supply developments in one’s own country are unique or
common to other nations. Nations differ in the structure of their economies, in labor market institutions, and, more generally, in their human
relations climates; these factors can produce different labor market outcomes.
The next section offers an introduction to the economic analysis of
life cycle variations in working time. The following section presents
data on a number of age cross sections of labor supply as well as some
cohort data, and discusses the implications for life cycle theory. The
next sections present an empirical model of labor supply and provide
the statistical results of testing this model, and the final section offers
some conclusions. An appendix describes the data sources used for
this study.
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LIFE CYCLE THEORY AND LABOR SUPPLY
Economists have long been interested in why labor supply varies
with age. The standard analysis is in terms of a choice between income
and leisure, since diverting time from leisure to paid employment
increases income. A higher price or opportunity cost of time is
expected to discourage taking leisure; on the other hand, higher levels
of income may yield a greater demand for leisure. Since the wage rate
is both an approximate measure of the price of time and a principal
determinant of the average person’s income, changes in the wage rate,
including those that occur over the life cycle, are expected to play an
important role in determining the age distribution of labor supply.
In the simplest theory, labor supply at each age is determined by
contemporary conditions, without regard to past or future concerns.
For example, the labor supply of a 30-year-old in 1980 is determined
by the wage rate available to him in that year, the wealth or nonlabor
income that he might have, and other contemporary influences, but not
by concerns about the future.
The effects of a high wage on labor supply at a given age are
ambiguous in this simple theory since, as noted above, a higher opportunity cost of time discourages leisure while higher income is likely to
increase it. We do know that over the past 150 years real hourly wages
rose and the average level of male labor supply fell, yielding the
famous backward sloping supply curve of labor. But these historical
data on national aggregates may not give us a good prediction of how
the number of hours worked will vary as an individual ages.
And indeed this simple theory does not explain life cycle variations
very well. There are numerous empirical examples that are not consistent with a negative relation between age-specific wages and labor supply: new entrants into the labor force and those nearing retirement age
typically earn less per hour yet supply fewer hours than those in the
prime-age category, for example. More generally, we know that individuals do consider their likely futures when making decisions; for
example, they save for their old age, when they expect to reduce their
labor supply.
The life cycle theory of labor supply provides an alternative to this
model.1 Ghez and Becker (1975) pioneered in the development of this
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theory. In their model,2 a young person’s lifetime wealth is given by
the initial stock of wealth he possesses plus the present value of all
future income streams, including those from earnings. It is a perfect
foresight model in which the individual can accurately predict these
future events. On these assumptions, an individual’s wealth does not
vary over his lifetime; year-to-year changes in hourly wages only represent differences in the price of time.
Individuals maximize their lifetime utility, the present value of the
utility gained in each year of adult life; the annual utility is a function
of leisure and consumption in a given year. They can borrow as much
as they like at a constant rate of interest and in any year work as many
or as few hours as they like at the same hourly wage. The individual
can then follow a utility-maximizing life plan for supplying labor, borrowing, and savings.
With wealth constant and higher wages in a given year simply representing a higher price of time, the individual will reduce the amount
of leisure and increase labor supply when his wage is high, yielding a
positive correlation of wages and labor supply.
The theory does not predict a perfect positive match between
wages and hours over the life cycle, though. On the one hand, the market rate of interest encourages individuals to work hard and save when
they are young; on the other hand, a common preference by individuals
for present over future satisfactions provides an inducement to borrow
and take leisure when young. If the rate of interest is high relative to
the way the individual discounts the future, he is expected to have a
peak in hours of work somewhat earlier than the peak in his hourly
earnings.
The Ghez-Becker model makes some strong assumptions. Most
people can not in fact readily predict how long-term trends in wages
will affect their lives; even if they could, they face constraints in both
credit and labor markets that would prevent them from taking full
advantage of their predictions. Most of us cannot borrow as much as
we might like at any interest rate, let alone a constant rate. In the labor
market, part-time employment is often less well paid than full-time,
while very long hours fatigue us, reducing our productivity and, often,
the hourly return for our efforts. A temporary withdrawal from the
labor force also imposes costs—lower earnings when the employee
returns to seek new employment are common. Finally, the majority of
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full-time workers are employed at standard hours that constrain the
ability of younger and older workers to have very different schedules.
Ghez and Becker did submit their theory to an empirical test, comparing the age distribution of hours per employed males with the age
distribution of hourly wages, both for the year 1965. They found a
very good fit: both hours and wages followed an inverted U path.
Hours peaked before hourly wages, as their theory would predict if
individuals faced a rate of interest that exceeded their personal rate of
time preference.
This was not a satisfactory test of the theory, though; life cycle theory is a theory of the behavior of individuals, not age cross sections.
The latter compares the labor supply of a number of cohorts at a
moment of time; this need not trace out the experience of a single
cohort.

EMPIRICAL DATA3
Age Cross Sections
Canadian and U.S. data on hours, labor force participation,
employment, and earnings over the past 75 years provide us with a rich
source of information. Long-term data on the age cross sections of
male labor input (defined here as the proportion of the group employed
times hours worked by those employed), reveal broadly similar patterns in Canada and the United States (Table 1). Data on child labor
are not even collected, presumably because it has become so unusual.
The labor of teenagers is reported and is relatively low.4 Labor supply
rises for those in their early twenties and is typically at a maximum for
those in their late thirties. Those in the 45–64 age group work less, and
those over 65 supply much less labor than those aged 45–64. We thus
obtain an inverted U in each age cross section.
These inverted Us do change their shape over time. Earlier withdrawals from the labor force and later entry by young people, together
with continued heavy participation by prime-age males, have yielded a
more peaked distribution of labor supply in both countries.
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Table 1 Hours of Labor Input, by Males
Canada

United States

Age group

Age group

15–19 20–24 25–44 45–64

65+

16–19 20–24 25–44 45–64

65+

1995

8.6

23.1

33.6

28.1

3.2

1995

11.7

28.8

38.9

33.6

4.9

1990

11.9

26.9

35.4

29.5

3.5

1990

12.7

29.7

39.7

33.4

5.0

1985

10.5

25.9

34.6

29.5

3.8

1986

12.2

29.8

39.1

32.6

4.7

1980

13.9

29.3

36.4

32.0

4.7

1983

11.3

27.1

37.2

32.1

4.8

1975

14.1

29.1

37.0

33.3

6.1

1980

14.2

29.4

39.0

33.7

5.7

1970

12.2

29.9

38.3

35.5

8.2

1977

14.7

30.2

39.9

34.7

5.8

1965

13.5

34.7

41.2

38.0

10.0

1970

13.1

30.7

41.1

37.4

8.7

1960

14.1

34.2

40.3

37.6

11.3

1965

13.3

34.2

42.8

39.0

9.6

1955

17.4

36.9

41.8

38.8

12.5

1960

14.0

34.0

41.1

38.1

11.5

1950

21.7

39.7

44.4

41.4

16.7

1955

17.4

35.2

42.2

39.0

14.9

1946

24.2

38.4

44.7

42.7

20.0

1950

19.1

33.7

40.9

38.2

17.8

1941

25.1

44.2

50.5

49.0

21.7

1940

14.7

33.0

40.4

37.1

17.7

1931

23.1

39.3

44.3

43.4

22.7

1930

20.0

37.6

44.8

42.0

25.4

1921

31.3

45.2

50.3

49.6

27.3

1920

28.7

43.5

50.2

47.0

29.2

The age cross sections of wages for males in the two countries are
also peaked. Hourly wages typically are very low for teenagers, rise
with age, then peak in the late forties (somewhat later than the peak in
labor supply).
There is one important difference between labor supply trends in
Canada and the United States: the increase in Canadian unemployment
over the past 15 years has now introduced a persistent, significant
wedge between labor force and employment rates. However, this has
not greatly influenced the relative distribution of labor input in the
cross section, since there has been a substantial increase in the rate of
unemployment among prime-age Canadian males, as well as higher
rates among other age groups. When labor supply data obtained by
multiplying hours per employed person by the labor force participation
rate are compared with data using hours and the employment rate, little
difference is observed in the relative age distribution of labor inputs.5
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Time Series
Over the past 75 years, labor input per capita fell in each age
group. In the earlier years of this period, reduced hours per employed
male were the principal factor reducing labor input; in more recent
years, declining rates of labor force participation and, most recently in
Canada, higher rates of unemployment have been much more important.
Hours reduction in Canada also took a somewhat different course
than in the United States. There was a sharp reduction from 1850 to
1950 in the United States, but very little reduction since for prime-age
males.6,7 Hours reduction continued for a few years longer in Canada;
for example, the standard workweek in Canadian manufacturing fell
from 50.3 hours in 1921 to 43.2 hours in 1950, but then dropped to
40.2 hours in 1965. But household data show little if any reduction in
the past 20 years.8
Male labor force participation rates fell significantly in both countries; there was a long-term downward trend in every age group. The
largest declines are seen among teenagers and those over 55. These
trends have accelerated in recent decades, in the very years in which
hours decline was moderated or ceased.
Because of higher unemployment, in Canada the decline in male
employment rates was significantly sharper than that in labor force participation. Among males 15 and older, only 65 percent were employed
in 1995. Even in the prime-age group—35–44 years—only 85 percent
were employed.
Cohort Analysis
As noted above, life cycle theory is not a theory of age cross sections, but of individuals as they age, better measured by cohort data.9
In both countries, cohort data show that the labor supply of male workers declines more with age than is indicated in the cross sections (compare Table 2 with Table 1). The basic reason for this difference is the
downward time trend in male labor supply. Consider how inaccurate it
is to use a cross section of U.S. males in, say, 1965 to evaluate the life
cycle of labor supply of a man who is 67 years old in that year. Census
data indicate that a 22-year-old in 1920 actually was likely to put in as
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much as 10 more hours per week, on average, than a 22-year-old was in
1965. Hence, an age cross section that compares 22-year-olds in 1965
with 67-year-olds in that year significantly underestimates the decline
in labor supply with age that cohort actually experienced.
This cohort cross section discrepancy is now modulated somewhat
differently than in earlier years. In both countries there has been a
sharp decline in the proportion of males employed over 55 years of
age, while hours of work have recently been flat. One result is that the
discrepancy between cohort and cross-sectional data has become much
smaller for the middle-age groups than for older groups. A cross-sectional age distribution of labor input in 1920 not only greatly exaggerated the input that a contemporary 17-year-old would supply in the last
years of his working life, it also yielded substantial overestimates of his
labor input in his twenties, thirties, and forties (see Table 1). More
recently, though, while a 17-year-old in the 1960s did experience much
more decline in his old age than would be predicted from a 1960s cross
section, the cross-sectional data did not yield a bad prediction of his
labor input as a middle-age worker. With weekly hours remaining
fairly stable, the labor inputs of workers in their thirties or early forties
were not falling very much in, say, the 1960–1980 period. (The forecasting error would be somewhat larger for Canadian workers because
of the much larger increase in Canadian unemployment among the
prime-age group.)
The Relation between Labor Input and Earnings
The real hourly earnings of males quadrupled in both countries
over the past 75 years. The steep upward time trend in real wages in
the first part of this period, from 1920 to about 1970, introduced major
differences between age cross section and cohort earnings data. When
wages rise at almost 2.5 percent per year,10 the average wage at the end
of a 50-year working life will be about triple the average wage at the
beginning. Absent any changes in the age distribution of wages, the
real hourly wage of a man in a given age group will then be more than
three times as high in 1970 as in 1920. This rising trend yields a much
more rapid increase in wages with age for a cohort than we see in the
cross section. While the cohort gains both from this trend and from the
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benefits of the group’s lifetime of job training and other useful work
experience, we see only these latter effects in the cross section.
This has important implications for the life cycle theory of labor
supply set forth above. Labor supply has tended to decline with age,
while real hourly wage in the 1920–1970 period increased with age.
As a result, data for the cohort entering in 1920 demonstrate a weak
relationship between labor supply and wage. (See Figures 1 and 3.)
A representative worker in this cohort might achieve a four- or
fivefold increase in his real wage over the next 50 years (due in part to
improvements in his own skills and experience, and in part to the
upward national trend in real wages), yet his labor input would decline
by about 80 percent. Even if we compare the earnings of a man in his
early twenties in this period with those he might earn in late middle age
(say, 30 years later), we see a similar, if more moderate, result: a
decline in labor input despite a more than threefold increase in his
wage. Such facts challenge a life cycle theory that predicts that a
future of rapidly rising wages will induce a cohort to take leisure when
young and defer working until late in life.
The dramatic change in real wage growth in the past 25 years, from
rapid increase to stagnation, affords another opportunity to consider the
empirical usefulness of this theory. The relationship between labor
input and wage in the cohort data now differs less from that found in
the recent cross sections (compare Figures 2 and 4 with Figures 1 and
3, respectively); the cohort relation is now more uniformly positive,
and so more like that in the cross section. An observer who relied only
on these recent data might conclude that the simple life cycle theory is
approximately correct.
The life cycle theory predicts that this major change in real wage
growth (and hence in the way in which wage varies with age for the
average person) would have produced large-scale changes in the life
cycle of labor supply; the elimination of the trend reduces the incentive
to supply more labor later in life, and so forecasts a shift toward supplying labor at earlier ages. It is difficult to see this effect in the cohort
data in Table 2.
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Figure 1 Labor Input versus Wage, Canada, 1921–1971

Figure 2 Labor Input versus Wage, Canada, 1941–1991

Key to Figure Legends
Legend
Age group (years)
a
Under 20
b
20–24
c
25–44
d
45–64
e
65 and older
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Figure 3 Labor Input versus Wage, United States, 1920–1970

Figure 4 Labor Input versus Wage, United States, 1940–1990
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Table 2 Cohort Analysis of Hours of Labor Input
Canada

United States

Year cohort born

Year cohort born

Age

1904

1914

1924

1934

1944

Age

1903

1913

1923

1933

1943

16–19

31.3

23.1

25.1

20.9

14.0 16–19

28.7

20.0

14.7

19.1

14.0

20–24

42.2

41.8

38.4

36.3

30.2 20–24

40.6

35.3

33.3

35.2

34.2

24–44

48.6

44.6

40.9

39.5

36.7 24–44

41.7

40.8

41.8

40.6

39.9

45–64

38.1

36.5

32.5

29.5

28.1 45–64

38.6

38.3

34.7

32.8

33.6

7.7

4.5

3.4

8.7

5.7

5.0

65+

65+

AN EMPIRICAL MODEL
The Basic Cohort Model
Such questions can be explored more systematically in a statistical
treatment that uses multivariate analysis. Following Ghez and Becker,
the behavior of a single cohort can be modeled with the log of labor
input (I) being a function of a constant term, age (A), and the log of
wage (W) at each age, i:
(1) Ii = b0* + b1Wi + b2 Ai
In the Ghez-Becker model, b 2 is the product of the difference
between the rate of interest and an index of individual time preference,
and a measure of the substitutability of present and future consumption
experiences; b1 is a weighted average of this substitution possibility
and the extent to which goods and time are substitutes within a single
period;11 and b0* reflects the influence of the cohort’s wage (the present
value of its earnings over its lifetime) as well as a constant.
The present study uses data from a number of birth cohorts (see
Table 2). A Ghez-Becker type model can be rewritten for more than
one cohort as
(2) Iij = b0 + b1 (Wij − Wj ) + b2 Aij + b3Wj ,
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where i denotes age group, j denotes the jth birth cohort, and Wj is the
log of cohort wage.12 In this model, b1 is expected to be positive, since
the relative variation of wage over the lifetime of a given cohort is
expected to increase labor supply. The constant b2 will be negative if
(as in the Ghez-Becker study) the market rate of interest exceeds the
individual rate of time preference. The constant b3 may be negative if
there is a “backward sloping supply curve of labor,” in the sense that
those cohorts facing higher wages supply less labor over their lifetimes.
Eq. 2 can also be written as
(3) Ii = b0 + b1Wij + b2 Aij

+

(b3 − b2 )Wj

The age (Aij) and the log of current wage (Wij) of a cohort can
readily be measured. Measuring the cohort wage is not so easy. A perfect foresight model would assume that each individual knows his
future wages and hence could calculate their present value—a measure
that would be consistent with the Ghez-Becker model. However, we
lack full working life information for many of the cohorts in our data.
One might, moreover, wish to consider other hypotheses about wage
expectations. Several alternative models of cohort wage were developed to deal with these concerns. The first, Wj1 , simply assumed that
the cohort wage of each cohort surpassed that of a cohort born a year
earlier by the same percentage, g, so that Wj1 = W0 + jg , where W0 is the
logarithm of the cohort wage in a base year 0, and j is the number of
years from the birth year of the base cohort to that of the jth cohort.
For convenience, the base birth year chosen here was 1903. The age of
an age group was taken at its midpoint. For example, those 14–19
years old in 1920 (the youngest cohort in the earliest year for which we
had data) were assumed to be 17 years old then, or born in 1903. Or, to
take another example, those 25–44 years old in 1950 were assumed to
be born in 1916. In the first example, j was equal to 0; in the second, to
13.
W0 is invariant. Hence, substituting in Eq. 3, we can write
(4)

Iij = b0 + b1Wij + b2 Aij + (b3 − b1 )(W0 + jg)
= b0′ + b1Wij + b2 Aij + (b3 − b1 ) jg.

The Life Cycle of Working Time in the United States and Canada

27

Here the constant term is b0′ = b0 + (b3 − b1 )W0 .
A stochastic equation was used to estimate labor input in this first
model:
(5)

Iij = β ′0 + β1Wij + β 2 Aij + (β 3 − β1 )gj + uij ,

where uij is a random disturbance term.
Cohort and Unexpected Period Effects
The break in wage regimes noted above (rapid wage growth followed by wage stagnation) offers an opportunity to carry out simple,
informal tests of the importance of cohort and unexpected period
effects on the life cycle of labor supply. The data were first divided
into two periods, “early,” 1920–1970, and “late,” 1975–1995. The
model was estimated for each of these periods separately.13
To explore this period hypothesis further, a dummy variable L,
equal to 1 if after 1970, zero otherwise, was introduced as an independent variable and as multiplying each of the regressors, in an estimation of the 1920–1995 period:
(6) Iij = β ′0 + β1Wij + β 2 Aij + (β 3 − β1 )gj + β ′0* L + β1*Wij L + β*2 Aij L

(

)

+ β*3 − β1 gjL + uij ,

where uij is a random disturbance term.
If the life cycle or cohort theory is correct, and the cohort wage is
defined accurately, we should expect little change in the coefficients
between the early and late periods. By the same reasoning, Eq. 6
should not afford a better fit to the data than Eq. 5.
A change in wage regimes may also affect expected cohort wage.
To explore this possibility, four other measures of expected cohort
wage were constructed and used in alternative estimations. These measures assumed that those cohorts that had left the labor force by 1970—
while wages were still rising—did use the average rate of growth of
wages before 1970 to predict the long-term trend in their earnings; the
log of the cohort wage for this group (j < 0) was measured as W0 + jg,
where g is the growth rate in average wages in the early period.
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The alternative measures assumed that the change in wage regimes
altered expectations for younger cohorts. All four assumed that those
who entered the labor force after 1970 expected no upward trend in
their wages (i.e., that g = 0 if j ≥ 50).
This leaves a third group containing those who entered before 1970
but reached retirement age after that date (i.e., 0 ≤ j ≤ 50). The first
alternative Wj2 assumed constant cohort wage growth for those in this
group up to 1970, but no growth after that date. The log of the cohort
wage in this model, Wj2 , is then

( )

if j ≤ 50,
Wj2 = W0 + jg
(if j ≥ 50,
Wj2 = W0 + 50 g). 14

Variant 3 rejects the notion that the middle group didn’t take future
wage stagnation into account. The expected rate of growth of cohort
wage for cohorts in this middle group is assumed instead to have
declined linearly in the 1920–1970 period, from the growth rate
expected by those entering in 1920 or earlier to the zero growth
expected by those entering in 1970 or later. In this variant, the log of
cohort wage for the middle group is
Wj3 = W 0 + jg(1 − 0.01 j ).

This function is at a maximum at j = 50, and so predicts no further
growth after 1970.15
The last variants Wj4 and Wj5 explicitly recognize that if wage
stagnation occurred later in life, it might have less impact on life cycle
decision making for two reasons: fewer years would be affected by the
change in growth rates, and later years may be weighed less heavily
than earlier years. The present value of the future wage trend was used
to measure expected cohort wage in these variants. (The wage trends
used continued to be the observed trend in the 1920–1970 period, and
zero growth from 1970 onward.) Wj4 used a real rate of discount of 4
percent; Wj5 used a zero rate of discount. In these models, the log of
cohort wage for the middle group is

(

)
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Wj = W0 + ∫ 50
e
0

g ( j + t ) − rt

( )(
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)

− rt
dt + e g 50 ∫ 50
dt ,
50 − j e

using r to denote the rate of discount.16
Multicollinearity
Current wages and cohort wages display similar upward trends, as
do their logs, Wij and Wj. In an alternative regression, it was assumed
that the trend in the dependent variable was due to changes in the
cohort wage. ∆I/∆yr was calculated for each period studied, and used
to calculate an adjusted dependent variable Iij′ = Iij − j ( ∆I / ∆yr).
Iij′ was then regressed against age (Aij) and the log of current wage
(Wij).
Canadian Unemployment
As noted above, the persistently high level of unemployment in
Canada calls into question the use of labor input—hours per worker
times proportion employed—as a measure of labor supply. To deal
with this problem, alternative regressions were run with Canadian
labor supply measured using labor force participation rate instead of
proportion of population employed.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results of statistical estimations of the log of
labor input, I, using the basic model set forth in Eq. 5 and data for Canada and the United States for the past 75 years. Part A presents results
using the first measure of cohort wage Wj1 ; the third measure (Wj3 ) is
employed in part B.17 (Space limitations prevent presentation of results
for Wj2 , Wj4 , and Wj5.) In each country, estimates are given for the entire
1920–1995 period, for the “early” period (1920–1970), and the “late”
(1975–1995) period. Table 3, part C presents the results of an alternative method for standardizing for the cohort wage effect, using the
adjusted dependent variable, Iij′ (defined above as I – j ( ∆ I / ∆ yr)).
(Note that the cohort wage effects in parentheses are based on the calculation used to obtain the adjusted dependent variable, not on a multi-

( )
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Table 3 Empirical Resultsa
A. Dependent variable: labor input
Cohort wage used: first (W1j )
Canada
1920–1995
Constant
Wage

Cohort wage

N

1920–1995

1920–1970

1975–1995

7.1733

5.3189

6.2422

6.5215

2.8810

(31.750)

(29.024)

(9.251)

(18.933)

(30.496)

(4.782)

1.6480

1.4792

2.1984

1.2514

1.3803

2.7630

(14.217)

(7.784)

(14.183)

(14.861)

–0.0726

–0.0704

–0.0528

–0.0509

–0.0548

–0.0259

(–18.064)

(–15.422)

(–7.101)

(–9.434)

(–14.481)

(–3.476)

–2.4136

–1.8441

–3.9858

–1.8443

–1.6914

–3.1520

(–17.231)
Cohort wage,
adjusted coefficient
–
R2

1975–1995

7.3448

(14.846)
Age

1920–1970

United States

(13.65)

(–1.928)

(–8.760)

(–14.694)

(2.730)

–0.7655

(–14.66)
–0.3649

–1.7874

–0.5929

–0.3111

–0.3890

0.829

0.844

0.915

0.544

0.856

0.888

70

45

25

75

40

35

1975–1995

1920–1995

B. Dependent variable: labor input
Cohort wage used: third (Wj3)
Canada
1920–1995
Constant

1920–1970

United States
1920–1970

1975–1995

7.3709

6.7760

5.5300

6.1160

6.2617

4.0160

(25.726)

(22.982)

(9.206)

(19.914)

(22.572)

(5.796)

Wage
Age
Cohort wage
Cohort wage,
adjusted coefficient
–
R2
N

1.7747

1.3779

2.4380

1.4960

1.3716

2.5470

(14.531)

(11.035)

(13.222)

(8.381)

(11.377)

(10.483)

–0.0760

–0.0658

–0.0515

–0.0498

–0.0530

–0.0402

(–18.522)

(–12.369)

(–8.421)

(–9.685)

(–11.386)

(–5.793)

–3.0593

–2.2990

–1.6450

–2.0950

–2.1865

0.5358

(–7.491)

(–7.503)

(–2.199)

(–9.050)

(–7.192)

(0.702)

–1.2846

–0.9211

0.7930

–0.5990

–0.8149

3.0828

0.697

0.670

0.919

0.559

0.647

0.863

70

45

25

75

40

35

C. Dependent variable: I′ = labor input net of calculated cohort wage effect
Canada
Constant
Wage
Age
Cohort wage
(calculated effect)
N

United States

1920–1995

1920–1970

1975–1995

1920–1995

1920–1970

17.4540

17.7910

17.0970

13.7850

15.2160

1975–1995
4.8710

(90.909)

(84.245)

(142.258)

(80.700)

(83.764)

(37.594)

0.4166

0.4490

2.2020

0.3168

0.3624

2.6430

(2.908)

(3.027)

(14.256)

(2.421)

(2.768)

(13.313)

–0.0222

–0.0190

–0.0462

–0.0169

–0.0107

–0.0447

(–5.543)

(–4.809)

(–15.663)

(–4.550)

(–2.917)

(–13.562)

[–0.39]

[–0.30]

[–1.96]

[0.29]

[–0.22]

[0.30]

70

45

25

75

40

35
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Table 3 (continued)
D. Dependent variable: labor supply = hours × labor force participation rate
Canada
1920–1995
Constant

1920–1970

1975–1995

7.3360

7.1623

5.3820

(31.267)

(31.209)

(9.002)

Wage

1.5932

1.4260

2.1332

t-ratio

(14.152)

(14.176)

(13.265)

Age
t-ratio
Cohort wage
t-ratio

–0.0718

–0.0695

–0.0535

(–17.606)

(–16.387)

(–6.916)

–0.0406

–0.0437

–0.0117

(–16.310)

(–15.437)

(–1.634)

1.5526

1.3823

2.1215

0.826

0.868

0.910

70

45

25

Cohort wage,
Adjusted
coefficient
–
R2
N
a

t-ratios are in parentheses.
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variate analysis.) Part D of Table 3 presents estimations of labor
supply in Canada, with the dependent variable defined as hours × labor
force participation rate.
In every regression, the current wage variable has a positive, statistically significant effect on labor input, and age has a negative, significant effect. These two effects are consistent with the empirical findings
in the Ghez-Becker study.
In the regressions for the entire period and for the early period in
Table 3, the age coefficients range from –5.5 to –7.6 percent over the
five models (Wj1 through Wj5 ). These are larger than expected (inasmuch as they are designed to reflect the difference between the available rate of return and individual time preference) and are much larger
than those found by Ghez and Becker. When a correction is made for
multicollinearity in Table 3, part C, the age coefficients for these periods are considerably smaller—between –1.1 percent and –2.2 percent—though still larger than the very small coefficients found by
Ghez and Becker. The results in the present study indicate that when
young people are faced with rapidly rising real wages, they are
restrained from taking full advantage of the upward trend and postponing effort to their later years by a discrepancy between the market rate
of interest and their own rate of time preference, and by uncertainty
and other factors constraining the young. It was argued earlier that
uncertainty about the future is a major constraint on life cycle variations in labor supply. In an interesting paper on the life cycle of savings, Nagatani (1972) argues that, under reasonable assumptions, such
uncertainty can be “translated into a risk premium which adds to the
market rate of interest in discounting future income.” On this reasoning, the relatively large coefficients on age found here can be interpreted as reflecting not only the market rate of interest, but also an
uncertainty premium.18
The elasticities of labor input with respect to current wage
obtained for the entire period and for the early period are also rather
large, ranging from 1.2 to 1.7, suggesting a high degree of substitutability of labor input between ages. However, when the adjusted
dependent variables are used (Table 3, part C), the estimated current
wage elasticities for these periods are more plausible, ranging from just
0.3 to 0.5.
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The estimations for the “late” period are more difficult to interpret.
Since there has been very little change in average real hourly wages in
recent years, we should be able to focus more clearly here on life cycle
variations in wages. While we do find good fits to the data in this
period, the age and current wage coefficients are implausibly large, and
they remain so even when an attempt is made to correct for multicollinearity (Table 3, part C). This may be the result of unobserved variables. In the Ghez-Becker model, these age and wage coefficients
generate an inverted U in the life cycle of labor supply. Conversely, an
increase in the steepness of this U in data will likely yield higher levels
of these coefficients in a regression. However, this increased kurtosis
may also reflect the influence of other, unobserved variables rather than
a true change in the substitution elasticities that the age and wage coefficients represent in this model.
The relationship between labor supply and cohort wage in this late
period is ambiguous, especially in the United States, where we see a
decline in labor input per capita accompanied by a decline in the real
average wage, yielding a calculated positive elasticity of about 0.3 (see
Table 3, part C). This may be a result of the very small changes in real
wages and labor supply in this period, i.e., –0.6 percent and –0.2 percent per annum, respectively. When change is this small, measurement
errors can dominate real movement. Some economists have argued
that the consumer price index has been upward biased over the past 20
years, by as much as 1 or 2 percent a year. If the measurement error
was, say, 1.2 percent per year, then real wages actually increased at an
annual rate of 0.6 percent, and the elasticity of labor supply with
respect to wages was –0.3! One cannot, then, rely on the estimates of
cohort wage effects in this period.
These estimations also provide evidence of a shift in labor supply
relationship over time. The goodness of fit improves when separate
regressions are run for the two subperiods. The adjusted R2 values (see
part A of Table 3) show a gain from 0.829 for the entire period to 0.844
and 0.915 for the two subperiods in the Canadian data, while this measure rises from 0.544 to 0.856 and 0.888 when U.S. data are employed.
Moreover, when the entire period is used, with a dummy variable, “late
period,” introduced for interaction with all variables (as in Eq. 6), the
adjusted R2 rises from 0.829 to 0.902 for the Canadian data and from
0.544 to 0.886 for the U.S. data (not shown).
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The alternative models of cohort wage Wj2 , Wj3 , Wj4 ,and Wj5 are
designed to help us see how individuals reacted to the major change in
the wage regime that occurred around 1970—to determine whether
what appear to be unexpected period effects might actually be
explained in terms of rational life cycle planning in a perfect foresight
model. In this context, the results are somewhat disappointing. While
the regression coefficients are broadly similar to those in the first
model, the alternative models of cohort wage typically yield poorer fits,
especially in the early subperiod (see parts A and B of Table 3). Unlike
the basic model, the alternative models assume that younger workers in
the early period forecasted wage stagnation and adjusted their labor
supply accordingly. The results do not support that hypothesis. (Using
alternative models has little impact in the late period, presumably
because wages were flat in that period.)
Finally, when the alternative measure of labor supply, hours ×
labor force participation rate, is used for Canadian data (in Table 3, part
C), the results are very similar to those obtained in parts A and B, when
hours × employment rate is used. The one exception is in the late
period, when the coefficient of cohort wage is insignificant.

CONCLUSIONS
1) The life cycle of working time has been remarkably similar in
Canada and the United States. There are, of course, some differences. Canadian unemployment has been higher in recent years,
reducing labor input. There are also smaller differences, especially in the timing of change; for example, the earlier achievement in the United States of a 40-hour standard workweek.
2) The age distribution of male labor supply is an inverted U. Over
time, the peak has become more pronounced, as participation for
young and old workers declined relative to those in their prime.
3) The level of male labor supply has declined over time: in earlier
years, it was largely a result of reductions in working hours; more
recently, it has been due to declining labor force participation.
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4) Cohort data are a more appropriate measure of the life cycle of
individual behavior than are cross-sectional data, but the cohort
data show less regularity—especially for the U.S. cohort whose
working lives spanned the entire 1920–1970 period, when wages
were growing rapidly.
5) A multivariate estimation of the life cycle model performs well in
the 1920–1970 period. When a number of cohorts are combined
in a multiperiod analysis, and estimates of cohort wage, current
wage, and age are used as independent variables, about 85 percent of the variation in labor input is accounted for in both countries. The signs of the independent variables are consistent with
the model and, when they are corrected for multicollinearity, are
of a plausible magnitude. The age coefficients do suggest that in
a period of rapid growth in real hourly wages, a high level of
uncertainty about the future, and possibly other factors, constrain
young people from taking full advantage of this trend.
6) The model fits the data even better in the later period. This is seen
both in a simple figure charting the experience of one cohort and
in a multivariate, multicohort analysis. However, the magnitudes
of the coefficients are implausibly large.
7) When the two periods are combined, significantly better results
are obtained when a dummy variable representing the change in
period is interacted with the independent variables. There are
important changes in the regression coefficients.
8) An attempt was made to determine whether workers whose lives
overlapped the early period, characterized by wage growth, and
the later period of wage stagnation foresaw the change and
adjusted their labor supply accordingly. No support was found
for this hypothesis.

Notes
1. I follow Ghez and Becker in using this term to refer to decision making over an
entire life cycle, rather than to decisions over a shorter period of time, such as a
business cycle. For interesting examples of the use of different life cycle analyses
using Canadian data, see Altonji and Ham (1990); Reilly (1994); and Roble,
Magee, and Burbridge (1992).
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2. For a positive assessment of this approach, see Browning, Deaton, and Irish
(1985) and Rios-Rull (1993).
3. Sources discussed in the Data Appendix to this chapter.
4. This group provides the most difficult measurement problems. Different age categories are used by censuses and surveys in different years; there is an important,
though difficult to measure, long-term trend from full- to part-time employment
as student enrollment increases, and the way in which government agencies have
measured (or have not measured) the role of student employment has changed.
5. Published sources of data and interpretations include Benimadhu (1987); Denton
and Ostry (1967); Gartley (1993); Gower (1992); Morisette and Sunter (1994);
Podoluk (1968); Rashid (1993); Simard (1986); Conference Board of Canada
(1974); as well as the Canadian Censuses of 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961, and
1971; Historical Statistics of Canada (1965 and 1983 editions); Historical Labor
Force Statistics; historical supplements of the Canadian Economic Observer; and
Hourly Data from the Survey of 1981 Work History.
6. As measured by household data, at least. The establishment data collected by the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate a sharper decline than do their
household data, partly because of increased moonlighting (measured in the latter
but not the former series) but also because of likely greater inaccuracy in the
household data. Similar gaps between household and establishment data are seen
in the Canadian statistics. Unfortunately, data collected from establishments are
not obtained in conjunction with questions on the age distribution of the establishment’s employment.
7. Since persistent, long-term variations in unemployment are usually small (much
less important than variations in hours or labor force participation rates), very
long-term analyses of labor inputs typically do not emphasize them. The longlived increase in Canadian unemployment does require discussion.
8. Again, for prime-age males. Moreover, while the average changed little, there
was an increase in the dispersion of hours. See Morisette and Sunter (1994) for an
interesting discussion.
9. The census and labor force survey data used here are only imperfect measures of
cohort behavior. As they age, cohorts are reduced by death and emigration,
increased in numbers by immigrants. If those who die, emigrate, or immigrate
supply, on balance, more or less labor than those who remain of the original
cohort, the results observed in these sources will only approximate actual cohort
behavior.
10. A typical rate of change in that period.
11. See Ghez and Becker (1975, p. 16). In real terms, the coefficient of the current
wage is given by –[σf (1 – s) + σcs] and the coefficient of age is σc(r – ρ), where
σc is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σf is the contemporary elasticity
of substitution between goods and time, r is the real rate of interest, and ρ is the
individual’s rate of time preference. s = WL/(WL + X) where W is the real wage
rate, L is consumption time, and X is consumption of goods and services.
12. A comparison of Eqs. 1 and 2 indicate that b*0 = b0 + (b3 – b1)Wj.
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13. The data used were those for the years shown in Table 1, plus for the United
States, 1993.
14. In estimating equations using the alternate measures of cohort wage, the constant
term was interpreted in the same fashion as when the first measure of cohort wage
was employed: in the third measure, for example, β ′ = β0 + (β3 – β1)W0 and the
independent variable, cohort wage, in the regression was W3j – W0 = jg if j ≤ 0; =
jg(1 – 0.01j) if 0 ≤ j ≤ 50; and = 25g if j > 50.
15. Note that Wj3 = jg at j = 0 (as in the earlier variants), and 25g at j = 50.
16. Regressions were also run that allowed for changed expectations within the late
period. A sixth measure of cohort wage was employed here, Wj6 = Wj1(1 – αy),
where y = current year – 1970 and α is an estimable parameter. These regressions
were not successful.
17. The estimations using Wj3 for the early period in Canada and the United States
and for the entire period in Canada displayed significant autocorrelation. The
results shown in Table 3 for these estimations were corrected for AR1 autocorrelation using the Cochran-Orcutt method.
18. The uncertainty premium here would be reflected in the lender’s unwillingness to
lend at a conventional rate of interest and the youth’s unwillingness to borrow.
The labor market constraints mentioned above would also contribute to large age
constraints on individual behavior.
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Data Appendix
United States: U.S. data for the 1977–1995 period from the Monthly Labor
Review, various issues; Employment and Earnings, various issues, and unpublished data from the United States Department of Labor. Data for 1920–1977
from Owen (1986). Data for the recent period were relatively easy to obtain.
When there was a change in data series in recent years, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics personnel were very helpful in providing unpublished data. I am especially grateful to Steve Hipple for his assistance in this work.
Canada: Canadian data were obtained from a number of published and unpublished sources. I am especially grateful to David Gower, Regine Lafnier,
Rene Morisette, and Abdul Rashid, all of Statistics Canada for their help in
supplying and interpreting data.
Labor input per capita: This series required data on the employment rate and
hours of work, by age and sex, over a 75-year period.
Employment rate: 1975–1995. Labour Force Surveys. Various issues, Table 1.
1946–1975. An employment rate was constructed for these years, then
linked at 1975 to the Labour Force Survey data. Employment rate was measured as (labor force participation rate) × (1 – unemployment rate).
Labor force participation rate: Historical Statistics of Canada. 1983. Series 205–222.
Unemployment rate: Historical Statistics of Canada. 1983. Series 223–
235.
1921–1946. An employment rate was constructed for these years, then
linked to the later series.
Employment rate was again measured as (labor force participation rate) ×
(1 – unemployment rate).
Labor force participation rates were constructed from data in Historical Statistics of Canada. 1967. Series D107–123, and Denton and Ostry (1967).
Unemployment rate: Gower (1992). These national unemployment rate
data were linked at 1946 with age divided data.
Hours: 1975–1995. Unpublished data from the Labour Force Survey, obtained from Statistics Canada.
1921–1975. A series of average hours was constructed. The ratio of female
to male hours in 1975 was assumed to persist in this period. This ratio was used
in conjunction with data on the changing proportions of males and females in
the work force and with the series on average hours to estimate the average
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male workweek. Within the male work force, the age distribution of hours was
assumed to correspond to 1975 ratios.
Average hours, 1966–1975. Unpublished data from Statistics Canada;
linked to 1975 data.
Average hours, 1926–1966. Ostry and Zaidi (1979), pp. 80–81. Nonagricultural workers hours series; linked to 1966 data.
Average hours, 1921–1926. Ostry and Zaidi (1979), Standard hours in manufacturing. Linked to later series.
Wages: A time series of male real wages was constructed. Ratios of the
wages of the different age groups to the male average were then multiplied by
this average series to obtain wages for each age group.
Average male wages: 1995. Employment, Earnings, and Hours, February,
1996, p. 38.
1969–1994. Real earnings of male full-time, full year workers were obtained from Earnings of Men and Women, 1994, Text Table 1. (Hours reductions were minimal in that period, so that this series is a fair approximation of
changes in hourly earnings.) Linked to 1995.
1920–1969. General index of wages (Deflated by Canadian CPI). Historical Statistics of Canada (1983), Series E209–219 for 1961–1969; E198–208
for 1920–1961. (This series endeavors to measure hourly earnings.) Linked at
1969 to later index.
Wage ratios: 1994. Earnings of Men and Women. 1994. Table 4. Average
earnings of earners, full-year, full-time workers.
1980, 1990. Average earnings of earners, full-year, full-time workers. Unpublished data for Earnings of Men and Women from Statistics Canada.
1941. “Earnings, Employment and Unemployment of Wage-Earners,
1941.” 1941 Census of Canada, Volume VI. 1946 had both annual earnings
and weeks worked by age and sex. The latter were divided by the former to
obtain weekly earnings by age and sex.
1931. Earnings of Wage Earners, Dwellings, Households, Families, Blind
and Deaf-Mutes 1931 Census of Canada. Vol. V. 1931 had weekly earnings
by age and sex.
These five years were used to obtain through interpolation the wage ratios
for the remaining years used in the statistical work.
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Perspectives on Working Time
over the Life Cycle
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INTRODUCTION
A central topic in social statistics is patterns of work in a population. In addition to the longstanding interest in basic information like
unemployment rates and employment/population ratios, there is
increasing interest in the way individuals’ working careers unfold over
their lifetimes.
However, the requisite long-term longitudinal data on working
careers are still largely unavailable in Canada and many other countries. As a result, statistical impressions have typically been generated
either by examining trends in cross-sectional age-specific patterns, or
by piecing together data using synthetic statistical methods. LifePaths,
a microsimulation model recently developed by Statistics Canada
(Wolfson 1995, 1997), provides an alternative means of combining
information from different cross-sectional and longitudinal data
sources to infer individual life paths. This model offers a means to
estimate and display coherent pictures of work and other kinds of time
use over various time scales ranging up to the full life cycle.

BACKGROUND—THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY
TIME-USE DATA AND LIFE TABLE APPROACHES
The most common perspectives on working time over the life cycle
draw on cross-sectional labor force survey or population census data.
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Figure 1 Population Age 15+, by Age, Sex, and Employment Status, 1991
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For example, Figure 1 shows a standard population pyramid from the
1991 Census. The proportion of individuals at single years of age is
divided between those who were employed and those who were not,
based on having positive labor market income in the previous calendar
year.
Another less frequently presented perspective on working time
over the life cycle draws on life table methods. The first such estimates
for Canada were Denton and Ostry (1969), in turn updated by
Gnanesekaran and Montigny (1975). More recently, Bélanger and Larrivée (1992) have made multistate life table estimates.
The original working life table efforts required only limited crosssectional age-specific labor force participation and mortality rate data.
These working life tables included two states: working and not working (“inactive”). Transitions between these states were based on agespecific labor force participation rates (for males only) and a series of
simplifying assumptions. The key assumptions were that individuals
could enter the labor market only once and could leave the labor market only once over their entire lifetime, and that overall, labor force
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participation rates first rise monotonically to an age where they are at a
maximum, and then fall monotonically.
The more recent increment-decrement methods used by Bélanger
and Larrivée relax these restrictive assumptions on transitions into and
out of the labor force by using longitudinal microdata from the Labour
Market Activity Survey (LMAS). These data allow gross flow transition probabilities to be estimated directly, so it is no longer necessary
to infer these rates based on an assumed equality with net flows and by
first-differencing age-specific participation rates. With increment/decrement methods, multiple exits and reentries to the labor force over a
lifetime are not ruled out a priori, as in the earlier working life tables.
However, strong simplifying assumptions are still embodied in the
analysis. In particular, transition probabilities into and out of the labor
force are assumed to be first order Markov, depending only on age, sex,
and labor force status in the previous year, and nothing of subannual
flows and seasonal patterns of employment is included.
Table 1 shows the two sets of estimates of working life expectancy
in a comparable fashion. Notwithstanding the various simplifying
assumptions, this series of male working life table summary results
vividly displays the long-run trends of more time spent in schooling,
ever earlier ages of retirement, a general reduction in working years,
and hence a long-run decline in the ratio of working to inactive or
retired years.
The last two rows give Bélanger and Larrivée results for 1986, first
using the older gross equals net flow assumption (the 1986a row), and
then using an increment/decrement life table based on gross transition
probabilities (the 1986b row). The rather large 5.2-year difference in
expected working life in these last two rows is indicative of the sensitivity of these kinds of results to the assumptions on transition rates.
However, both kinds of working life table assumptions, as well as
the population pyramid in Figure 1, take the calendar year as the smallest time period and treat working within the year as a dichotomous
variable. There is no allowance for part-time or part-year rather than
full-time, full-year work, and nothing on unpaid work. Data from the
1992 General Social Survey (GSS) (Statistics Canada 1997), in contrast, suggest a high degree of heterogeneity in actual hours worked.
For example, Figure 2 contrasts 1992 GSS data on hours of work in the
reference day with 1991 Census data on hours of work (employed and
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Table 1 Historical Stationary Male Life and Working Life Expectancies
at Age 15
Average age at

Number of years

Labor force
entry

Retirement

Average age
at death

Working

Retired

1921

17.5

62.7

67.6

45.2

4.9

1931

18.0

63.0

68.4

45.0

5.4

1941

18.2

63.1

69.1

44.9

6.0

1951

18.5

82.9

70.4

44.4

7.5

1961

19.2

63.0

71.2

43.8

8.2

Year

1971

19.8

62.3

71.3

42.5

9.0

a

20.0

65.5

73.8

44.8

8.3

1986b

20.0

60.3

73.8

39.4

13.5

1986

SOURCE: Adapted from Gnanasekaran and Montigny (1975) for decades 1921 to
1971 (Tables 2.1 and 12, 1975), and from Bélanger and Larrivée (1992) for the two
1986 rows (Tables 1 and 2, 1992).
NOTE: The Bélanger and Larrivée results were given only at age 16; age 15 results
have been extrapolated. Working life expectancy is taken from Table 2 for both the
active and inactive populations for the 1986b row. Also, they have only estimated the
average age at death, and the expected number of working years, so the average age at
retirement and number of years retired were derived based on the simple assumption
that the average age at labor force entry was exactly 20. There also appears to be an
inconsistency in the Gnanasekaran and Montigny results for 1971 average number of
years working in comparison to all their other estimates, so this figure has been
adjusted. The Bélanger and Larrivée definition of “working” is having worked at
least one hour in a reference week in September of each year. The Gnanasekaran and
Montigny definition for 1971 was essentially working or looking for work in the
week prior to census enumeration, but then excluding summer students.

Figure 2 Relative Frequencies of Hours of Work, 1991 Census and 1992 GSS
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self-employed) in the reference week (the latter hours divided by 5 for
comparability).
In common with similar survey data on hours worked in a week,
the census data exhibit a marked spike corresponding to exactly 40
hours (nearly 40 percent of responses for males and about 25 percent
for females). In contrast, the GSS reveals no more than about 8 percent
of exactly 8-hour-day responses. The GSS data suggest significant
rounding bias in the reported census data. In turn, the impressions of
working time over the life cycle given in Figure 1 and Table 1 may be
significantly biased due to this considerable heterogeneity in weekly
patterns, as well as the omission of part-year (seasonal) work.

LIFEPATHS: A MICROANALYTIC APPROACH
As an alternative to the population pyramid and multistate life
table approach, detailed impressions of working time over the life
cycle can be generated using microsimulation methods. This approach
is grounded in the simulation of a representative sample of realistic
heterogeneous individual life paths, in contrast to the cell-based methods of multistate life tables. As noted in Wolfson and Manton (1992), a
microanalytic approach can always be devised that nests any given
multistate life table analysis as a special case.
LifePaths is a monte carlo longitudinal microsimulation model
designed, among other things, to support generalizations of working
life tables. Like any empirical socioeconomic model, LifePaths draws
on multiple data sets, since no one data set contains all the required
information. Analytical results like transition probability functions are
estimated from various data sources. The simulation model then serves
as an “inferential apparatus.” The LifePaths apparatus serves as a
repository for diverse empirical results, and as an inference engine
where these results are synthetically integrated and their joint implications drawn out.
LifePaths achieves this objective by synthesizing realistic sets of
full individual life cycle histories, with each set representing a period
birth cohort. Generalized working life expectancies and associated life
tables are then by-products. It is simply a matter of cross-tabulating
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the individual life histories comprising the cohort to construct working
life table results analogous to those just presented. LifePaths’ explicit
microdata foundations further enable a wide range of “views” of cohort
work patterns over the life cycle.
Unlike a life table, which follows groups of individuals, LifePaths
generates one individual at a time, and follows him or her until death.
LifePaths allows individuals to be highly heterogeneous, since each
individual’s life path is uniquely simulated. Also, LifePaths models
individual dynamics in continuous time. LifePaths uses semi-Markov
processes, usually represented by multivariate hazard functions or
waiting time distributions. At any moment in time, an individual faces
chances of making a number of transitions. For example, depending
on his or her current state or set of attributes, this could be a transition
into the labor force, or into a marital union.
In the current version of LifePaths, individuals are jointly characterized by the following basic attributes at each point in their lives:
• age—as a continuous variable;
• fertility—exact ages at the birth of children, and information on the
presence of children in the familial home;
• nuptiality—unattached, in a common-law or marital union, separated, or
divorced;
• work status—including labor force participation and employment status
(hours per week, weeks in the year);
• school status—grade and type of institution if attending, educational
attainment otherwise;
• work income—hourly rate, weekly and annual earnings;
• time use—17 categories, including various kinds of work, learning, leisure, and personal care; and
• spouse attributes—including age, educational attainment, and labor
market experience.

In addition, a wide range of derived attributes can be constructed from
these basic attributes.
The core of the LifePaths model is the set of processes by which
the trajectories for each attribute are generated. A brief sketch is given
in the following paragraphs.
Demography. Fertility is modeled as a sequel to conception,
which in turn is modeled as a series of piecewise constant hazard rates,
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conditional on age, marital status, and number of previous live births.
The main data source is birth registrations, supplemented by data from
the 1983 Family History Survey to account for biases arising from conceptions while single or in a common-law union that are then followed
by a marriage before the birth of the child. Mortality rates are conditional on age, sex, and marital status, and are based on death registrations. In both cases, the population census provides the denominators.
Union formation and dissolution are represented by a series of hazard functions (Rowe 1989). From the single state, there are competing
risks of entering a common-law union or a legal marriage. Marriage
breakdown involves risks of separation and subsequent divorce. These
hazards have been separately estimated for men and women, and
depend in a complex way on previous history. For example, a woman’s
“risk” of entry to a union is positively related to being pregnant, and is
highest shortly following labor force entry. Risk of separation for a
woman is higher if there are no young children at home, if the woman
was a teenage bride, and if she has recent work experience.
Educational Progression. Transition rates for progression
through elementary and secondary school were constructed to be as
close to jointly consistent as possible with the 1986 and 1991 population census data on the school attendance rates of children of the relevant ages. Progression through postsecondary institutions (colleges,
trade schools, universities) is based on hazard rates jointly estimated
from the National Graduates Survey (NGS), administrative data on
school enrollments, and the LMAS for cases where young people quit
work to return to and continue their studies.
Labor Market. Labor market experience is simulated in two main
parts: whether or not employed, and earnings from employment. The
first of these, transitions into and out of employment, is estimated from
the LMAS separately for males and females, and also separately for
first entry, second and subsequent entry, and exit from employment.
First entry is represented by waiting time distributions, while the other
transitions are represented by multivariate hazard functions. Sex and
educational attainment are important determinants of the waiting time
to first employment. Reentry hazards depend on sex, educational
attainment, and duration of the current spell of nonemployment, and
for women the presence of infant children has an additional depressing
effect.
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Earnings are in turn based on employment status as just described,
and separate models for weekly hours of work, and hourly wages.
Upon first entry to employment, a weekly hours value is randomly
assigned, drawn from an age-, sex- and educational attainment-specific
distribution, in turn based on data from a combination of NGS, LMAS,
and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF, the annual household
income distribution survey). Subsequently, the weekly hours variable
is updated as a function of age, sex, last year’s weekly hours, and educational attainment. At the same time that weekly hours is assigned,
each individual is assigned a percentile rank for hourly earnings. The
hourly earnings rate is then “looked up” from age-, sex- and educational attainment–specific distributions. Percentile ranks are adjusted
from year to year based on estimates of rank order “churning” from the
LMAS.
Daily Time Use. The 1992 General Social Survey (GSS) collected
24-hour time-use diary data for about 9,000 individuals, evenly distributed by age, sex, day of the week, and month of the year. The GSS also
collected basic data on educational attainment, employment status, and
family status. After extensive analysis of these data, a LifePaths module was created that imputes to every simulated person-day one vector
of time spent over a 24-hour period in each of a series of 17 activities.
(Special assumptions have been made for children under age 15 and
the elderly living in institutions, since they were not covered by the
GSS.)
The statistical analysis indicated that age, sex, day of the week,
marital status, presence of young children, educational attainment, and
main activity (i.e., student, employed or self-employed, other) were all
significantly associated with these vector patterns. Thus, all of these
attributes, as generated by other LifePaths processes, were used in the
imputation. The imputation process was also designed to reproduce
the observed variability in time-use patterns among individuals with
the same attributes, based on using the distribution of vector residuals
from a multivariate regression analysis. Further details are given in the
appendix.
The multivariate life cycle histories generated by a LifePaths simulation enable basic working life table results to be extended in several
directions. Annual patterns of paid work can be examined in more
detail, going beyond a two-way breakdown between working and non-
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working years. For example, part-time work, hours worked per week,
subannual spells of unemployment or withdrawal from the labor force,
periods where work and school are simultaneously pursued, and selfemployment are all taken into account. In addition, the time aspects of
work are combined with earnings, formal schooling, and familial context (e.g., living alone or with other family members).

PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Before presenting results based on LifePaths simulations, Figure 3
shows the 1992 GSS time-use patterns in a manner analogous to
“employment” in the population pyramid in Figure 1. This time, however, instead of distributing total person-years in the population by age,
sex, and a dichotomous characterization of employment, Figure 3
shows the distribution of total person-hours in the population by age,
sex, and main type of activity. The 1992 detailed time-use patterns
have been combined with the same census population data for 1991 as

Figure 3 Total Population Age 15+ by Age, Sex, and Main Activity, 1991
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in Figure 1 by reweighing the GSS sample to correspond not only to
census counts of individuals by age and sex, but also by labor force status, census family size, and the age of the head of the census family.
Perhaps the most dramatic change from Figure 1 to Figure 3 is in
the apparent importance of paid or “market” work. Using a binary
classification on person-years as in Figure 1 gives the impression that
employment is a major use of time. On the other hand, using daily
hours as in Figure 3 suggests that paid work is of much lesser relative
importance in the daily (or even waking) lives of Canadians. This pair
of figures also indicates the limitations of conventional demographic
dependency ratios, which use raw counts of individuals of working age
(e.g., age 20 to 64) as the denominator. In the context of Figure 3, such
ratios clearly understate the degree of economic dependence of many
individuals in society.

BASIC LIFEPATHS RESULTS
The baseline LifePaths simulation consists, fundamentally, of a
sample of complete (synthetic) individual life cycle histories. This longitudinal micro database of sampled life histories is too complex to be
examined directly, so we offer here only selected summary “views” of
the underlying microcosm.
To start, Figure 4 shows the population pyramid for the base case
simulation scenario. This is similar to Figures 1 and 3 except that the
population envelope is the steady-state or period life table population,
rather than an actual population distribution by age and sex. It is based
on late 1980s and early 1990s transition probability functions, as
sketched above. As expected, at higher ages, the survival curve for
females falls more slowly than that for males, a counterpart to (or,
more accurately, the underlying reason for) females’ higher life expectancy. (The blip in the age 99 interval reflects the fact that this is actually the age ≥ 99 interval.)
Figure 4 also shows the population broken down into three socioeconomic categories—“employed,” “in school,” and “other.” “School”
starts at grade 1, so day care and kindergarten are part of “other.”
Since the LifePaths framework tracks individuals through time contin-
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Figure 4 LifePaths Population (person-years) by Major Activity,
Age, and Sex

uously, some arbitrary classifications have been applied in years where
individuals engage in more than one activity. Specifically, for a person-year to be considered “employed” in this diagram, the individual
had to be working at least 15 hours per week, and the plurality of time
during the year had to be spent working at this hours-per-week rate.
Thus, someone who spent 5 months as a student, 4 months working at
least 15 hours per week, and the remaining 3 months of the year working less than 15 hours per week (including not working at all) would be
considered in “school” that year; while if the 5 and 4 were reversed,
they would be considered “employed.” (Definitions such as these are
under the control of the LifePaths user.) The diagram shows that virtually everyone is in school by age 8, a few start leaving at age 16, most
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have left by age 20, but there is a tail of both males and females who
are in school through their twenties.
No one appears to make a transition directly from school to
employment, though we return to this point in a later figure. Instead, a
perhaps surprising proportion of individuals are in the “other” category, which includes the unemployment as well as those not in the
labor force (e.g., homemakers, the retired). As expected, males are
more likely to be employed at various ages than are females. There is a
bit of a dip in the employed profile for women in the prime child-bearing years. Men show a relatively sharper decline in participation in the
age 60–65 age range than women, whose participation begins dropping
at earlier ages.
Parenthetically, Figure 4 corresponds to Sir Richard Stone’s
“active sequence” (i.e., transitions among working and learning states)
in his proposed System of Social and Demographic Statistics (United

Figure 5 LifePaths Population (person-years) by Family Status,
Age, and Sex
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Nations 1975). Figure 5 gives the corresponding LifePaths view for
Canada of his “passive sequence,” the other main demographic focus in
the SSDS. It uses the same population pyramid graphic form, and
refers to exactly the same underlying LifePaths synthetic population,
but classifies individuals along a different dimension: family status. By
definition, all individuals under age 18 are classified as “growing up”
unless they are married or have a child. Also, whenever a marriage
breaks down, any children are assumed to remain with the mother.
This assumption explains why there are female but no male lone parents. (Future versions will incorporate more realistic data on custody
arrangements.)
Comparing the male and female curves for the married states (couples with and without children) shows the male curves displaced a few
years toward higher ages. This is a reflection of the general pattern
where husbands tend to be a few years older than their wives. Figure 5
also shows there are many more widows than widowers (“others” at
higher ages). This is a consequence of both the positive average age
difference between husbands and wives, and the greater life expectancy
of women. Finally, the diagram indicates the much higher rates of
institutionalization of women (principally in nursing or chronic care
facilities), due in turn to their greater longevity and higher prevalence
of health problems at older ages, and the fact that similarly incapacitated males more often have a wife who can care for them at home.
Figures 4 and 5 show only two rather straightforward “views” (in
this case, cross-tabulations) of the full underlying LifePaths microcosm—a multivariate longitudinal micro data set for a synthetic “early
1990s” period birth cohort. Exactly this same underlying longitudinal
micro data set can be tabulated to generate a view of the flows between
states rather than stocks within each state. For example, Table 2 displays the flows corresponding to the stocks in Figure 4. Each cell of
the table presents the average number of individuals making each kind
of transition each year (within each age range) for a cohort of 100,000
births.
The first transition is from “other” (early childhood or preschool)
to “school.” Figure 4 indicates that all male and female children make
this transition by ages 6 and 7. The next major transition is at the end
of “school,” where the peak flow rate to “work” occurs around age 20
for both males and females. A smaller number, also peaking at about
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Table 2 LifePaths Gross Flows between Major Activities Average Persons
per Year, by Age and Sex
Females
Age Other→school School→work School→other Other→work

Work→other

15–19

91

3727

1215

912

1202

20–24

493

5397

1236

4695

5388

25–29

179

1339

229

6352

5185

30–34

59

394

86

5231

4849

35–39

67

190

56

3319

3749

40–44

74

191

45

2807

2957

45–49

73

159

47

2411

3291

50–54

27

91

19

2165

3352

55–59

3

56

18

1499

3436

60–64

0

15

6

586

2882

65+

0

0

0

721

1260

Males
15–19

137

3505

1431

803

1302

20–24

719

5151

1574

3913

4175

25–29

222

1423

224

4157

2562

30–34

82

478

69

2899

2571

35–39

41

215

42

2455

2291

40–44

33

164

33

2153

2076

45–49

19

105

19

2000

2107

50–54

4

42

3

1997

2021

55–59

5

88

15

1955

3456

60–64

0

30

7

1373

4756

65+

0

0

0

971

2405

NOTE: From early adult ages to the 60s, the main flows are between the “work” and
“other” categories. Note that all these flows are gross rather than net. It is notable
that the net flow between work and other (based on comparing the gross flows) shifts
direction toward “other” in the 40–45 age range for females, but remains quite small
for males through age 50. This is followed by retirement peaks in the 55–65 age
range, the one for males being more pronounced.
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age 20, move from school to “other” activity. Recall that the “other”
category is any person-year where the plurality of the year (i.e., at least
a tiny bit more than one-third) was spent neither as a student nor working more than 15 hours per week.
In addition to stocks and flows of individuals in various categories
of activity, LifePaths also supports data views showing sojourn times,
which are the lengths of time individuals spend in various states. Such
sojourn times have already been illustrated in Table 1 above, giving
earlier life table estimates of working life expectancy. A major additional capability in LifePaths, given its explicit micro data foundations,
is the option of viewing uni- or bivariate distributions of durations or
sojourn times across the population. For example, Figure 6 shows the
joint distribution for males and females of years spent mainly in school
and mainly in employment, as a 3-d plot of simulated frequencies.
This graph indicates modes at around 12 years of school, for both
men and women, and about 30 years of employment for women compared to 35 to 40 for men. The expected distribution of years of school

Figure 6 LifePaths Joint Distribution of School and Work Sojourn Times
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is a bit wider for men, while the distribution of years of employment is
considerably wider for women.
Note that a year of employment in Figure 6 is based on the amount
of time (essentially week by week) that LifePaths is simulating the
individual as “employed” (yes or no, based on labor force dynamics
estimated from the LMAS). This is similar to an annual average of
monthly labor force surveys, which is essentially the proportion of
weeks employed. Years of schooling are analogously defined.
However, impressions of working life expectancy are sensitive to
the precise way work time is measured. For example, Figure 7 compares three definitions for a subsample of individual life histories generated by a LifePaths simulation. The straight line represents lifetime
work in hours, based on the most detailed time use data imputed from
the GSS. This ranges up to 10 years for women, and 12 years for men,
where these are years of working 24 hours per day and 365 days per
year.
The two clouds of points in Figure 7 represent annualized definitions like those used in Figures 1 and 6. The solid squares correspond
in concept to Figure 6, the amount of time LifePaths is simulating the
individual as “employed” (yes or no). The hollow squares then apply a
calendar year window, and count a year as “employed” if at any time
during the year, the individual was “employed” in the sense of the solid
squares. This latter definition corresponds to Figure 1, where the census data counted an individual as employed if he or she had strictly
positive labor market income in the calendar year.
The slopes of the point clouds suggest (reassuringly) that every
“solid” year of work (24 hours per day, 365 days per year) is associated
with about three years of work as more conventionally defined. However, each solid year of work is also associated with a considerable
scatter in the point cloud, representing the fact that annual dichotomous representations of working time are a considerable homogenization of reality.
Finally, Figure 8 gives another set of views of the LifePaths cohort.
This is also a small subsample of the cohort simulated. This time, individuals were “checked” every three months during their entire lifetimes. At each “check” time, their cumulative time spent in market
work, nonmarket work, and leisure was recorded. The various curves
in Figure 8 show individuals’ trajectories through the life cycle of time
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Figure 7 Lifetime Work Durations, Three Definitions

Market work PYs

Leisure PYs

Market work PYs

Leisure PYs

Figure 8 Sample LifePaths
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spent in pairs of these activities. For example, the graph in the upper
left shows time spent in nonmarket work along the horizontal axis, and
time spent in market work along the vertical. In all cases, individuals
move from the origin in the southwest toward the northeast.
Comparing the left pair of graphs, men tend to spend less time in
nonmarket work (the slope of their set of curves is higher) than women,
while women far more often interrupt their periods of market work and
have intervals where they spend most of their time in nonmarket work
(indicated by trajectories that head almost due east). Judging by the
typical slopes of the trajectories in the right-hand pair of graphs, for
every hour of nonmarket work, men spend almost twice as much time
in leisure as women.

VALIDATION AND DATA QUALITY CONCERNS
The synthetic microcosm of individuals’ life paths on which this
LifePaths analysis is based should, by construction, reproduce the
major marginal joint distributions from which it was built. This was
the case with labor force participation rates, fertility rates, mortality
rates, union formation and dissolution rates, educational enrollment
rates, and age/sex-specific distributions of labor market earnings.
During the course of constructing LifePaths, these comparisons
have been continually checked. By and large, agreement is good. The
main instances of disagreement arise when the underlying data sources
are inconsistent with each other (for example, as with administrative
data on school enrollments and census data on school attendance by
children).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
LifePaths is a richly multivariate longitudinal microsimulation
model. It constructs estimates of birth cohort life cycles by synthesizing samples of hypothetical but realistic individual life histories. It
therefore generalizes a variety of life table analyses, including working

Perspectives on Working Time over the Life Cycle

63

life tables, and affords a much wider variety of “views” of working
time over the life cycle. More recent work has extended LifePaths
from a single “period” cohort to a sequence of overlapping historical
birth cohorts; for example, to consider questions of the intergenerational equity of public pensions (Wolfson et al. 1998), and the intersection of adequate income, health, and leisure time (Wolfson and Rowe
1998).
One of the most striking results in this LifePaths analysis is the difference in impressions of the importance of paid work over the life
cycle depending on the “granularity” of the time accounting. Conventional approaches, when viewing the entire life cycle, tend to go year
by year, so that a typical life cycle can be expected to involve 20 to 40
years of work. However, when the analysis uses much finer units of
time (e.g., hours and days), it becomes clear that paid work is a much
smaller part of life.
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Appendix: Microsimulation of Patterns of Time Use
This appendix provides further detail on the methodology by which the time
use data collected in the 1992 General Social Survey (GSS) (Statistics Canada
1997) were imputed to the individual histories simulated by LifePaths. These
GSS data by nature provide a cross section of the time-use patterns of Canadians in 1992, and cannot directly provide a view of time use over the life course.
LifePaths simulations therefore require an imputation of time use patterns over
the lifetimes of synthetic individuals.

Structuring and Interpreting the Data
For these purposes, GSS time uses were partitioned into 17 mutually exclusive activity types:
1) employment

7) self-employment

13) commuting

2) family care

8) domestic work

14) volunteer work

3) adult education 9) formal education

15) sleep/nap

4) shopping

10) personal care

16) social leisure

5) active leisure

11) serviced leisure (movies, etc.)

17) passive leisure (tv, etc.)

6) reading

12) other

Given this classification of activities, the GSS data set can be thought of as
an array of 8,815 rows, each 17 columns wide (each row corresponding to one
of the 8,815 respondents with a complete set of responses). About 60 percent
of all the cells of this array indicate zero reported time use. However, for two
reasons, these zeros should not necessarily be interpreted as representing a
complete absence of time engaged in a given activity:
• reported time use activities are “main” activities that partition the day
into mutually exclusive periods (for example, joint time use such as
reading for leisure while travelling to work on the bus would be reported
as commuting); and
• there is evidence of substantial rounding in the responses (for example,
32 percent of reported durations of sleep are even multiples of an hour,
while 16 percent are even multiples of half an hour).
Moreover, it is important to distinguish between two types of zeros in this
overall array:
• Response zeros—zeros that represent activities that are engaged in with
small probability, for short intervals or that are unlikely to be a main
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activity. Ideally, the expected values of such zeros in the observed GSS
data should be represented as small positive quantities.
• Structural zeros—zero time spent in an activity that is likely to be a
main activity, where such a zero is reasonable in relation to the stage in
the life cycle. For example, retirement usually implies no paid work.
Such zeros should be modeled as zeros—they are essentially impossible
events.
Zero time spent in an activity was operationally identified as a structural zero
for:
• Employment or self-employment—if the main activity in the previous
seven days was either retirement, long-term illness, maternity/paternity
leave, or other nonwork if no work was reported in the previous year.
• Commuting—where both employment and self-employment are structural zeros.
• Formal education—if employment and/or self-employment are nonzero.
• Family care— if no spouse or child were present in the household.
About 12,000 structural zeros were identified by these definitions, representing about 13 percent of the zeros in the data array.

Regression Analysis
A sequence of three equations was then estimated as the basis for imputing
daily time-use patterns to the individual trajectories simulated by LifePaths. In
all cases, k indexes the 17 activities, and i the individual respondents to the
GSS. These equations were estimated from the GSS 8815 by 17 array.
The first set of logistic equations describes the patterns of occurrence of
structural zeros:
(A1) E(ZEROik ) ≈ (1 + exp ⎡ – Xij* β jk ⎤) −1
⎢⎣
⎥⎦
The second set of 17 log-linear equations provide estimates patterns of time
use conditional on the structural zeros estimated in the first equation:

[

(A2) E(GSSik ZEROik = 0) = exp Xij β jk + β i

]

where GSSik = the proportion of daily time spent by individual i in activity k.
A special feature of this second set of equations is the term i representing a
constant term for every respondent in the sample. These individual level constants represent a constraint on each individual’s predicted time-use pattern
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(i.e., it must sum to 100 percent of 24 hours). The individual level constants
may also be interpreted as reflecting random factors at the individual level that
can be further modeled.

The third set of equations then captures patterns in individual variability of time spent in each activity. Residual variances are defined in terms
of differences in square-root proportions, rather than the more usual log
differences, to avoid problems with response and structural zeros
(since the log residual (ln(0) – ln(u)) is undefined). As well as being
defined for zeros, the vector distance measure expressed in terms of
differences in square roots is a true distance (i.e., satisfying d(x,y) ≥ 0,
d(x,y) = d(y,x) and d(x,y) + (d(y,z) ≥ d(x,z)) and is unique in that respect
among common distance measures on the unit simplex.
⎛Σ
⎝

(A3) SD i =

(

[

GSSik − exp Xij β jk + β i

[

]) ⎞⎠ .
2

]

= exp Xij θ jk + δε i ,

(

)

where ε ≈ Normal O, δ 2 . In other words, it is being assumed that the standard

deviations (SD1) of time-use proportions are log normal, though with means
depending on Xij.
Estimation for Eqs. A1 and A2 was carried out by iterative proportionate
adjustment, while Eq. A3 was estimated by least squares.
The choice of predictor variables in each of the equations was constrained
by what was available both on the GSS and in the LifePaths model. The following variables were used:
Predictor variables

Definitions

Reference day

Sunday, . . . , Saturday

Sex

male, female

Age group

15–17, 18–19, 20–24, 25–29, . . . , 65–69, 70+

Marital situation

married or CLU (spouse not working last week),
married or CLU (spouse worked last week),
never married, widowed, divorced or separated.
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Children

no children at home,
all children at home aged 5+,
one or more children at home aged <5

Education attainment

less than secondary school,
secondary school only,
at least some postsecondary.

Respondent’s work

mainly a full time student last week,
working last week,
not working and not mainly a full time student last
week.

Response rounding

zero responses in multiples of one-half hour,
1 response in a multiple of one-half hour,
two responses in multiples of one-half hour, more
than three responses in multiples of one-half hour.

An evaluation of the fit of these equations is difficult both because of the zeros in the data, and because the statistical properties of entries in time use diaries are difficult to specify. The following evaluation measures were calculated
by analogy to statistical models of count data and should be taken as merely
suggestive of the explanatory power of each variable.
Reduction in deviance
due to addition of
independent variables

Structural zero model

Time-use model

(Equation 1)

(Equation 2)

# Fitted
parameters

Deviance

# Fitted
parameters

17.1 ns

42

4645**

119

875.0**

12

923.1**

34

4611.8**

78

1241**

221

29.1 ns

24

198.5**

68

Children

230.5**

18

1325**

51

Education attainment

327.9**

18

389.7**

51

Work

—

—

4355**

51

Rounding

—

—

Variable
Reference day
Sex
Age group
Marital situation

Deviance

48.55 ns

NOTE: ** denotes significance at 5%; “ns” denotes not significant at 5%.
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Imputation algorithm
Finally, given the estimated set of equations, imputation of the 17 element
time-use activity vectors was based on an algorithm that started with annual
features, and then successively expanded the imputation to weekly and ultimately daily features. For each individual life cycle history simulated by LifePaths, and for each year, the following procedure was implemented.
Starting at the annual level,
• choose ZERO day - based on a uniform random number ranging from 1
to 365. Note that the interval between successive ZERO days will range
from 1 to 729 days.
• on ZERO day, it is decided whether or not a structural zero will be
imputed to market work, commuting, formal learning and/or care for
family members for the next “year” (actually until the next ZERO day),
based on probabilities determined from the logistic regression Eq. A1
estimated from GSS data.
Given these annual level imputations, the process next focuses on a week:
Starting at the annual level,
• choose a random REF day, based on a uniform random number ranging
from 1 to 7. Note that the interval between successive REF days will
range from 1 to 13 days.
• on REF day each week, one of the actual 8,815 empirical residual vectors RESID is chosen at random. The residual vectors are in standardized form:
RESID = [(

(GSS) –

fitted from equation 2)]/SD.

• also on REF day, a random heterogeneity term (δε) is generated from
the log-normal distribution represented by Eq. A3.
Finally, the imputation algorithm determines a set of daily activity patterns for all 365 days of the year (actually, all the days until the next ZERO
day):
• each day, the appropriate average time use vector (AVG) is determined—corresponding to the day of week, sex, age, marital situation,
presence of children, employment/schooling and education attainment—by applying Eq. A2 to the LifePaths variables pertaining to that
day. A corresponding calculation, based on Eq. A3, provides the heterogeneity term (SD) appropriate to the day of the week, etc. and to δε.
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• subsequently, the average, residual, and heterogeneity terms are combined.
(AVG) + RESID × SD
The added variability due to the RESID and SD terms preserves correlations among time use activities and accounts for interindividual variation. By varying RESID and SD only on a weekly basis, some (possibly
spurious) correlation is induced between days of a given week.
• impossible time uses are set to zero—for example,
age < 6: preschool: domestic work, formal learning and reading;
age < 12: family care;
age < 15: market work, commuting and adult education;
institutional: market work, commuting, family care, domestic
work, and volunteer work.
Likewise, structural zeros as prescribed above are set if necessary conditions are still met:
• employment time use = 0, if no work simulated for the previous 12
months
• self-employment time use = 0, if no work simulated for the previous 12
months
• commuting time use = 0, if no work simulated for the previous 12
months
• formal learning time use = 0, if currently employed
• family care time use = 0, if no spouse & no children are present at home
• finally, negative [ (AVG) + RESID × SD] combinations are set to
zero, with the remaining values transformed and scaled to sum to 1.0.
The algorithm thus provides simulated time use proportions that will approximately reproduce time use averages, variances and covariances as observed in the GSS data.

Note
The work reported here is very much a team effort, principally by members of the
Socio-Economic Modeling Group of the Analytical Studies Branch, Statistics Canada.
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Very helpful suggestions were provided by Alice Nakamura, though we remain responsible for any errors and infelicities in this chapter.
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Part II

3
Adults Returning to
School—Payoffs from Studying
at a Community College
Duane E. Leigh
Washington State University
Andrew M. Gill
California State University at Fullerton

In his well-known survey article, Willis (1986, p. 526) pointed out
that as an empirical tool, the Mincer human capital earnings function is
one of the great success stories of modern labor economics. As he noted,
the Mincer earnings function has been used in hundreds of studies using
data from virtually every historical period and country for which suitable data exist. The great advantage of the Mincer earnings function is
that, with a few simplifying assumptions, the internal rate of return to
education can be estimated from cross-section data limited to information on current earnings of those in the labor force, their age, and their
years of schooling. One of these simplifying assumptions is that individuals complete their schooling early in their lifetimes and only then
enter the labor force, the state in which they remain until retirement.1
Accumulating evidence indicates, contrary to this Mincerian
assumption, that the work and schooling patterns of U.S. workers are
such that schooling investments no longer necessarily occur early in
life. An early article by Corman (1983) showed for the 1970s that a
growing proportion of postsecondary students were older than the traditional college ages of 18 to 22. Moreover, an increasing number of
these older students enrolled in nondegree programs at postsecondary
vocational schools. More recently, several studies have appeared demonstrating the empirical significance of nontraditional schooling patterns (see Light 1995; Oettinger 1995; and Leigh and Gill 1997).
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), all three of
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these studies indicate that school enrollment histories are frequently
characterized by lengthy interruptions in attendance. For example,
Light reports that 35 percent of white males who left school for the first
time between 1979 and 1988 returned to school before 1989.
Another strand of the education literature makes it clear that community colleges, rather than vocational schools, have become the major
alternative to four-year colleges in meeting society’s demand for postsecondary education and training.2 Labor economists and policymakers’ interest in community colleges has recently been stimulated by a
widely cited working paper by Kane and Rouse (1993). (The published version of this paper is Kane and Rouse 1995a.) Using data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of the Class of 1972 (NLS72),
as well as the NLSY, their study provides evidence of a substantial
return to college credits, whether provided by a two- or four-year college and whether the credits lead to a degree or not. The Kane-Rouse
study does not, however, address the issue of nontraditional schooling
patterns. Specifically, they do not distinguish between returning adults
and continuing high school graduates in estimating the earnings effects
of postsecondary education. Leigh and Gill (1997) made this distinction and find that returns to community college training are positive
and of essentially the same size for returning adults as they are for continuing students. Among males, in fact, returning adults enjoy an earnings increment from nondegree community college programs above
that received by comparable continuing students.
One explanation of differential returns to alternative groups of people possessing the same level of education is that individuals in the two
groups made different choices regarding their major field of study. At
the level of four-year educational institutions, there is considerable evidence that the returns to college vary widely by major field (Altonji
1993; Berger 1988; Grogger and Eide 1995; James et al. 1989; and
Rumberger and Thomas 1993). Grogger and Eide, for example,
showed that a substantial portion of the rising college wage premium
observed during the 1980s can be attributed to the decisions of college
students to select more financially remunerative majors.
Differential returns to alternative fields of study have attracted
much less attention at the community college level. In one of the few
available empirical studies, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1997)
examined a large sample of displaced workers in their mid thirties who
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participated in a classroom program operated at a community college
located in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. This study suggested that
there is a good deal of variation in the returns to what the authors term
“hard” and “easy” classes.3 The authors found that there is no gain for
completing easy courses, while substantial labor market returns are
enjoyed by those who make it through hard courses. In a second
empirical study, Grubb (1992) showed using NLS72 data that substantial variation in annual earnings exists by field of study at two-year
institutions and proprietary schools. Once work experience has been
controlled for, however, most of the positive earnings impacts disappear, leading him to question why individuals choose to enroll in these
postsecondary institutions.
It is interesting to note that Grubb’s results in his 1992 paper and in
a closely related 1993 paper are in direct conflict with evidence presented by Kane and Rouse (1993) in their analysis of NLS72 data.
Recently, Kane and Rouse (1995b) reexamined Grubb’s NLS72 sample
finding, after correcting for the mislabeling and mismeasurement of
several key variables, that both men and women who attended a twoyear college earn more than comparable high school graduates, whether
or not they completed the degree. Moreover, these positive labor market effects remain even after controlling for labor market experience.
Using NLSY data, we examine the payoffs to returning adults from
studying at a community college. Our objectives are twofold. First,
we seek to establish whether returning adults differ from continuing
high school graduates in terms of the field-of-study choices they make.
An important element of this aspect of our analysis is investigating
gender differences in community college field of study. Second, we
estimate the earnings effect of community college schooling for returning adults as opposed to continuing students, exploring how these
effects vary by major field of study and demographic characteristics
including gender.

THE DATA
Kane and Rouse (1993) developed a useful hierarchy for organizing the detailed information on postsecondary education programs
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available in the NLSY. Following their empirical strategy, we first
establish whether a respondent has completed a postsecondary degree.
Working backward from 1991, we record the highest degree reported.
Thus an individual who had earned an Associate of Arts (AA) degree
and later a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree would be classified as a BA
degree holder. Next, respondents without postsecondary degrees are
classified by the type of college they attended; that is, a two- or fouryear institution. Again, it is the most recent college attended that takes
precedence. Finally, individuals for whom we could not assign a highest degree or a postsecondary educational institution attended were
checked for participation in an occupational training program, excluding regular school programs. This question appears in the training (as
opposed to the regular schooling) section of each questionnaire, and a
number of possible sources of occupational training are listed. Following the classification scheme of Kane and Rouse, we classify respondents by whether or not they attended an occupational training program
in a vocational or technical institute. A summary of these variable definitions appears in Table 1.
Table 1 Definitions of Postsecondary Education Variables
Variablea

Definition

Highest degree
AA

Obtained an AA degree

BA

Obtained a BA or BS degree

Graduate degree

Obtained an MA, Ph.D., or professional degree

Other

Most recent college attended is a two-year
institution and earned no degree

Most recent college attended

a

Two-year

Most recent college attended is a two-year
institution and earned no degree

Four-year

Most recent college attended is a four-year
institution and earned no degree

Voc/tech

Attended a vocational or technical institute
occupational training program but did not
attend college. (Note: This excludes
apprenticeships, correspondence courses, and
other forms of training.)

Categories are mutually exclusive.
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To make our results comparable to those of Kane and Rouse, we
impose the following restrictions on our NLSY sample:
1) Respondents must have been working but not self-employed in
1993.
2) Respondents must not have been enrolled in school in 1993.
3) Respondents must have participated in all waves of the survey.
4) Respondents must have reported a l993 hourly wage rate of
between $1.67 and $100.
The third restriction allows us to easily construct a measure of actual
work experience. Restriction 4 has the effect of trimming from the
sample a handful of respondents who reported extremely high or low
wage rates. These restrictions result in a total sample of 5,015 respondents. Note that we do not restrict from our sample high school dropouts.
Since we are interested in distinguishing postsecondary educational enrollment of returning adults as opposed to continuing high
school students, it is crucial for us to determine the timing of the variables specified in Table 1. NLSY data provide information on the year
the highest degree was obtained, the year the most recent educational
institution (two- and four-year) was attended, and the last year training
in a voc/tech institution was received. Using this information, we can
calculate the age at which a respondent obtained his or her highest
degree, last attended college, or was last enrolled in a voc/tech. Table 2
presents frequency distributions for the age at which respondents
earned an AA or BA degree, most recently attended a two-year college,
or last attended a voc/tech.
To better understand how these frequency distributions were calculated, it may be useful to focus on the distributions shown in columns 1
and 4 for AA and BA degree holders, respectively. (Age of two-year
college attendance and of voc/tech enrollment are constructed in the
same manner.) Letting AGEDEG represent the age at which the highest postsecondary degree was awarded,
AGEDEG = YRDEG – 79 + AGE79,
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Table 2 Percentage Distributions of Age at which Respondents Received
an AA or BA Degree, Last Attended a Two-Year College, or Last
Participated in a Voc/Tech Program
Postsecondary education variables

Age
<18

1

2

3

4

5

6

AA
degree

Two-year
college

Voc/tech

BA
degree

Grad
degree

BA
returnees

0.3

1.8

9.6

0.1

--

--

18

1.8

9.1

11.0

0.3

0.5

--

19

13.3

15.5

8.9

0.2

--

--

20

15.9

10.5

7.5

1.2

0.5

3.2

21

14.1

8.5

6.8

30.7

0.0

1.6

22

9.7

7.2

6.4

27.4

4.9

6.4

23

8.9

6.7

5.5

16.4

6.9

6.5

24

5.4

5.6

7.8

8.0

12.2

8.1

25

6.1

7.5

6.2

4.1

18.6

14.5

26

4.6

6.8

6.2

3.5

10.3

11.3

27

6.4

4.2

6.4

3.1

16.7

16.1

28

3.8

2.9

5.9

1.6

13.2

6.5

29

2.0

3.4

4.3

1.2

5.9

8.1

7.7

10.3

7.5

2.2

10.3

17.7

N

30+

391

789

438

835

204

62

% of total
sample

(7.8)

(15.7)

(8.7)

(16.7)

(4.1)

(1.2)

NOTE: The sample includes respondents working but not self-employed in 1993,
excludes those enrolled in school in 1993, includes those who participated in all
waves of the survey, and includes those reporting a 1993 hourly wage rate of between
$1.67 and $100 (N = 5,000).

where YRDEG is the year the respondent reported his or her highest
degree was awarded, and AGE79 is the respondent’s age in 1979. The
distribution presented in column 1 is specific to respondents who
reported that their highest degree is the AA, and column 4 is specific to
BA degree holders. Overall, nearly 8 percent and 17 percent, respectively, of the sample possess AA and BA degrees, another nearly 16
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percent attended a community college, and an additional almost 9 percent were enrolled in a voc/tech. Across all seven of the postsecondary
education variables defined in Table 1, we were unable to calculate
AGEDEG for just 15 individuals. Thus our analysis is based on a sample of 5,000 respondents.
Our main interest in presenting Table 2 is to gain insight into the
number of respondents represented in the table who can reasonably be
interpreted as returning adults as opposed to continuing high school
students. Looking specifically at community college attendance in columns 1 and 2, the central tendency of the distributions is, as expected,
at about age 20 for the AA degree and at about age 19 for two-year college students. Nevertheless, there are a considerable number of students in their mid twenties and older who returned to school at a
community college and earned the AA. The particular age chosen to
distinguish returning adults from continuing students is inevitably
somewhat arbitrary.4 However, it seems reasonable to follow Corman
(1983) in choosing an age threshold of 25, since such a threshold
would allow an individual who graduated from high school at 18 to
accumulate four or five years of work experience before enrolling in a
community college and graduating with an AA degree at 25. Using age
25 as our threshold, about 31 percent of AA degree holders and 35 percent of two-year college students are classified as returning adults.
Indeed, fully 10 percent of two-year college students are in their thirties. In column 3, about 37 percent of voc/tech students are classified
as returning adults, while just 16 percent of BA degrees in column 4
were earned by respondents we classify as returning adults.
The last two columns of Table 2 examine the quantitative importance of two often-heard statements, namely, that large numbers of
“mid career” students obtain advanced and professional university
degrees at older ages, and that many BA degree holders return to local
community colleges to enroll in nondegree vocational programs. Column 5 indicates that about 4 percent of our sample earned graduate or
professional degrees. Of these individuals, just 10 percent are 30 years
of age or older when they received their degree. The central tendency
of the distribution seems to be at about age 25 or 26, indicating, at least
for our sample, that it is fairly uncommon for college graduates with
substantial labor market experience to return to school to study for an
advanced or professional degree. Column 6 suggests that it is even less
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common for BA degree holders to subsequently enroll in a two-year
college program.
Stratifying the data by gender, Table 3 compares community college field-of-study choices made by returning adults and continuing
high school students. Represented in the table are all AA recipients
and enrollees in nondegree two-year college programs in our sample.
Table 2 indicates that a total of 1,180 respondents are either AA degree
holders or two-year college attendees. The sample size reported in
Table 3 is slightly smaller at 1,110 respondents because we were
unable to assign a field of study to 70 individuals.5 It is also worth noting that although males outnumber females in the total sample of 5,000
respondents (2,555 males vs. 2,445 females), females are considerably
more likely than males (25.8 percent versus 19.4 percent) to enroll in a
community college.
Aggregating the NLSY codes for detailed fields of study at postsecondary educational institutions, the fields of study we distinguish in
Table 3 are the following:
• business and management,
• nursing,
Table 3 Distributions of Field Study of AA Degree Recipients and
Two-Year College Attendees, by Gender, Age of Threshold
of 25 and Older
Males
Field of study

All

Females

Continuing Returning
students
adults

All

Continuing Returning
students
adults

Business

0.209

0.217

0.194

0.325

0.357

0.268

Nursing

0.012

0.012

0.012

0.119

0.116

0.125

Health professions/ 0.070
physical sciences

0.058

0.094

0.124

0.111

0.147

Engineering/
0.320
computer science

0.299

0.363

0.117

0.111

0.130

Education

0.047

0.046

0.050

0.080

0.063

0.112

Social science/
public service

0.094

0.088

0.106

0.064

0.065

0.063

Letters, humanities,
and other

0.248

0.281

0.181

0.170

0.178

0.156

488

328

160

622

398

224

N
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• health professions (excluding nursing), physical sciences, and
agricultural and natural resources,
• engineering, computer and information sciences, mathematics,
and architecture and environmental design,
• education,
• social sciences, psychology, and public affairs and services, and
• letters, area studies, communications, fine and applied arts, foreign languages, home economics, law, theology, and interdisciplinary studies.
At the community college level, the fields of study health professions/physical sciences and engineering/computer science correspond,
respectively, to science technology and engineering technology education. These two fields warrant special notice in view of a National Science Foundation program—the Advance Technological Education
program—designed to promote curriculum development and program
improvement for technician training in the application of advanced
technologies. In a recent NSF report that is part of this program, Burton and Celebuski (1995) discussed the important role of community
colleges in contributing to the nation’s resources in science and engineering. As they suggested, two-year colleges “. . . take seriously their
service to the community by offering courses designed to help the
workforce upgrade and renew job skills and [to help] others to pursue
lifelong learning.”6 The authors also pointed out an interesting contrast
between the time trends in degrees earned and in course enrollment for
the two technology programs. For the 1989–1992 period, while the
number of engineering technology associate degrees awarded fell and
science technology degrees flattened out, course enrollment in engineering technology and science technology programs increased by 11
percent and 30 percent, respectively. Their interpretation of this evidence is that community college students are enrolling in courses to
obtain specific course work rather than an AA degree.
In Table 3, nearly one-third of males in our community college
subsample indicate an engineering/computer science field of study.
The next most popular field at about 21 percent is business, with about
7 percent of the sample emphasizing course work in the health professions/physical sciences (excluding nursing). Among women, the most
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popular field of study by far is business, at about one-third of the subsample. Approximately 12 percent of female respondents is found in
each of three fields including nursing, health professions/physical sciences, and engineering/computer science. Differences by gender in
choice of field of study also show up in data for four-year institutions.
Rumberger and Thomas (1993) reported for the 1985–1986 period that
the most popular college majors of employed male BA recipients are,
in descending order, business, science/mathematics, and engineering.
In contrast, the top three majors for employed female BA holders are
health professions, education, and business.
Making the returning adult/continuing student distinction, the
major difference shown for males in Table 3 is that returning adults are
10 percentage points less likely than continuing students to have
enrolled in course work in the letters, humanities, and other category.
The bulk of this difference is explained by a more than 6 percentage
point greater representation of returning adults in engineering/computer science. One interpretation of this evidence is that male returning
adults are more interested, relative to male continuing students, in
fields of study that have immediate application in the labor market. For
females, returning adults are seen to be about 9 percentage points less
likely to be studying business courses than continuing students. On the
other hand, female returning adults are about 5 percentage points and 4
percentage points, respectively, more likely to report as their field of
study education and health professions/physical sciences.

ESTIMATED RETURNS
Using an age threshold like age 25, our empirical strategy for estimating the labor market payoffs to postsecondary education programs
is to define a dummy variable ADULT representing returning adults.
This variable is then interacted with the education variables in an earnings regression with which we can estimate the payoffs to postsecondary education programs for returning adults as distinct from continuing
students. To simplify the discussion, suppose that we collapse the
postsecondary education outcomes into a composite variable called
POSTSEC. Our regression framework would thus look as follows:
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(1) lnW = a1 + a2POSTSEC + a3(POSTSEC × ADULT) + a4X + u,
where W is a measure of earnings, X is a vector of control variables,
and u is a disturbance term. Controlling for factors expected to affect
earnings in X, a1 is our estimate of the return to postsecondary education for continuing high school graduates, while a2 measures how this
payoff may differ for returning adults.
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4, which is taken from our companion
paper (Leigh and Gill 1997), report return estimates to alternative types
of postsecondary education in terms of the hourly wage rate and annual
earnings measured as of 1993. Following the specification of Kane and
Rouse (1993), control variables in the regressions include age in 1979,
race/ethnicity, actual weeks worked, weeks worked squared, Armed
Forces Qualification Test score, region and urban residence in 1993,
and part-time employment in 1993. Because we do not restrict our
sample to high school graduates, we also include a dummy variable
measuring less than 12 years of schooling.
As noted in the first section, a key finding presented by Kane and
Rouse (1993) is that community college programs generate positive
wage differentials, even for those not completing an AA degree. In
Table 4 this result shows up strongly for men and somewhat less
strongly for women. Relative to high school graduates, estimated differentials for males enrolled in two-year college programs are seen to
be 10.2 percent and 18.9 percent, respectively, measured in terms of
hourly wages and annual earnings. The two-year nondegree point estimates for women are lower at 5.7 percent and 4.4 percent, although
return estimates to AA degrees are higher for women than for men.
Also apparent in the table is confirmation of the Kane-Rouse finding
that enrollees at two- and four-year colleges who did not earn degrees
fared about equally well in the labor market.7
Following the empirical strategy laid out in Eq. 1, columns 2 and 3
and columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 present for hourly wages and annual
earnings, respectively, estimates of the returns to education for continuing students and the increments in these returns, which may be either
positive or negative, for returning adults. The age threshold distinguishing returning adults in these results is receipt of degree or most
recent postsecondary school attendance at an age not younger than 25.
Beginning with males, a glance down columns 3 and 6 indicates as

Col. 1

2

3

4

Log hourly wage
Explanatory variables

All

Continuing
students

5

6

Log annual earnings
ADULT
increment

All

Continuing
students

ADULT
increment

0.198**

0.071

Males
Highest degree
AA

0.200**
(0.036)

BA

0.311**
(0.029)

0.209**

–0.028

(0.042)

(0.070)

0.354**

–0.137**

(0.031)

(0.055)

0.218**
(0.055)
0.440**
(0.044)

(0.063)
0.464**

(0.105)
–0.140*

(0.046)

(0.083)

Most recent college
Two-year

0.102**
(0.027)

Four-year

0.103**
(0.031)

Voc/tech

0.075**

0.084*

(0.031)

(0.046)

0.136**

–0.110**

(0.035)

(0.056)

0.035

0.011

0.072

(0.029)

(0.034)

(0.054)

0.189**
(0.041)
0.075**
(0.047)
0.108**
(0.045)

0.157**

0.101

(0.047)
0.226**

(0.070)
–0.168**

(0.053)

(0.084)

0.099*

0.028

(0.053)

(0.084)

Adj. R2

0.339

0.342

0.325

0.327

N

2,555

2,555

2,446

2,446
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Table 4 Returns to Selected Categories of Postsecondary Education, by Gender, Age Threshold of 25 and Oldera,b

Females
Highest degree
AA

0.243**
(0.031)

BA

0.336**
(0.028)

0.235**

0.026

(0.035)

(0.055)

0.320**

0.100*

0.263**
(0.057)
0.407**

0.228**

0.083

(0.065)

(0.101)

0.380**

0.170*

(0.030)

(0.053)

(0.051)

(0.054)

(0.094)

0.051*

0.015

0.044

0.054

–0.023

(0.029)

(0.038)

(0.046)

(0.053)

(0.071)

Most recent college
Two-year

0.057**
(0.025)

Four-year
Voc/tech
Adj.
N

R2

0.037

0.007

0.009

0.000

(0.028)

0.073**

(0.032)

0.063**

(0.050)

(0.052)

(0.059)

(0.090)

–0.013

–0.004

–0.025

–0.003

0.032

–0.090

(0.032)

(0.041)

(0.059)

(0.060)

(0.075)

(0.110)

0.406

0.406

0.413

0.413

2,445

2,445

2,311

2,311

a

Control variables included in the regressions are race/ethnicity, age in 1979, total weeks worked, weeks worked squared, AFQT score,
and dummy variables for 1993 residence classified by region and urban/rural, high school dropout, and part-time employment in 1993.
Graduate degree and other postsecondary degree are also included.
b ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the 10% level Standard errors are in parentheses.
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many negative adult increment estimates as positive estimates. The
positive estimates appear for AA degrees and two-year college programs. In particular, incremental effects of two-year college programs
of 8.4 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively, are reported in the hourly
wage and annual earnings equations. That is, a nondegree community
college program boosts earnings for returning adult males by 8 to 10
percent more than it does for male continuing students. In contrast,
there is little evidence of a positive additional effect for returning adult
males of an AA degree. Estimated adult increments are uniformly negative (and statistically significant) for BA degree holders and enrollees
in four-year college programs.
A note of caution is worth mentioning in connection with our estimated returns to a BA degree and potentially also to attendance at a
four-year college. While Table 2 shows that receipt of a BA is concentrated at the ages of 21 and 22, it is certainly possible that at least some
older BA degree recipients we classify as returning adults are really
continuing students who took longer than normal to complete their
degree requirements. For example, a respondent receiving a BA at age
25, rather than being a returning adult, might be a continuing student
who needed seven or eight years to complete the degree because he or
she was only able to attend college on a part-time basis. The problem
of misclassifying returning adults is less of an issue for community college students because of the shorter length of their programs.8
Turning to females, with one exception the ADULT increment estimates are small and/or statistically insignificant. The exception is
receipt of a BA degree. In contrast to the results for men, completion
of a BA is estimated to increase the wages of returning adult females
by 10 percent and annual earnings by 17 percent relative to the wages
and earnings of continuing students.9
The positive incremental effect we estimate for returning adult
males enrolled in nondegree two-year programs might be due to 1)
older males choosing in greater numbers to study more remunerative
fields, or 2) older males enjoying a larger payoff to the same fields of
study compared to younger males. We considered the first of these
possibilities in Table 3. Turning to the second, Tables 5 and 6 report
estimated returns to community college fields of study for males and
females, respectively. In Table 5, for example, all the male observations in our sample are used in estimation except for a small number of

Table 5 Returns to Community College Fields of Study for Males, Age Threshold of 25 and Oldera,b
Log hourly wage
Field of study
Business

All
0.123***
(0.044)

Health/science, incl. nursing

0.112*
(0.067)

Engineering/computer science

0.171**
(0.038)

Education
Social science/public service

0.112**

ADULT
increment
0.039

(0.051)

(0.088)

0.273**
(0.087)
0.129**

All
0.193**
(0.067)

Continuing
students

ADULT
increment

0.142*

0.162

(0.079)

(0.132)

–0.379**

0.062

0.221*

–0.385*

(0.131)

(0.100)

(0.129)

(0.197)

0.115*

0.237**

0.082

(0.068)

0.069

0.070

–0.001

0.116

0.084

0.090

(0.087)

(0.107)

(0.179)

(0.132)

(0.164)

(0.269)

0.150**
0.095**
(0.041)

0.109

0.112

(0.078)

(0.125)

0.070

0.105

(0.046)

(0.087)

(0.056)

0.208**

(0.045)

(0.063)
Letters, humanities, and other

Continuing
students

Log annual earnings

0.273**
(0.093)
0.156**
(0.061)

(0.067)

(0.102)

0.212*

0.165

(0.115)

(0.185)

0.125*

0.137

(0.068)

(0.131)

Mean dep. var.

2.401

2.401

10.040

10.040

Adj. R2

0.339

0.341

0.328

0.329

N

2,521

2,521

2,413

2,413

a

Included in the regressions, in addition to the control variables specified in the note to Table 4, are BA degree, four-year college, graduate degree, other degree, and voc/tech.
b **indicates significance at the 5% level; *indicates ignificance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6 Returns to Community College Fields of Study for Females, Age Threshold of 25 and Oldera,b
Log annual earnings

All

Continuing
students

Business

0.064**
(0.032)

0.068*
(0.036)

–0.013
(0.059

0.103*
(0.059)

0.103
(0.067)

0.001
(0.110)

Nursing

0.276**
(0.048)

0.263**
(0.059)

0.035
(0.092)

0.381**
(0.088)

0.348**
(0.110)

0.085
(0.169)

Health/science

0.181**
(0.047)

0.222**
(0.061)

–0.094
(0.089)

–0.005
(0.086)

0.003
(0.111)

–0.017
(0.162)

Engineering/computer
science

0.085*
(0.048)

0.112*
(0.060)

–0.068
(0.092)

0.086
(0.090)

0.124
(0.113)

–0.097
(0.173)

Education

0.126**
(0.057)

0.039
(0.079)

0.174
(0.109)

0.088
(0.104)

0.023
(0.144)

0.129
(0.199)

Social science/public
service

0.099
(0.063)

0.085
(0.077)

0.039
(0.128)

0.164
(0.117)

0.056
(0.147)

0.287
(0.233)

Letters, humanities,
and other

0.058
(0.041)

0.059
(0.049)

–0.004
(0.080)

–0.026
(0.075)

0.032
(0.089)

–0.178
(0.146)

Field of study

ADULT
increment

All

Continuing
students

ADULT
increments

Mean dep. var.

2.220

2.220

9.646

9.646

Adj. R2

0.403

0.402

0.413

0.413

N

2,409

2,409

2,277

2,277

a

Included in the regressions, in addition to the control variables specified in the note to Table 4, are BA degree, four-year college, graduate degree, other degree, and voc/tech.
b ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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males who attended a community college but failed to report a field of
study. The regressions estimated are the same as those in Table 4
except that separate field-of-study variables measured for all AA
degree and two-year college respondents are used in place of the AA
and two-year college variables. The reference category is, as before,
high school graduates.
For males in Table 5, all of the return estimates are positive, as
expected, in both the wage and annual earnings equations. However,
there are sizable differences in returns across fields. (Note that for
males, nursing is included in the health professions/physical sciences
category.) Point estimates in the wage regression range from a low of
6.9 percent for education to highs of 15.0 percent for social science/
public service and 17.1 percent for engineering/computer science.
Even greater variation is exhibited for annual earnings, with point estimates ranging from 6.2 percent for health professions/physical sciences to 23.7 percent for engineering/computer science and 27.3
percent for social science/public service.
Compared with males, the female estimates in Table 6 tend to be
lower at the low end and higher at the high end. In the wage equation,
for example, estimates range from 5.8 percent for the letters, humanities, and other category up to 27.6 percent for nursing. Nursing has an
even larger return estimate of 38.1 percent in the annual earnings equation.
Comparing these return estimates with the field-of-study decisions
reflected in Table 3, the evidence, at least for males, is consistent with
our earlier speculation that returning adults may be more sensitive to
market wage differentials in making their career training decisions than
are continuing students. The relatively low-wage field of letters,
humanities, and other is the choice of a lower percentage of returning
adult males than male continuing students, while the high-wage engineering/computer science field attracts a relatively high percentage of
returning adult males.
We might also briefly compare the variation exhibited in these
community college return estimates to variation in returns calculated
for four-year institutions. Holding constant a variety of demographic,
labor market, and other variables, Rumberger and Thomas (1993)
report that starting annual salaries of males majoring in engineering or
in a health-related field—the highest-paying of the seven fields they
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examine—are over one-third higher than starting salaries for male
humanities graduates (their reference category). Consistent with our
community college findings, the variation in returns to BA degrees
appears to be greater for females than males. Rumberger and Thomas
report that female engineering and health profession majors command
starting salaries that are over 40 percent higher than the salaries of
female humanities majors.
A final result to note in Tables 5 and 6 draws on the returning adult/
continuing student distinction. Large standard errors lead to estimated
adult increments that for women are uniformly not significantly different from zero at customary significance levels. This evidence is consistent with our Table 4 finding for females that neither an AA degree nor
a two-year nondegree program provides an additional return to returning adults above that received by continuing students. For males, we
estimate statistically significant adult increments, of opposite signs, for
engineering/computer science and health professions/physical sciences. The large negative estimates for health professions/physical sciences in both the wage and the earnings regressions appear to be an
anomaly associated, at least in part, with the very low wages and
annual earnings of just two returning adult males with nursing training
whose earnings strongly influence the coefficient estimates because of
a small cell size. The more reliable result is the positive 11.5 percent
increment in wages we obtain for returning adult males with training in
engineering/computer science. Recalling the estimated returns presented in Table 4, it appears that the incremental effect of 8 to 10 percent reported there for returning adult males in two-year programs is
associated with a disproportionate representation of returning adults in
engineering/ computer science coupled with a statistically significant
incremental effect, at least for wages, of engineering/computer science.
For all male community college enrollees (both AA recipients and
nondegree two-year program attendees), Table 7 presents the results of
a decomposition analysis intended to measure the extent to which differences in wages between returning adults and continuing students are
due to differences in choice of major field of study versus differences
in the returns to any selected major. The column 1 differences in major
field are based on Table 3, while the differences in returns to alternative
majors shown in column 2 make use of the adult increments reported in
Table 5. Table 7 makes it clear that the positive wage differential
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Table 7 Decomposition of the Effects of Community College Field
of Study on the Wages of Male Returning Adults
and Continuing Students
Differences in
choice of fielda

Differences in
returnsb

–0.003

0.008

0.005

Health/science, including nursing

0.010

–0.040

–0.030

Engineering/computer science

0.008

0.042

0.050

Education

0.000

0.000

0.000

Social science/public service

0.002

0.012

0.014

Letters, humanities, and other

–0.007

0.019

0.012

0.011

0.040

0.051

Field of study
Business

c

Total

Total

a

Weighted by coefficients estimated for continuing students.
by field-of-study choices made by returning adults.
c Totals may be off due to rounding.
b Weighted

enjoyed by returning adult males who attended a community college is
largely driven by a favorable difference in returns estimated for training in engineering/computer science.

CONCLUSION
Using NLSY data through 1993 (when respondents were between
28 and 35 years of age), this study examined the payoffs to studying at
a community college, looking specifically at choices among and the
returns to different fields of study for returning adult students as
opposed to continuing high school graduates. We report that it is not
uncommon for respondents in their mid twenties or even thirties to
return to school in a community college program. Among community
college students, NLSY data allow us to distinguish between AA
degree recipients and those who attended a community college program but did not receive an AA.
Our results indicate, not surprisingly, that both male and female
community college attendees earn at least as much as comparable high
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school graduates regardless of their field of study. The size of the earnings premium varies substantially by field of study, however, with engineering/computer science and social science/public service the highest
paying fields for men, and nursing the highest paying field for women.
Looking at the distributions of respondents by field of study, there are
substantial differences between men and women and between returning adults and continuing students. A question that is yet to be
answered is explaining the greater propensity of women to enroll in
community colleges.
Comparing the field-of-study distributions with our estimated earnings premiums, there is evidence, particularly for men, that returning
adults are more sensitive to market wage differentials in making career
training decisions than are continuing students. Especially noteworthy
are the findings for engineering/computer science, the field of study
distinguished in NLSY data that corresponds to community college
engineering technology programs. We find that 1) engineering/computer science attracts a relatively high percentage of returning adults
compared to continuing students, and 2) returning adults in engineering/computer science programs command an 11.5 percent wage premium relative to comparable continuing students. Thus our earlier
result (Leigh and Gill 1997) indicating an incremental earnings effect
of 8 to 10 percent from two-year nondegree programs seems to be
associated with both more-than-proportionate enrollment of older adult
males in the relatively high paying field of engineering/computer science and a higher return to returning adults from engineer/computer
science programs. This finding is consistent with Burton and Celebuski’s (1995) evidence that students in engineering technology programs are increasingly enrolling in courses to obtain some specific
course work rather than an AA degree. Further research is needed to
determine whether the incremental earnings effect for returning adult
males enrolling in engineering technology programs can be accounted
for by their greater participation in nondegree short courses and customized technical courses developed by community colleges to meet
the particular skill requirements of local employers.
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Notes
The comments of our discussant, Shelly Lundberg, are gratefully acknowledged.
Susan Houseman also provided us with a number of helpful comments.
1. The other assumptions are that the only cost of schooling is foregone earnings,
and that the length of each individual’s working life is independent of his or her
years of education.
2. Kane and Rouse (1995a) pointed out that community colleges currently enroll
more than half of first-time, first-year postsecondary school students, and an even
larger share of those whose decisions to attend college are affected by state and
federal financial aid programs. Grubb (1991) and Osterman and Batt (1993) documented the long-term shift in emphasis from academic to vocational programs
within community college systems, making them natural subcontractors for government-sponsored retraining programs.
3. Hard classes are defined as academic math and science courses and as vocational
courses in nursing, other health-related fields, trades and repair, and computer
information systems. All other vocational and academic courses are classified as
easy courses.
4. In our companion paper (Leigh and Gill 1997), we experimented with different
threshold ages and with an alternative approach to making the returning adult/
continuing student distinction based on a gap in continuous school enrollment.
5. In the NLSY, field of study is asked in a sequence of questions providing detail
about the respondent’s two- and four-year college program rather than about his
or her highest degree. Hence, there is not perfect matching between the available
information on highest degree and college field of study.
6. Burton and Celebuski (1995) also mentioned that community colleges 1) support
a diversity of learning objectives, including remedial courses that prepare students
for further career-oriented training as well as courses for transfer to four-year
institutions; and 2) provide access to higher education for many who might otherwise not have the opportunity, including large numbers of minority and female
students.
7. An apparent anomaly in the female earnings regression in column 4 is the small
and statistically insignificant return estimates for two-year and especially for fouryear college programs. We find that our annual earnings estimates are quite sensitive to the inclusion of female respondents with very low annual earnings. Imposing a lower bound restriction of just $1,500 per year, for example, raises our
estimates to 6.1 percent (from 4.4 percent) and 8.1 percent (from 0.7 percent),
respectively, for two- and four-year colleges. These coefficient estimates are also
statistically significant.
8. Distinguishing returning adults from continuing high school students by a gap in
continuity of schooling rather than AGEDEG, we reported in Leigh and Gill
(1997) that the negative incremental effects for the BA degree and for four-year
college disappear for returning adult males. Positive incremental effects of a BA
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degree for returning adult women, noted below in the text, also disappear. However, the estimated return to males for nondegree two-year college programs
remains in the 8 to 10 percent interval.
9. In our companion paper (Leigh and Gill 1997), we also attempted to control for
self-selection in the decisions to enroll in a postsecondary education program, and
among those choosing to enroll, determining choice of educational institution.
Our approach to the self-selection issue is simply to augment the regression
model summarized in Table 4 with explanatory variables—measures of family
background and motivation—expected to influence both enrollment and choice of
educational institution. The results suggest the presence of a small upward bias in
measured returns to education and a slight narrowing of returning adult/continuing student differentials. Nevertheless, the incremental impact of a nondegree
community college program for returning adults remains at 8 to 10 percent in
terms of wages and annual earnings.
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4
Children’s Effects on Women’s
Labor Market Attachment
and Earnings
William E. Even
Miami University
David A. Macpherson
Florida State University

Economic explanations of sex differentials in the labor market
often rest upon the fact that women are more likely to exit the labor
market than men. As numerous studies have demonstrated, childbearing is an important reason why women exit the labor market. Over the
past 20 years, the effect of children on women’s labor market attachment has diminished considerably. For example, the percent of women
exiting work after having a child dropped from 58 to 24 percent
between 1976 and 1995.
This study’s first objective is to document the changing pattern of
women’s labor force exits over the past 20 years, particularly as it
relates to childbearing. The analysis reveals a dramatic decline in exit
rates among women, particularly among married women with infants.
The second objective is to determine why this dramatic decrease in exit
rates occurred. Among the explanations explored are increased education, earnings, and a movement of women into occupations where
labor force attachment has a larger return. The results reveal that,
despite a wide range of available information on standard labor supply
variables, very little of the decrease in exit rates can be accounted for.
Alternative explanations for the decline in exit rates are discussed.
The final objective of the study is to test an important prediction of
the economic theory of sex differences in the labor market; namely, if
the impact of children on labor force attachment has diminished over
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time, their indirect effect on wages should be decreasing as well. There
is strong evidence in support of this proposition.

BACKGROUND
The fact that women have more frequent career interruptions than
men is the foundation for two well-established economic theories of
male/female wage differentials. According to the human capital theory, the fact that women are more likely to withdraw from the labor
force than men results in several gender-related differences that lead to
lower wages among women. For example, women will accumulate
less human capital through labor market experience and be less willing
to invest in training (general or specific) since the return on such investments is reduced by a higher quit rate. Also, given their higher quit
rates, women may select into occupations that impose a lower penalty
for an interruption. For example, women may choose jobs in which
skills depreciate slowly during a period out of the labor force and jobs
with less firm-specific training.
A higher quit rate among women will also reduce their wages if
employers practice statistical discrimination. According to this theory,
sex-related differences in quit rates lead employers to discriminate
against women if there are hiring or training costs that make quits
costly to the employer.1
Since these two theories imply that continuity of employment is an
important determinant of wages, the relative constancy of the male/
female wage gap as labor force participation rates increased rapidly
between 1950 and 1980 was initially viewed as evidence against the
theories. However, several studies note that rising female labor force
participation does not necessarily generate an increase in the continuity
of women’s employment. That is, for example, suppose that 30 percent
of the women work 100 percent of the time. If there is an increase in
labor force participation among women that work less than 100 percent
of the time, the average degree of continuity among women will fall.
Several studies document that increased employment continuity
did not always accompany rising labor force participation rates. For
example, Goldin (1989) shows that the average work experience of
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employed married women did not change substantially since 1920
despite the fact that the labor force participation rate of women
increased sevenfold. Also, O’Neill (1985) finds that average tenure of
working women fell during the 1960s and early 1970s as labor force
participation rates rose.
Since the mid 1970s, women’s labor force continuity has
improved. O’Neill and Polachek (1993) report that working women’s
labor market experience has been rising since the mid 1970s, thus contributing to a narrowing of the wage gap during the 1980s. Also, Shaw
(1994) finds that the degree of persistence in young women’s hours
worked has increased over time.
Among employed women, the probability of a career interruption
rises substantially around childbirth. Furthermore, Shapiro and Mott
(1994) demonstrate that employment behavior surrounding a woman’s
first birth is an important predictor of labor market behavior 15 to 20
years into the future. Thus, examination of trends in women’s employment behavior surrounding childbirth provides an important forecast of
future labor market attachment and the direction of sex differences in
earnings and occupations.
Among studies that focus on the impact of children on women’s
labor supply, an important issue is whether the model conditions on
prior labor supply behavior. For example, while Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) examine the labor supply behavior of all women with a child
less than a year of age, Even (1987) restricts his analysis to women that
were working during pregnancy.2 Nakamura and Nakamura (1994)
discuss the desirability of conditioning on prior labor supply. They
make the argument that, in cases where prediction accuracy is paramount, prior labor supply and child status variables should be included
in the model since they control for unobserved differences in “tastes for
work.”
Whether labor supply models should be conditioned on prior labor
market experience depends largely on the investigator’s objective. For
example, when an employer is deciding whether to invest in the training of a woman, the key statistic is not the percentage of all women that
work, but rather the probability that a working woman will exit the
labor force.
In this study, focus is placed on employment following childbirth
among women that worked in the year prior to the birth. In this sense,
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the study is an analysis of conditional labor supply. There are two reasons for the emphasis on employment following childbirth. First,
childbirth is one of the most important reasons that women withdraw
from the labor force early in their careers. Second, as noted by Shapiro
and Mott (1994), employment following childbirth is a very strong predictor of future labor market attachment.
The study adds to the literature in several ways. First, it is the only
study to examine trends in conditional employment following childbirth over the past 20 years. Second, it is the first to attempt to account
for the tremendous increase in labor market attachment that has
occurred. Finally, it examines whether the predictions of human capital and statistical discrimination theories are borne out in terms of
changing wage patterns predicted by the decline in women’s exit rates.

THE DATA
The data for the analysis are drawn from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1976 through 1995.3 The sample is
restricted to civilian women aged 21–40 in the week of the survey. We
exclude women under age 21 because of the complications that arise
from school attendance and employment. We exclude those over age
40 to focus on women in their childbearing years.
An advantage of the March CPS data is that it includes information
on employment status in the week prior to the survey and also asks a
variety of questions about employment and earnings in the prior year.4
Thus, it is possible to examine employment transitions by comparing
employment status last year with employment in the week prior to the
survey. For the analysis, anyone who reports more than one week of
employment in the prior year is defined as employed last year. Anyone
who reports that they worked in the week prior to the survey or is on
leave (paid or unpaid) is defined as employed this year.
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Figure 1 Employment Rates of Women Aged 21–40

TRENDS IN WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT
In Figure 1, the percentage of 21- to 40-year-old women employed
is presented for the years 1976 through 1995. Over the period, the
employment rate rose from 53.8 to 70.2. The growth in the employment rate has subsided over the past 10 years. Whereas it rose at an
average of 1.2 percentage points per year between 1976 and 1985,
average growth was only 0.4 percentage points per year since 1985.
Employment rates by child status are presented in Figure 2. There
are several notable points. First, employment rates are highest among
women without children and lowest among women with infants
(defined here as a child less than one year of age). Second, the differences in employment rates according to child status fell dramatically
over time. For example, the employment rate of women with an infant
rose 30.7 percentage points (from 22.4 to 53.1) percent between 1976
and 1995. Among women with no children, the employment rate rose
only 4.4 percentage points (from 77.4 to 81.8). For women whose
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Figure 2 Percentage of 21- to 40-Year-Old Women Employed, by Age of
Youngest Child

Figure 3 Percentage of Women Employed, by Marital Status
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youngest child was more than one year old, the increase in the employment rates lies between these extremes.
Figure 3 presents employment rates by marital status. Consistent
with the fact that the greatest increase in employment has occurred
among women with children is that employment rates are rising more
rapidly among married than never-married women. The rate of growth
in previously married (i.e., divorced, widowed, or separated) women’s
employment rates lies between these two extremes. Between 1976 and
1995, the employment rate rose 21.6 percentage points (from 47.7 to
69.3) among married women; rose 7.0 percentage points (from 63.5 to
70.5) among previously married women; and fell by 0.3 percentage
points (from 72.3 to 72.0) among never-married women. It is likely
that the greatest growth in employment rates among married women is
related to the fact that employment has risen most among women with
young children.

TRENDS IN EXIT BEHAVIOR
The evidence on employment rates makes it clear that the percentage of women employed has increased dramatically over time, particularly among women with young children. This does not, however,
necessarily imply that there has been an increase in women’s labor
force attachment. In fact, within certain limits, it is possible to have a
simultaneous increase in the percentage of women employed and the
percentage of women who exit the labor force from one year to the
next.
Because the predictions of human capital and statistical discrimination models rest upon gender differences in exit rates, not employment rates, this section examines trends in exit behavior, with a focus
on what occurs following childbirth. The analysis is restricted to
women who were employed in the year prior to the March survey.
Among such women, two types of exits are defined on the basis of the
woman’s reported activity in the week prior to the survey. A work exit
occurs if a woman reports she did not work in the week prior to the survey. An employment exit occurs if a woman reports that she did not
work and was not on leave (paid or unpaid) from her employer. Given
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Figure 4 Work versus Employment Exits of Women

its more comprehensive definition, the percentage of women who exit
work will always exceed the percentage that exit employment.
Figure 4 presents work and employment exits for all women aged
21–40. Between 1976 and 1995, women’s employment exit rates fell
8.9 percentage points (from 21.5 to 12.6), and the work exit rate fell
8.7 percentage points (from 25.0 to 16.3). The fact that the absolute
decrease in exit rates is virtually the same for work and employment
exits suggests that the percentage of employed women that go on leave
has been stable over time.
The fact that exit rates have fallen so dramatically over time among
women implies that gender differences in earnings and human capital
accumulation should be falling, ceteris paribus. With greater labor
force attachment, women should be more willing to seek jobs that
require specific training, and employers should be more willing to hire
women into such jobs. Also, with women’s improved labor force
attachment, differences in labor market experience between men and
women should be on the decline.
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Figure 5 Women’s Work Exit Rates, by Age of Youngest Child

Employment exit rates, by child status, are presented in Figure 5.
Across the entire time period, exit rates are highest for women with an
infant and lowest among those with no children. The difference in exit
rates among groups has dropped dramatically over time, however.
Whereas the exit rates of women with an infant fell 25.7 percentage
points (from 57.6 to 23.9), those for women with no children fell only
5.4 percentage points (from 14.3 to 8.9). For women with children
more than a year old, the decline in the exit rate was somewhere
between these two extremes. In general, exit rates have decreased for
women with every child status examined, and there has been a narrowing of differences across child status groups.
The reduced effect of children on exit rates is consistent with the
convergence of exit rates across marital status presented in Figure 6. In
1976, the exit rates were 24.3, 16.1, and 18.6 for married, previously
married, and never-married women, respectively. By 1995, exit rates
had fallen for the three groups to 12.2, 13.1, and 16.5, respectively.
While exit rates fell for all three groups, they fell most for married and
then previously married women. In fact, whereas married women had
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Figure 6 Work Exit Rates, by Marital Status

the highest exit rates in 1976, by 1995 they had the lowest exit rates.
Given that married women are more likely to be affected by childbearing, the greater decline in their exit rates is not entirely surprising. It is,
however, rather surprising that married women today have lower exit
rates than never-married women. Given that never-married women are
not likely to have a partner who can generate income when she is out of
work, it is surprising that such women are more likely to exit employment. One possible explanation is that never-married women are more
likely to be eligible for federal income support programs and face
greater disincentives for work.
In summary, exit rates fell dramatically over the past 20 years, particularly among women with young children and married women. The
economic impetus and consequences of this dramatic change are the
subject of the next two sections.
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WHY HAVE MARRIED WOMEN’S EXIT
RATES DECLINED?
The standard theory of women’s employment decisions rests on a
comparison of market and reservation wages. A woman’s reservation
wage is the minimum wage at which she is willing to accept employment. A woman works if the wage rate offered in the market exceeds
the reservation wage. For a woman to exit, either the reservation wage
must increase or the market wage must decrease. In most circumstances, women’s market wages are not likely to fall with time since
on-the-job training and the accumulation of experience will naturally
increase their wages. The exception occurs when there is a decrease in
labor demand, causing employers to cut wages. It is probably the case,
however, that most working women’s exits result from sudden changes
in their reservation wages. For example, the birth of a child will likely
increase the reservation wage and increase the likelihood that a woman
exits the labor force. Nakamura and Nakamura (1996) show that several nonwage variables (e.g., marital status, child birth, husband’s
income) have large effects on women’s employment.
An important consideration in the wage/reservation theory is the
impact of human capital accumulation and depreciation. Mincer and
Polachek (1974) describe the relevant wage rate as the “full wage,”
which includes 1) the market wage, 2) the present value of the reduction in future earnings caused by the increased depreciation of human
capital during time out of the labor force, and 3) the present value of
the loss in future earnings associated with the foregone accumulation
of human capital. Using this expanded definition of the relevant wage
rate, ceteris paribus, the greater the depreciation of wages during time
out of the labor force, the less likely a woman will exit. Similarly, the
greater the foregone growth in wages during time out of the labor
force, the less likely a woman will exit.
There are several pieces of empirical evidence consistent with the
notion that labor force withdrawals reduce earnings and that women
select into occupations that penalize exits the least. Mincer and
Polachek (1974) find that wage deterioration during time out of the
labor force is highest for those with the highest level of schooling and
in high-skill occupations. Moreover, Polachek (1981) shows that
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women tend to select into the occupations that have the lowest atrophy
rates. Light and Manuelita (1995) report that women’s wages fall less
than men’s after a temporary departure from the labor market and that
they rebound more quickly after reentry. Also, Hirsch and Macpherson
(1995) show that occupations with a disproportionate share of women
tend to have less training. In general, the greater frequency of labor
force exits impacts the types of jobs that women enter and their earnings growth.
Given these considerations, a model of women’s exit behavior
must control for several factors: the market wage, factors influencing
the reservation wage, and factors that influence the impact of an exit on
future wages. Possible explanations for the decline in exit rates are
higher market wages, lower reservation wages, or a movement of
women into jobs that have greater wage growth and/or depreciation
rates.
The CPS data include information on wage rates. Several variables
that are likely to influence the reservation wage are also available, such
as marital status, other family income (excluding transfer payments
that would be endogenous to the woman’s work decision), children in
various age groups, and the woman’s age and race. Finally, occupation
and industry controls are included to account for differences in the
level of training and skill atrophy across jobs.
Since the earlier examination of trends in exit rates by marital status reveals that most of the decline has occurred among married
women, it appears that separate analysis by marital status is in order.
For the sake of brevity, focus is placed only on married women in this
section. In work not reported here, the relative stability of exit rates
among never-married and previously married women is consistent with
the observed changes in their characteristics.5
Among married women who worked in the year prior to the survey,
there are several factors that may have contributed to the rapid decline
in their exit rates between 1976 and 1995. Some possible explanations
are provided by the sample means in Table 1. First, the average number of children fell slightly from 1.6 to 1.5. This may have contributed
to a modest decline in exit rates because many exits are associated with
childbearing. Second, women’s education has increased over time.
The average number of years of education among married women
increased from 12.7 to 13.6, and the percentage of married women
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with college degrees increased from 18.08 to 26.9. Higher levels of
education could reduce exit rates by improving women’s wages.
Finally, the percentage of women who are self-employed rose from 3.5
to 7.3. The flexibility of some types of self-employment could make it
easier for women to stay at home with an infant and continue working.
Also, for some self-employed workers there will be investments in capital or reputation that could drive up the opportunity cost of staying out
of the labor force.
Table 1 Sample Means for Married Women Aged 21–40 Who Were
Employed in the Prior Year
Year

Education
(years)

Have a college Self-employed
degree (%)
(%)

Number of
children

Sample size

1976

12.66

17.97

3.49

1.61

7,952

1977

12.73

18.77

3.89

1.58

10,047

1978
1979

12.74

18.93

4.59

1.54

9,790

12.83

19.38

4.44

1.52

10,481

1980

12.88

19.80

4.85

1.49

12,683

1981

12.91

19.34

5.29

1.47

12,627

1982

12.97

20.56

5.50

1.47

11,367

1983

13.09

22.09

5.54

1.41

11,405

1984

13.19

23.62

6.40

1.43

11,407

1985

13.17

22.90

5.81

1.42

11,744

1986

13.17

22.69

5.83

1.43

11,763

1987

13.22

23.23

5.97

1.44

11,872

1988

13.23

23.41

6.41

1.44

11,755

1989

13.28

25.01

6.12

1.44

11,020

1990

13.29

25.07

6.21

1.45

11,736

1991

13.35

25.58

6.38

1.46

11,372

1992

13.33

24.46

6.35

1.46

11,192

1993

13.44

25.98

6.12

1.46

10,951

1994

13.51

26.06

6.72

1.47

10,282

1995

13.55

26.89

7.31

1.46

10,097
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To determine the extent to which the above changes have contributed to married women’s declining exit rates, a decomposition of the
change in exit rates over time is performed. The comparison is made
between 1976–1979 (1970s) and 1992–1995 (1990s) exit rates. A probit model of exit rates is estimated for 1976–1979. Using the 1976–
1979 probit coefficients, a predicted exit rate is generated for women in
1992–1995. The difference in the 1976–1979 exit rate and that predicted for 1992–1995 is the change in the exit rate that can be
accounted for by changes in observed characteristics of working
women. Using the approach described in Even and Macpherson
(1990), it is also possible to calculate how much of the change in exit
rates can be attributed to changes in a particular explanatory variable.
Table 2 presents the estimated probit models of exit behavior for
the 1976–1979 and 1993–1995 samples. Most of the results are consistent with expectations. Focusing on the probit model for the 1976–
1979 sample momentarily, the effect of children on the probability of
exit is quite substantial when the child is an infant but diminishes rapidly as the child ages. A child under the age of one increases the probability of an exit by 26.7 percent. The effect drops sharply to 8.9
percent for a child aged 1 to 2, and falls gradually to 0.8 percent for
children aged 13–16. Children 17 and over have a statistically insignificant effect on exits.
A higher real wage has a statistically significant but diminishing
negative effect on the probability of an exit.6 While the effect of real
wages is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, quantitatively the
effect is quite small. At the mean value of the minimum wage in 1973–
1976, a $1 increase in the real wage reduces the probability of an exit
by only 0.03 percentage points. This effect is minuscule in comparison
to the effect of young children on the probability of an exit.
The type of job held by women also has an important effect on the
probability of exiting. Consistent with expectations, self-employed
women are 10.2 percent less likely to exit than female wage and salary
workers in the private sector. Also, there are significant differences in
the probability of an exit across industry and occupation. The differences across industry and occupation could reflect variations in the cost
of an exit from the labor force due to variations in training or skill
depreciation rates.
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Table 2 Probit Estimates of Exit Model for Married Women Aged 21–40
1976–1979

1992–1995

dp/dx

t-statistics

dp/dx

t-statistics

0.05

1.38

–0.07

–2.72

<1

0.27

39.43

0.10

23.04

1

0.09

11.52

0.04

7.67

2

0.05

6.62

0.03

7.21

3

0.04

6.14

0.02

5.07

4

0.04

5.36

0.02

4.94

5

0.03

3.76

0.02

3.78

6–7

0.02

4.68

0.02

4.63

8–9

0.02

3.35

0.01

1.41

10–13

0.01

2.29

0.00

0.39

14–17

–0.01

–1.43

0.00

0.45

HS graduate

–0.03

–4.95

–0.04

–6.26

Some college

–0.03

–3.78

–0.04

–6.15

College graduate

–0.04

–4.20

–0.04

–5.10

Black

–0.06

–6.73

0.01

1.37

Other nonwhite

–0.02

–1.57

0.01

1.24

0.00

–9.24

0.00

–10.66

0.00

10.93

0.00

12.03

Intercept
Number of children of age

Education

Race

Real wage
2/100

(Real wage)

Other income/100

0.08

3.13

0.00

–0.15

(Other income)2/100

0.00

1.93

0.00

3.91

Part-time

0.08

16.78

0.08

22.37

24–26

–0.03

–3.86

–0.03

3.93

27–29

–0.04

–5.64

–0.04

–5.46

30–32

–0.07

–8.03

–0.05

–7.73

33–35

–0.08

–8.72

–0.06

–8.53

Age
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Table 2 (continued)
1976–1979

1992–1995

dp/dx

t-statistics

dp/dx

t-statistics

36–38

–0.09

–8.75

–0.06

–8.75

39–40

–0.10

–9.24

–0.07

–8.63

Public sector employee

–0.02

–2.68

–0.01

–2.20

Self-employed

–0.10

–9.02

–0.05

–7.56

Sample size

38,270

42,522

Scale factor

0.28

0.18

–18,247.17

–14,767.78

Log likelihood

NOTES: The partial derivatives (dp/dx) are evaluated at the sample means of the independent variables. The partial derivative divided by the scale factor yields the associated probit coefficient. The model also includes controls for the amount of training
required in the 3-digit occupation, as well as 8 region, 12 occupation, and 12 industry
dummies.

Other results consistent with predictions are the fact that more educated women, who are generally believed to have more firm-specific
training, are less likely to exit. Also, other sources of family income
increase the probability of an exit by increasing the reservation wage
through an income effect.
Comparing the 1976–1979 estimates with those for 1992–1995
reveals a high degree of similarity. The most notable difference is that
infants have a much smaller effect on exit probabilities in the 1990s
than in the 1970s. Whereas having an infant increased the probability
of an exit by 26.7 percentage points in the 1970s, the effect fell to 10.4
percent in the 1990s.
The decomposition of the change in married women’s exit rates is
presented in Table 3. The exit rate fell by 9.6 percentage points
between the 1976–1979 and 1992–1995 sample. Using the 1970s probit coefficients, only 2.3 percentage points of this decline can be
accounted for by changes in married women’s observed characteristics.
With the 1990s coefficients, 2.1 percentage points are accounted for.
In either case, about one-fourth of the decline in married women’s exit
rates can be accounted for by the long list of control variables included
in the probit models.
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Table 3 Factors Contributing to Change in Exit Rates among Married
Women between 1976–1979 and 1992–1995
Base-year coefficients

1976–79

1992–95

Variable
Children

0.43

0.22

Education

–0.28

–0.36

Race

0.02

0.01

Wage

–0.25

–0.23

Other income

–0.10

0.00

Occupation

0.00

–0.24

Industry

0.11

0.05

Part-time

–0.09

–0.10

Region

–0.09

–0.06

Age

–1.11

–0.89

0.08

0.06

Self-employed

–0.21

–0.12

Occupation characteristics

–0.77

–0.46

Total explained

–2.27

–2.14

Total unexplained

–7.30

–7.43

Total change

–9.57

–9.57

Public
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Table 4 Factors Contributing to Change in Exit Rates among
Married Women with a Child under One between 1976–1979
and 1992–1995
Base-year coefficients

1976–79

1992–95

–0.09

–0.09

Variable
Children
Education

–0.07

0.06

Race

–0.02

–0.05

Wage

0.00

0.00

–0.21

0.16

Occupation

0.22

–0.66

Industry

0.18

0.26

Part-time

0.11

0.22

Region

0.20

–0.08

–1.90

–2.56

0.10

0.10

Self-employed

–0.52

–0.33

Occupational characteristics

–1.36

–0.83

Other income

Age
Public

Total explained

–3.83

–4.20

Total unexplained

–22.89

–22.52

Total change

–26.72

–26.72

Given the fact that childbirth is arguably the most important cause
of women’s exits in the labor force and that the impact has dramatically
fallen over time, a focus on behavior surrounding childbirth is instructive. As in the prior section, focus here is placed upon the behavior of
married women.
In Table 4, a decomposition of the change in exit rates between the
1970s and 1990s sample is presented.7 Of the 26.7 percentage point
decline in exit rates, only 3.8 (4.2) percentage points can be accounted
for by the characteristics included when using the 1970s (1990s) probit
coefficients. Thus, less than one-sixth of the decline in exit rates can be
accounted for by changes in observed worker characteristics.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF GREATER LABOR FORCE
ATTACHMENT FOR WOMEN’S EARNINGS
The greater likelihood of labor force exits among women is often
pointed to as a cause of several gender-related differences in labor market outcomes. This section investigates whether the large decline in
women’s exit rates has resulted in the wage effects predicted by human
capital and statistical discrimination theory. In particular, the changing
pattern of exit rates has implications for women’s wages through their
effect on job choices and the level of training received.
One important change in exit rates is that, whereas married women
had substantially higher exit rates than previously married or single
women in the 1970s, they have slightly lower exit rates in the 1990s.
To the extent that married women and their employers incorporate this
behavior into their human capital decisions, married women’s investments in training should have increased. Also, whereas married
women should have been more inclined to be in traditionally “female”
occupations in the 1970s, this tendency should have diminished over
time. Finally, as married women’s investments in human capital
improve, and as employers practice less statistical discrimination
against them, married women’s wages should have improved relative to
other women.
Another important change in exit rates is the remarkable decrease
in the effect of childbirth on exit rates, particularly among married
women. Since children have a smaller effect on the probability of an
exit, their negative effect on wages should have diminished over time,
especially among married women.
Table 5 presents log-wage regressions for the 1970s and 1990s. In
the first two columns, estimates are presented for all women aged 21–
40. Consistent with the hypothesized effect, the impact of children on
wages has diminished over time. Whereas each child reduced wages
by 3.4 percentage points in the 1970s, the effect had fallen to 2.5 percent by the 1990s.8 Consistent with the dramatic reduction in married
women’s exit rates relative to single and previously married women is
the fact that married women’s wages have increased relatively. In the
1970s, married women had slightly higher wages (0.009) than other
women, though the difference was statistically insignificant. By the

All women
Variable

1976–79

Intercept

1.491

Number of children

1992–95
1.452
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Table 5 Log-Wage Regressions by Marital Statusa
Married women
1976–79
1.492

1992–95
1.586

Previously married
women
1976–79
1.543

1992–95
1.31

Never-married women
1976–79
1.507

1992–95
1.367

38.78b

41.24

30.99

33.66

13.48

12.74

18.80

21.12

–0.034

–0.025

–0.031

–0.016

–0.035

–0.038

–0.031

–0.048

–6.11

–7.30

–7.40

–5.67

–8.53

–16.92

–11.71

–12.28

Years of education (reference
group < 12 years)
12

0.10
14.92

13–15

0.133
17.40

16 or more

0.225

0.119
14.61
0.211
24.82
0.39

0.072

0.101

0.133

0.149

8.65

9.06

9.25

8.69

0.109
11.11
0.202
17.16

0.198
16.86
0.39

24.78

41.30

30.22

0.03

–0.04

0.051

–0.03

4.21

–5.75

4.97

0.023

–0.018

1.72

–2.11

0.173
10.25
0.301
12.96

0.237
12.96
0.417

0.187
10.32
0.194
10.45
0.272

0.125
7.40
0.199
11.64
0.353

17.93

13.41

19.26

0.025

–0.045

–0.018

–0.049

–2.59

1.79

–2.98

–1.35

–4.54

0.034

–0.033

–0.027

0.007

0.018

–0.001

1.99

–2.77

0.78

0.31

0.70

–0.05

Race (reference group white)
Black
Other race

Part-time worker

0.042

–0.016

0.054

–0.002

0.07

–0.036

0.008

–0.038

8.38

–3.34

8.60

–0.37

4.91

–2.67

0.65

–4.18

Age (reference group
aged 21–23)
24–26

0.108
16.23

27–29

0.168
23.82

30–32

0.195
25.84

33–35

0.222
27.72

36–38

0.237
28.64

39–40
Public sector employee
Self-employed

0.222

0.101
13.11
0.197
25.25
0.261
33.45
0.298
37.62
0.32
39.87
0.329

0.102
10.85
0.152
15.96
0.171
17.15
0.199
19.02
0.204
19.05
0.197

0.109

0.055

0.071

8.22

2.74

2.38

0.191

0.123

0.147

6.29

5.19

0.151

0.192

15.06
0.253
20.29
0.288
23.07
0.306
24.48

7.67

6.97

0.166

0.254

8.09

9.33

0.232

0.27

11.17

9.97

0.126
11.47
0.204
14.60
0.272
15.31
0.314
14.77
0.311
12.83

0.101
9.75
0.212
18.06
0.286
22.52
0.307
21.76
0.349
22.17

0.31

0.186

0.277

0.314

23.46

8.16

9.85

9.97

20.17

0.002

–0.041

0.006

0.001

–0.019

–0.054

23.48

37.33

–0.005

–0.041

–0.70

–5.96

0.22

–4.57

0.36

0.05

–1.46

–4.16

–0.276

–0.18

–0.298

–0.201

–0.15

–0.126

–0.141

–0.105

–4.43

–4.54

–3.34

–3.97

–22.90

–18.97

16.40

0.393

–21.62

–18.21
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Table 5 (continued)
All women
Variable

1976–79

1992–95

Married women
1976–79

1992–95

Marital status (reference
group never married)
Married
Previously married
(widowed, divorced,
or separated)
a

0.009

0.046

1.52

8.74

0.024
3.21

0.009
1.37

Wage regressions also include controls for 13 occupations and 14 industries.
are presented below the coefficient estimates.

b t-Statistics

Previously married
women
1976–79

1992–95

Never-married women
1976–79

1992–95
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1990s, married women earned 4.6 percent higher wages than other
women, and the difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
In columns 3–8 of Table 5, log-wage regressions are presented for
married, never-married, and previously married women separately.
Since the effect of children on exits has dropped most for married
women, the negative effect of children on wages should have fallen
most for married women. The results are consistent with this hypothesis. Among married women, the marginal effect of children on wages
fell from 3.1 percent in the 1970s to 1.6 percent in the 1990s. For previously married women, there was no statistically significant change in
the marginal effect of children on wages over time. Among single
women, there was a statistically significant increase in the negative
effect of children on wages.9 Thus, the negative impact of children on
wages has diminished only for married women. This is consistent with
the fact that exit rates following childbirth fell most among married
women.
Part of the reason that children should have a smaller negative
effect on women’s earnings in the 1990s than the 1970s is that childbearing is less likely to reduce women’s labor market experience or
sever ties with an employer. Another part of the explanation is that
children should have a smaller effect on occupational and industrial
choices. That is, if women are less likely to interrupt their careers
when they have children, they should be more inclined to select into
occupations and industries with training investments.
To the extent that the measured effect of children on wages is capturing tenure, occupation, and industry effects, the estimated coefficient on children should diminish as these variables are added to the
wage equation. Moreover, given that the evidence from exit equations
suggests that the link between children and these labor market characteristics has diminished over time, the addition of these variables to
wage equations should reduce the estimated child effect more in the
1970s than the 1990s.
To investigate these issues, another data source is required since
the March CPS has no information on employee tenure or experience.
The May 1979 and April 1993 CPS have virtually the same wage and
labor market information as the March surveys with additional information on employee tenure. Unfortunately, however, no information is
available for total labor market experience.
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Table 6 Effect of Number of Children on Wagesa
Model

1979

1993

No tenure/no ind. & occ

–0.039
(–7.16)

–0.021
(–3.69)

With tenure/no ind. & occ.

–0.03
(–5.55)

–0.017
(–3.04)

No tenure/with ind. & occ.

–0.031
(–5.97)

–0.015
(–2.88)

With tenure/with ind. & occ.

–0.023
(–4.52)

–0.012
(–2.38)

No tenure/no ind. & occ.

–0.037
(–5.40)

–0.018
(–2.55)

With tenure/no ind. & occ.

–0.027
(–4.10)

–0.015
(–2.18)

No tenure/with ind. & occ.

–0.029
(–4.55)

–0.015
(–2.22)

With tenure/with ind. & occ.

–0.022
(–3.41)

–0.013
(–1.96)

No tenure/no ind. & occ.

–0.056
(–4.40)

–0.02
(–1.82)

With tenure/no ind. & occ.

–0.046
(–3.58)

–0.021
(–1.67)

No tenure/with ind. & occ.

–0.041
(–3.43)

–0.015
(–1.31)

With tenure/with ind. & occ.

–0.033
(–2.78)

–0.014
(–1.19)

No tenure/no ind. & occ.

–0.015
(–1.01)

–0.03
–2.00)

With tenure/no ind. & occ.

–0.01
(–0.934)

–0.02
(–1.41)

No tenure/with ind. & occ.

–0.008
(–0.56)

–0.02
(–1.33)

All women

Married women

Previously married women

Never-married women
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Model
With tenure/with ind. & occ.

1979
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1993
–0.007
(–0.5)

–0.01
(–0.81)

NOTE: Data sources are the May 1979 and April 1993 Current Population Surveys.
The sample is restricted to female wage and salary workers aged 21–40. The models
also include controls for age and its square, part-time status, firm size (four dummies), plant size (two dummies), race (two dummies), union coverage, education
(three dummies), and public sector status.
a t-statistics are in parentheses.

In Table 6, the estimated effect of children on wages is presented
for four specifications. All four include numerous employer and
employee characteristics and the number of children in the family. In
the first specification, tenure, occupation, and industry controls are
excluded from the regression. In the second through fourth specifications, these controls are added separately and then jointly to determine
how much of the reduced children effect is due to the fact that children
have a smaller effect on tenure and industrial or occupational choice.
The regressions are estimated separately by marital status and by year.
Consistent with the results from the March CPS data, the effect of
children on wages fell across time for all women, married and previously married women, regardless of whether tenure, industry, or occupation are controlled for. Also, as in the March CPS, the negative
effect of children rose over time for never-married women.
Comparing the four specifications for a given sample reveals that
part of the explanation for the declining effect of children on wages is
their reduced correlation with tenure, occupation, and industry. For
example, in the regression for all women, the coefficient on children
dropped 0.018 between 1979 and 1993 when tenure, occupation, and
industry are excluded from the model. When these additional controls
are added, the coefficient on children drops only 0.011 between 1979
and 1993. Thus, the reduced effect of children on wages over time is
partly because children have less effect on women’s tenure and on their
inclination to select into low-wage occupations or industries.
The results by marital status reveal a similar pattern for married
and previously married women. Without controls for tenure, occupation, or industry, the coefficient on children drops 0.019 and 0.033
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among married and previously married women. With these controls
added, the coefficients drop 0.009 and 0.019. Thus, the changing relationship between number of children and these labor market characteristics (tenure, occupation, and industry) account for an important share
of the declining effect of children on wages.
For never-married women, the negative wage effect of children has
grown over time, but the increase in the coefficient is smaller when tenure, industry, and occupation are controlled for. This seems to suggest
that, in contrast to the case for married and previously married women,
the adverse effect of children on labor market characteristics has worsened over time among never-married women.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study documents the dramatic decline in women’s exit rates
that has occurred since 1976 and shows that the declines have been
most pronounced among married women with young children. A
model of married women’s exit behavior was estimated as a function of
labor market characteristics and factors that could influence the value
of time in the home. The model was used to determine how much of
the change in married women’s exit behavior occurring between the
1970s and 1990s could be accounted for by changes in observed characteristics. Less than one-fifth of the decline in exit rates can be
accounted for by changes in observed characteristics. This is true for
the exit behavior of all married women and for women with a child less
than one year old.
The fact that changing labor market characteristics account for so
little of the decline in exit rates leads to a natural question: What has
caused the decline that is not included in the model? A simple
response is that “social norms” have changed and women now find it
more acceptable to work when they have young children. Testing this
hypothesis is rather difficult, however. Before abandoning the neoclassical economic explanations, there are several additional avenues that
might be explored. First, rising divorce rates may increase married
women’s desire to establish a career. In support of this argument,
Johnson and Skinner (1986) find that higher divorce probabilities
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increase married women’s labor supply. An advantage of this explanation is that it is consistent with a greater decline in married women’s
exit rates than single or previously married women’s exits.
A second possible explanation for the rapid decline in married
women’s exit rates is that there may be a compounding effect of a
decrease in exits. Namely, if married women’s exit rates fall, statistical
discrimination against women diminishes and women can move into
jobs with greater training investments. As they move into such jobs,
the cost of an exit is increased. The difficulty in empirically testing this
hypothesis is that training investments are difficult to measure.
Given that the exit rates of married women fell more than nevermarried or previously married women, human capital and statistical
discrimination theory predict that married women’s wages should have
risen relative to others. This prediction is supported in the wage analysis. Furthermore, since children have a much smaller effect on exit
rates in the 1990s, theory also predicts that the effect of children on
wages should diminish over time. This hypothesis was tested and supported with two separate data sources. In both cases, the negative
effect of children on wages has diminished over time. The analysis
also reveals that part of the reason that children have a smaller negative
effect on married and previously married wages is that the negative
relationship between children and “wage enhancing” labor market
characteristics (as measured by tenure, occupation, and industry) has
diminished over time.
In general, the predictions of human capital and statistical discrimination theory are borne out by the empirical analysis. As women’s
exits have fallen, their wages have grown. Moreover, as the effect of
children on exits fell, their effect on wages dropped as well. Finally,
the subgroups of women whose exit rates fell the most have generally
experienced the greatest wage growth since the 1970s.

Notes
1. Statistical discrimination against women will also emerge in efficiency wage
models if women have higher quit rates. The logic is that the efficiency wage premium serves as a smaller deterrent to shirking for women since the expected
present value of the premium is reduced by a higher quit rate. (See Bulow and
Summers 1986.)
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2. Other studies of women’s employment behavior surrounding childbirth include
Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite (1992, 1992a), Klerman and Leibowitz (1990),
and Klerman (1990).
3. There are two reasons that we did not include years prior to 1976. First, the earlier data provide less information on household relationships and in many cases
makes it difficult to match mothers with children. Second, the earlier data have
categorical responses on weeks worked in the prior year, making it impossible to
construct a realistic estimate of the hourly wage.
4. Numerous other data sets, including the U.S. and Canadian censuses, provide
information about past and present employment status. The primary advantage
with the March CPS is that such information is available on an annual basis for 20
consecutive years.
5. In a probit model of exit rates, among previously married women, there is no significant difference in intercepts for the 1976–1979 and 1992–1995 periods.
Among previously married women, there is a statistically significant 2.7 percent
lower exit rate in 1992–1995 than in 1976–1979. Among married women, the exit
rate is estimated to be 7.0 percent lower in the later period.
6. The diminishing effect is reflected in the positive coefficient on the quadratic
term. The marginal effect of higher real wage does not turn positive until wages
rise to about $59.
7. The probit estimates for the 1970s and 1990s data are not presented for the sake of
brevity. Generally speaking, the pattern of results is similar to that for all married
women with two exceptions. First, the statistical significance of the control variables are lower when the sample is restricted to women with infants. This is
undoubtedly partially due to the much smaller sample size. Second, children have
a much smaller effect on exit rates when the sample is restricted to women with
infants. The fact that a two-year-old is associated with a lower exit rate might
reflect the fact that a woman working with a two-year-old has a strong attachment
to the labor market. Support for such behavior is found in Nakamura and Nakamura (1992).
8. The t-statistics for equality of the coefficient on number of children is 2.99. Thus,
there is a statistically significant difference in the effect of children on wage in the
1970s and 1990s.
9. The t-statistics for testing the null hypothesis of equal coefficients on number of
children in the 1970s and 1990s is 2.09 for never married women. Thus, the null
is rejected at the 0.05 level.
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U.S. Health Policy and Mothers
of Children with Disabilities
Janet Hunt-McCool
Economics Consultant

In this chapter, the effects of tying health insurance coverage to
employment are explored as they affect a potentially vulnerable segment of the U.S. population: mothers whose children suffer from disabilities or physical limitations. The U.S. insurance cannot be
described by a single set of benefits or a simple set of regulations at the
federal or state level. This system is largely voluntary and has evolved
privately. Benefits, costs to workers, and regulation of insurers vary
substantially by the firm-specific policy covering an employee and his/
her family. In many ways, the U.S. health insurance system in which
employers voluntarily bear the costs of health care provision is unique
among developed countries.
The shortcomings of this system are well known: a large segment
of population has no health insurance; many people risk loss of insurance through job change, retirement, or unemployment; and uncertainty exists about costs, benefits, and continued access to health
insurance. The risk of adverse selection may preclude small firms from
offering health insurance. Persons in worse than average health are
more likely to demand insurance than others. Premiums, in turn, will
rise above the level that would cover the average worker, reflecting the
greater needs of those who elect coverage. In small firms, a large and
diverse risk pool is not available to offset this potential selection problem. Further, because insurance is a per-person expenditure, part-time
workers and low-wage workers may not be offered employment-based
health insurance.
Not only does the voluntary nature of health insurance coverage
have the potential to distort the price of insurance through adverse
selection, but tax preferences further separate the value of insurance
from their resource costs, creating demand pressures on a very expen-
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sive health care system. (See Newhouse [1994] on the relationships
between medical care use and coverage, and between out-of-pocket
costs and use of services.)
More and more U.S. workers and families are losing private insurance coverage as premiums increase. Medical care inflation has
exceeded the average rate of inflation in most years of the last two
decades. Employers are therefore reducing coverage or limiting benefits in response to higher health care costs. They may also be limiting
pension benefits in response to health costs (Hunt-McCool, Hunt, and
Gabel 1998).
Recently, attention has focused upon the indirect consequences of
an insurance system that effectively ties coverage to full-time work.
These consequences include job lock or limits on voluntary job change
from insurance clauses that deny benefits for health conditions that
existed prior to employment. Incentives for firms to discriminate
against workers in poor health are also created because premiums
reflect the average health experience of workers in a firm. Premium
costs are not uniform; rather, they vary to the individual firm based on
expected health risks, generosity of benefits, state mandates of covered
benefits, and competition in the insurance market. (These issues are
found in Woodbury [1983]; Madrian [1994]; Newhouse [1994], among
others.)
In this analysis, I focus on the indirect effects of the U.S. health
care system on the labor market: the case of female labor supply for
mothers of children with disabilities and physical limitations. Two
institutional constraints create special problems for this group. First,
premiums per worker are indivisible regardless of the hours one works.
Because workers must repay benefit costs indirectly through their productivity, full-time work is often a prerequisite for obtaining workrelated health insurance. Secondly, because of scale economies, risk
pooling, and the problems of adverse selection, a firm can generally
offer health insurance at a premium substantially lower than the cost of
an individually purchased health plan. Thus, full-time work is not only
a prerequisite for employer-based coverage, it may also be associated
with a substantial reduction in the premium.
It is also reasonable to assume that substantial demands are made
on the nonmarket time of caregivers if family members suffer from
special health problems. Therefore, if the individual has both a high
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value of nonmarket time and a high demand for health insurance, a tension is created between the competing uses of time. Full-time work is
generally required to obtain health insurance. It may come at the
expense of time needed for monitoring and caring for a child with special needs.
A test of the competing forces on the allocation of time is provided
in this research. The labor supply of married mothers and single mothers of children with disabilities are contrasted using data from the U.S.
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). The health insurance
options facing these mothers include 1) no insurance, 2) Medicaid, a
state/federal program for very low income households, 3) employmentbased insurance, often conditional on full-time work and relatively
high wages, or, 4) if married, possible coverage by the spouse’s
employer-provided insurance policy. If the mother is not married and
the child is not covered by the policy of the former spouse, then the
extent to which time and paid medical care are substitutes determines
whether these mothers work, how much they work, and the nature of
their insurance coverage, if any.
In addition to the analysis of labor supply, this research employs
data on the specific health conditions of children. The ICD9 (International Classification of Disease, 9th edition) codes attached to all children’s physician visits and hospitalizations were reviewed. A public
health pediatrician, Dr. Jennifer Mayfield, developed indicators of conditions that were considered sufficiently severe or chronic to require 1)
substantial medical expenses, or 2) the need of additional monitoring
of the child. Parental responses to a child health survey were also
employed to identify other children with substantial physical limitations or mental disorders. These conditions were then grouped into categories based on chronicity and disease state.
In this way, the analysis attempts to study two questions regarding
female work effort in the United States: the effects of various public
and private health insurance offerings on labor supply given child
health, and the effect of specific child-health problems on work effort.
The analysis proceeds along the following lines. In the next section I provide background material to illustrate the extent of this potential problem. The theory of labor supply under insurance and health
care needs is then developed as an extension of the work of health production functions and the allocation of time.
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The third section contains a description of the data and the empirical test: a multinomial logit model of work choices under alternative
scenarios about insurance coverage. Previewing this evidence, insurance affects the labor supply of both single and married women in predictable ways. The final section concludes the analysis.

THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
The U.S. health care system is a composite of producers, payers,
and consumers in the private and public sector. Key features of the system are 1) near universal care for the elderly through Medicare, a federal program, 2) a limited state/federal Medicaid program for some
poor, some poor children, and some elderly in need of long-term care,
3) and an employer-based system of health insurance provision for the
majority of U.S. households that hold insurance.
Both for-profit and nonprofit providers (persons and institutions)
compete for medical care dollars. As noted, private insurance coverage
is voluntary, largely at the level of the employer. Regulations vary by
type of coverage and by state. A consequence of rising health care
costs has been limitations on insurance offerings by employers to their
employees. The number of workers covered has declined over time.
The probability of obtaining private coverage has been found to depend
upon age, gender, income, geographic location, health status, marital
status, and the distribution of firms by type and size within a geographic area. Nearly 90 percent of private insurance coverage is
employment-based, with just under 60 percent of the U.S. population
receiving coverage in this manner.
Still, three-quarters of persons without health insurance live in
households with working family members. This is not a problem of
poverty, per se. Most persons without insurance are in households in
excess of the poverty threshold. Currently, some 18 percent of the U.S.
population have no insurance coverage, either private or public. This
number has increased over time with the rising cost of health. The loss
of coverage has disproportionately occurred among persons outside the
highest wage group.
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Private insurance is often available for persons not covered by
work or a spousal policy, or ineligible for public coverage. However,
premiums vary a great deal between individuals and groups, making
individual purchases out-of-reach for many. The asymmetry of information between insurers and individuals, or the adverse selection problem, is often considered to be the source of this differential.
Medicare is the federal program that covers most elderly and certain qualified younger disabled persons. All but one percent of older
persons (65 and above) qualify for Medicare, insuring some basic coverage for 38 million persons in 1996. Like private insurance, Medicare
beneficiaries generally pay a deductible and a co-payment for most services. Medicare does not cover all services; notably, for prescription
drugs. Because hospital use and prescription drugs may result in substantial out-of-pocket costs, many older persons purchase private supplemental coverage as well.
The Medicaid program covers certain eligible groups: the blind,
disabled, aged, pregnant women, and low-income families with children. The income and other criteria for eligibility vary by state once
basic federal criteria are met. Services coverage is highly variable as
well. Thus, it is extremely difficult to provide a proper description of
the program.
In 1994, Medicaid covered 40 to 60 percent of the low-income
population in each of the states, totaling 34 million persons. Spending
by states ranged from around $1,000 per covered person to an average
$4,800 at this time. Half of this spending was devoted to acute care,
while long term care services accounted for one-third. The remainder
was spent on hospitals serving a disproportionate share of low income
and Medicaid persons. Most coverage applies to the poor or near-poor
elderly, and to the very young. Medicaid is free and without user fees.
Special provisions for children are found in a number of state Medicaid
programs. For example, Medicaid is virtually the only program that
covers in-home care for children with disabilities.
Historically, eligibility for Medicaid was tied to eligibility for
assistance through either Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) or another means-based program, Supplemental Security
Income. In recent years, however, Congress expanded Medicaid to
poor children and pregnant women who do not qualify for cash assistance. Recently, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program
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replaced AFDC, but eligibility for Medicaid remains nearly the same
(Liska 1998).
The result of living in households maintained solely by females is
often poverty. In the United States, another consequence is being without health insurance coverage. Indeed, while more women in the
United States are covered by health insurance than men, this is the
result of public coverage and spousal benefits in private policies. Privately, fewer women than men are offered health insurance on the job
(Schur and Taylor 1991). In the United States, one-half of approximately 75 million families have children. Twelve million of these families are maintained by women only, while 4 million are maintained by
men. Policy to limit Medicaid growth by the states and the erosion of
employee coverage suggests that more and more low-income women
with children may lose coverage.

THE ALLOCATION OF TIME
At this time, stylized examples of health production, a nonmarket
use of time, is discussed. Then, a formal model in which health insurance and full time work are explicitly linked is developed. The consequences for labor supply of women are developed under this constraint.
Examples of Insurance Offerings and the Allocation of Time
The basic model of health production (Grossman 1972) is an
extension of the more general model of Becker’s (1965) theory of the
allocation of time. In the health production model, at least one of the
home-produced goods is the stock of family health. Its inputs, like any
other home goods, are time of family members and market-purchased
goods—in this case, medical care. Allowing for substitution between
time and goods (medical care), production isoquants can be developed
that are associated with some indicators of health (e.g., absence of bed
days per year, pain-free days, life years). Like any other home production, the family is constrained by income (earnings and asset income),
time, and the production technology. These constraints apply to health
production as well as any other home-produced good that generates
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utility for the family. Thus, health states are traded against other homeproduced goods such as time in recreation, dining, and educating children. Crucially, money income is generated primarily through market
work, so time in home production is purchased by a reduction of work
hours (and therefore money earnings).
Figure 1 contains the production isoquant and budget constraint in
the case where access to health care and labor supply are independent.
This figure may be applicable in the United States for married women
if the husband provides health insurance to the family or if earnings of
the female are too low to qualify for health insurance on the job regardless of hours worked. In these cases, time in health production and
medical care needs do not place undue constraints on labor supply.
In contrast, Figure 2 shows the effects of receiving health insurance on the job, effectively reducing the per-unit price of medical
inputs. (Firm purchases of group health insurance are cheaper than privately purchased insurance due to such factors as scale economies, tax
preferences, and bargaining power associated with size.) In this case,
cheaper health inputs are revealed in a rotation of the budget constraint
upward from T. However, nonmarket time per week is constrained. If
the parent works 40 hours per week in order to obtain insurance, the
maximum time remaining is 128 hours per week. The budget constraint is stepped accordingly.
In Figure 3, the budget constraint under Medicaid is shown. A substantial penalty for market work occurs in the form of loss of eligibility
for Medicaid (via the underlying limits on the associated program Aid
to Families with Dependent Children). In the figure, this constraint is
noted as AFDC. The 100 percent tax on earnings occurs at very low
levels of earnings for many women, given poverty-based eligibility
rules. (These rules vary by state. Some states may require work for
AFDC eligibility, and some allow women to maintain child care and
Medicaid for up to two years after leaving the program. Mostly, rules
are more restrictive and include lifetime and calendar month limitations on eligibility.)
Work, Marriage, and Insurance Coverage: The Evidence
Figure 1 shows the case where purchases of health care and labor
supply are independent. Health production (H) is dependent upon mar-
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Figure 1 Independence of Hours of Work and the Price of Purchased
Health Services

H = H(h – hmin, M – Mmin)
M

Mmin

h

Zmin

Figure 2 Health Insurance Provided by Employer, Health Care Costs,
and Labor Supply
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Figure 3 Health Services Costs, Labor Hours, and Medicaid

M

Medicaid

Mmin

ket purchased health services (M) and time in health production (h). T,
the maximum time in health production, is constrained by the number
of hours in the week, 168 hours. Therefore, time used in health production is taken away from time in the labor market, so if h = 168, then
labor supply must be 0. The biological/health specific minimum
requirements imply a minimum number of hours in health production
(Zmin) and purchased medical services (Mmin). Independence of the two
inputs implies only that their relative prices are constant and not dependent upon hours of work, so the budget line is straight. This budget
allows the household to afford at most H1 amount of health.
Figure 2 shows what happens to the budget constraint if the price
of market-based medical services changes with employer-sponsored
health insurance. The price of insured health benefits drops vis-à-vis
the private price pushing the budget constraint upward on the M axis.
But to receive insurance (I), full-time work is likely to be required. In
the figure, this is the point where I = 40, denoting 40 hours of market
work. Time for important home production activities such as time in
child health is reduced to a maximum of 128 hours. The budget constraint becomes stepped accordingly.
Salkever (1980, 1982a, 1982b), Breslau, Salkever, and Staruch
(1982), and Breslau (1983) have examined how disabled and chroni-
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cally ill children affect maternal time allocation. Salkever found that
children with disabling health conditions affected maternal labor supply by reducing annual hours of work, but that child health had only a
small impact on the participation decisions. He defined children’s
health conditions through indicators such as mobility and sensory limitations, mental and nervous system disorders, heart problems, and circulatory or respiratory ailments. His data included only white, twoparent families. The availability of insurance, public or private, was
not explicitly modeled in his analysis, although he did acknowledge
their importance. Breslau, Salkever, and Staruch reported that having a
disabled child reduced labor supply of married women but had little
effect on single mothers. Breslau found that if a child in the household
had cystic fibrosis, cerebral palsy, myelodysplasia, or other severe
physical handicaps, the time a married mother spent in housework
increased by more than three hours per week. No significant effect on
the time in housework by single mothers was found. A theme common
to these studies is that married women alter hours more so than single
women in response to children’s health problems.
A Formal Model of the Allocation of Time
Our model of parental time allocation in the presence of children
with health problems draws upon the household production framework
of Becker (1965) and Grossman (1972). The framework is extended to
incorporate the availability of work-related health insurance and the
required trade-off between benefits and wages in a competitive labor
market. As such, it is a logical extension of Figures 1 and 2, in which
the marginal exchanges of time in health production (Lh) offer marketpurchased health. Services (M) are affected by health insurance.
Consider the case of one parent and one child with health capital
H0. Household utility is defined as U(X, H) where X is a good purchased exclusively in the market and H is child health, produced with
inputs of time and medical care. The child health production function is
(1) H = H[M,Lh | H0, r(e)],
where the productivity of inputs M (market-based medical services)
and Lh (parental time in child health) is contingent on the initial stock
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of health, H0, and the rate of depreciation of health capital, r(e). The
rate of depreciation is unknown but expected to follow a known probability distribution defined by e1 or e2. In good health (state 1), which
occurs with probability p, depreciation is r1, which is low. In state 2
with probability (1 – p), depreciation is r2, which is high. Specifically,
we assume that the change in health in state 1 is too low to demand
medical inputs in excess of the amount of the insurance deductible D.
The marginal productivity of M and Lh are presumed greater in the
poor-health state. Hence there is a state-specific utility created by the
inputs of time, market goods, and medical care. If the family has
health insurance for the child, the price of medical care, Pm, is not constant. Instead, out-of-pocket medical care expenditures for the family
are
(2) D + ξ(Pm, M2 – D),
assuming that the poor-health state occurs so that spending on M
exceeds the deductible, D.
Additional out-of-pocket spending beyond D is determined by ξ,
the co-insurance rate, so that the family spends only ξM per unit of M.
However, in the health state r1, spending is not expected to exceed the
deductible and is simply Pm M1.
The household pays for health insurance from the employer indirectly in the form of reduced wages. This is a requirement of competitive labor markets in which no employer can afford to offer more total
compensation than its rivals. Firms can, however, vary the distribution
of total compensation between wages and benefits. If a worker earns
total compensation equal to $S per hour and the worker holds health
insurance, hourly compensation may be written as
(3) S = w + pi I,
where Pi I is the value of insurance purchased per hour of work by an
equivalent reduction in hourly wages.
Labor supply is determined by maximizing expected utility,
(4) max E{U(X,H) = p1(U1,H1)} + 1 – p1(U2,H2),
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subject to a time constraint that divides total weekly hours between
home production and market labor:
(5) T = Lh + Lm,
an hourly compensation constraint expressed in Eq. 3, and the child
health production function described by Eq. 1.
Let G(M, I) describe the family cost of health care. The cost of
health care is uncertain but has the expected value of the sum of spending in each state weighted by the state-specific odds:
(6) E{G(M,I | ξ, D, PmM)} = pPmM + (1 – p)[D + ξ(pmM – D)].
Total income of the household is made up of unearned income, V,
and total wage income wLm. Because purchases of market goods (X)
and spending on medical care cannot exceed total income, the budget
constraint is defined by equating actual spending with actual income in
each state as
(7) X + G(M, I) = V + wLh + V + w(T – Lh),
or simply as
(8) X = V + (S – PiI)(T – Lh) – G(M, I),
where X, I, and G are specific to the state of health that actually occurs.
This problem can be restated as
(9) max E{U[V + ( S – Pi I )(T − Lh ) − G( M, I ), H ( Ih , M )]}
= pU[V + S(T − L1h ) − Pm M , H1 ] + (1 − p)U[V + ( S − PI I )(T − L2h )
−( D + ξ( Pm M − D), H2 )]

The first order conditions are
E(U ) I = – pUx Pi (T – L1h ) – (1 − p)Ux [ Pi (T – L2h ) + G] = 0
E(U ) Lh = – pUx ( S – Pi I ) − (U h HL1h ) – (1 − p)Ux [ S – Pi I – H 2 ] = 0
1
1
E(U ) m = − p[Ux (Gm
– Uh Hm
)] − (1 − p)Ux (Gm2 − U h Hm2 ).
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They can be transformed into the familiar conditions for optimal insurance: an individual will transfer consumption of X between states of
child health (through the purchase of insurance) in proportion to the
odds of the poor health state occurring. As p increases, G1 approaches
zero and there are no cost savings from insurance. Similarly, if p is
low, the benefits from insurance are great. An individual should be
willing to trade wages (and hence consumption) in state 1 for this benefit. The equilibrium level of Lh is described in the remaining conditions so that the exchanges between market goods and child health and
medical care and child health are optimal given the probabilities of
each health state.
The first order conditions can be differentiated to develop I, Lh, and
M, defined as functions of exogenous prices, income, and the variables
in the utility and production functions. Maternal labor supply is
obtained by solving the demand for time in home production. It too is
state-specific and depends upon the state of health of the child that
occurs. Maternal labor supply can be expressed as
(10) Lm = T − Lh = Lm ( w, Pi I , Pm V , ξHo , r(e)).
Constraints on Insurance Provision
In reality, time constraints can preclude market work entirely, or
limits on work hours and limited earnings potential may preclude the
offer of health insurance. A likely constraint facing female households
is that their wages may be too low for the firm to offer any health insurance. For example, health insurance is unlikely to be offered to parttime or minimum or low-wage employees who earn too little to offset
the costs of insurance. For persons affected by these constraints, PI = 0
and w = S, regardless of preferences.
Because full-time employment is usually a requirement for workrelated coverage, the utility of employer-sponsored insurance depends
upon the degree to which parental time in child health can be substituted for market-provided health care and the extent to which substitutes exist for private health insurance. Women with very low earnings
are unlikely to be offered job-related health insurance. An alternative
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source of coverage is Medicaid for low-income persons. Eligibility
requirements vary by state but are generally means-tested.
Both the availability of employment-based health insurance and of
Medicaid eligibility are unknown a priori. Even full-time work may
not guarantee that a worker will obtain employment-related coverage.
Firm attributes including average preferences of workers, size of the
work force, health risks, and the ability to achieve group purchase discounts will affect availability at the firm level. Similarly, a complex
system of regulations by states and federal government determines
Medicaid eligibility. Accordingly, the decision to participate in the
labor market is conditioned on the likelihood of obtaining work-related
or public insurance coverage. Such probabilities are explicitly
included in the estimates of the maternal labor supply decision.

AN EMPIRICAL TEST
Data
To examine the relationships between maternal labor supply and
child health, and between health insurance coverage and labor supply,
we employ data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES). NMES was a year-long survey of the medical care use and
expenditures, and health insurance coverage of the U.S. population
based on about 15,000 households. A limited number of questions
were also devoted to employment and hours of work. This analysis
employs a subset of families with children between 1 and 17 years of
age. These data consist of 3,069 two-parent and 1,590 single-parent
families in which mothers are present. The sample of married mothers
was further restricted to households in which husbands were employed
full time as wage and salary workers.
A restriction of the data included the age of children. Mothers of
children less than one year of age were excluded from the analysis
because of complex institutional rules about parental leave time and
difficulties discerning child illness or limitations at this early stage.
NMES contains two sources of child health information. First, the
symptom, reason, or condition associated with any reported medical
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event (e.g., physician office visit, hospitalization, use of outpatient
clinic) or disability day was coded into a specific disease category
according to diagnostic classed established by the International Classification of Diseases, 9th edition. Secondly, information on parental
responses to the NMES Health Questionnaire for children 4 and under
and for children 5 to 17 was coded for the presence or absence of
health problems. This information included the general health status of
children, the presence of activity limitations, and the presence of acute
or chronic health problems. We considered a child to be in need of special medical care or monitoring time if she or he had activity limitations, chronic health problems such as asthma, heart murmurs or other
heart problems, or constant, long-lasting digestive problems.
Criteria for defining child health problems included physical disabilities and illnesses of a chronic, persistent, or recurrent nature.
Three decision rules made up the classification scheme: the condition
or diagnosis was potentially costly either in terms of time or medical
care costs; the condition was associated with the risk of unanticipated
child care demands that could interrupt routine schedules such as
schooling or work; and the presence of the condition was likely to be
independent of the time at which it was reported (e.g., the condition
was chronic or recurrent).
The following classes of child health problems were extracted:
LIMITATIONS = sensory and ambulatory limitations.
INFECT = acute and chronic infectious diseases.
ALLERGY = allergies and asthma.
PSYCH = drug dependency, emotional problems, depression, and
eating disorders classified as psychological.
TRAUMA = head trauma, fractures affecting mobility, and severe
burns.
METADIG = disorders of the metabolism or digestive tract.
PULMCAR = disorders of the pulmonary and cardiovascular systems.
Infectious diseases and allergies, common among children, were
included only when they were associated with an unusual event such as
the loss of 10 or more days from school or an episode of hospitalization. They are denoted by
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INF × BED = infectious disease resulting in a large number of
bed days.
ALL × STAY = allergy or asthma resulting in one or more hospital
episodes.
Table 1 contains a description of the distribution of children aged
1–17 in the data according to specific health conditions. Most commonly, these children experienced acute or chronic infectious diseases,
allergies or asthma, or recurrent or episodic problems that do not
always connote severity. Between 2 and 3 percent of children in the
sample had relatively serious health problems of a physically or mentally disabling nature, as well as problems that required hospitalization.
Model Specification
Multinomial logit estimates (MLE) of the choice of usual hours of
work per week are used to estimate the effects of child health states and
the availability of private and public insurance on maternal labor supply. They are estimated separately for married and single mothers.
The operational definitions of labor supply and health are found in
Table 2.
The choices available include no work, part-time hours (less than
35 hours per week) or work at full-time hours (the omitted group).
Because multinomial logit incorporates the restrictive IIA assumption,
we tested for IIA using the Hausman-McFadden statistic. This test
Table 1 Distribution of Health Conditions among Children
Conditions
Limitations

%
3.0

Allergy and asthma

13.0

Infectious diseases

15.4

Trauma

2.9

Pulmonary and cardiovascular disorders

3.3

Metabolic and digestive disorders

2.5

Psychological disorders

2.3

Number of children

8,945
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Table 2 Variable Symbols and Definitions
Labor supply
No work

Index denoting that mother does not
work for pay

Part-time work

Mother works part time

Full-time work

Mother works full time

Health conditions of children
LIMIT

Sensory and ambulatory limitations in
child

PULMCAR

Pulmonary or cardiac disorder in child

METADIG

Metabolic, digestive, or endocrine
disorder in child

PSYCH

Psychological or mental disorder

TRAUMA

Head trauma, fracture limiting walking,
or serious burns

INFECT

Acute or chronic infectious disease

ALLERGY

Allergy or asthma

Health status of children (events)
BED10

Child lost 10 or more school days due to
illness

HOSP

Child was hospitalized at least once

Health conditions (interaction of conditions
and events)
ALL × STAY

ALLERGY = 1 and one or more hospital
stays

INF × BED

INFECT = 1 and BED10 = 1

Insurance probabilities (predicted by probit)
PROB. MEDICAID

Odds that mother is eligible for
Medicaid if not working

PROB. INSURANCE

Odds that mother would be offered
insurance on the job if she worked full
time
(continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
Other health insurance
FATHER INSURED

Father holds employment-related health
insurance

Personal characteristics
EDUC

Years of education

BLACK

Race is black

Income and wealth of household
NONEARNED INCOME

All nontransfer and nonwage income

FATHER’S WAGE

Father’s hourly earnings

involves a comparison between coefficients of a full-choice model
inclusive of all alternatives and the coefficients of the restricted model.
The addition of an alternative should not alter parameter estimates of
the remaining choices if IIA holds. We did not find compelling evidence of IIA violation (Hausman and McFadden 1984).
The independent variables in the model are the six categories of
health limitations/conditions described previously, and
PROB. INSURANCE = estimated odds of private coverage if
woman with these human capital and experience characteristics
were to work full time.
PROB. MEDICAID = estimated odds of Medicaid coverage if
woman with these human capital and socioeconomic characteristics were not at work. This is estimated for single mothers only.
Income of husbands in the sample generally precludes Medicaid
coverage.
BLACK = race is black.
EDUCATION = years of education.
CHILDREN 1–2 = presence of children in household aged 2 or
younger.
CHILDREN 3–5 = presence of children in household aged 3
through 5.
BEDUC = interaction term of race and education.
BCHILDREN–2 = interaction term of race and children 2 or under.
BCHILDREN–5 = interaction term of race and children 3 to 5.
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NONEARNED INCOME = all nonwage income except transfer
payments.
This variable is found in the test of married mothers’ labor supply
only.
FATHER’S WAGE = hourly wage of spouse if married only.
BINCOME = interaction between race and income.
BFATHER’S WAGE = interaction between race and father’s wage.
Multinomial Logit Results
Estimates of employment decisions by single and married mothers
are found in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The main finding with regard
to disease states is that potentially chronic illnesses in children deter
both single and married mothers from full- or part-time employment.
This result differs from many previous studies that find a response only
among married women. Women who do work appear to choose limited hours or part-time work.
In terms of insurance offerings, conflicting labor force incentives
are evident. Single mothers are responsive to the odds of Medicaid
coverage, while married women are responsive to the odds of obtaining
private health insurance on the job.
The final column in each of the tables shows the distributional
characteristics of each sample. Married mothers and single mothers
have children with similar disability and disease profiles. However,
they differ somewhat in the distributions of ages of children and in
race. Single mothers are more likely to have children between one and
two years old than their married counterparts. They are also disproportionately black. Because the labor market experience of black women
and other women may vary independent from socioeconomic household characteristics, we calculated interaction terms between race and
children, between race and education, and between race and income in
the sample of married mothers.
The coefficients and marginal probabilities from the logit models
for single mothers are described in Table 3. Specifically, a child with
activity limitations increases the odds of no work relative to full-time
work by almost 9 percentage points and increases the probability of
part-time versus full-time work by about 4 percentage points. Children
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Table 3 Trichotomous Logit Results of the Labor Supply of Single
Mothersa
Part-time vs.
full-time
work
Constant
LIMIT

dp/dx

0.531

0.087

0.485

0.058

0.066

0.065

–0.007

0.042

0.128

(0.316)

–0.009

0.047

0.683

0.102

–0.025

0.026

–0.177

0.053

0.020

0.467
(0.286)

0.071

0.574
(0.271)

0.015

–0.021
(0.344)

0.028
0.142

(0.483)
INF × BED

0.063

(0.285)

(0.302)
ALL × STAY

0.039

(0.512)

(0.329)
PSYCH

Mean

–0.538

(0.260)
METADIG

dp/dx

1.925

(0.272)
PULCAR

No work vs.
full-time
work

–0.010

(0.485)
–0.005

(0.483)

0.274
(0.448)

PROB.
INSURANCE

–1.344
(0.951)

–0.184

–1.786
(1.0420)

0.193

0.650

PROB.
MEDICAID

0.422
(0.127)

0.071

0.351
(0.0136)

0.028

0.543

2.076

0.377

1.219

0.613

0.42

0.019

11.91

BLACK

(0.781)
EDUC

–0.194

(0.873)
–0.045

(0.043)
CHILDREN 1–2

1.173

–0.232

(0.181)
CHILDREN 3–5

0.448
(0.161)

0.048
(0.0420)
0.387

–0.002

0.223

–0.016

0.324

(0.213)
0.093

0.069
(0.273)
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Part-time vs.
full-time
work
BEDUC

–0.149

BCHILDREN–2

–0.569

dp/dx

No work vs.
full-time
work

dp/dx

–0.026

–0.101

–0.006

–0.114

–0.167

(0.066)

(0.070)

(0.253)
BCHILDREN–5

0.122
(0.231)

LOG L

(0.304)
0.023

0.055
(0.273)
–1,462

NO WORK

N1 = 485

PART-TIME

N2 = 301

FULL-TIME

N3 = 788

a

0.009

Coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses.

0.001

Mean
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Table 4 Trichotomous Logit Results of the Labor Supply of Married
Mothersa
Part-time
work vs. fulltime work
Constant

LIMIT

dp/dx

–0.0669

1.479

(0.501)

(0.471)

–0.021

0.010

(0.239)
PULCAR

0.332

0.774

0.026

–0.231

0.082

–0.037

–0.53

0.349

0.046

0.532

0.081

0.048

0.950

0.133

0.039

0.119

0.039

0.038

0.069

0.020

0.097

0.025

(0.268)
–0.031

(0.398)
INF × BED

–0.039

(0.281)

(0.275)
ALL × STAY

Mean

(0.242)

(0.282)
PSYCH

–0.205

dp/dx

(0.256)

(0.243)
METADIG

No work vs.
full-time
work

0.341
(0.363)

0.023

(0.339)

0.617
(0.327)

PROB.
INSURANCE

0.095
(0.91)

0.202

–2.627
(0.902)

–0.524

0.670

FATHER

0.251
(0.115)

0.008

0.565
(0.124)

0.093

0.690

1.293

0.206

0.587

0.025

0.157

INSURED
BLACK

(0.865)
EDUC

–0.024

(0.859
0.006

(0.027)
CHILDREN 0–2

0.201
(0.099)

–0.147

–0.027

12.49

(0.027)
–0.007

0.652
(0.097)

0.114

0.373
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CHILDREN 3–5

Part-time
work vs. fulltime work
0.103

dp/dx

No work vs.
full-time
work

dp/dx

Mean

0.088

0.052

–0.151

0.365

(0.098)

(0.096)

NONEARNED
INCOME

3.0E-05
(8.0E-05)

–2.0E-06

2.0E-04
(8.0E-04)

2.0E-06 2053.00

FATHER’S
WAGE

0.019
(0.012)

–0.0002

0.056
(0.011)

0.010

BEDUC

–0.152

–0.026

–0.035

0.004

(0.075)
BCHILDREN–2

0.023

0.032

0.206

–1.0E-04

0.088

–0.054
(0.037)

–0.007

–0.693

–0.151

–5.0E-05

–2.0E-07

(3.0E-04)
–0.007

LOG L

–0.054
(0.036)

–0.007

–2,447

NO WORK

N1 = 649

PART-TIME

N2 = 668

FULL-TIME

N3 = 1,140

a

–0.081

(0.317)

(0.037)
BFATHER’S
WAGE

–0.398
(0.275)

(0.264)
BINCOME

11.13

(0.073)

(0.264)
BCHILDREN–5
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with pulmonary or cardiovascular health problems reduce the probability of full-time employment relative to working part time by 7 percentage points but raise the likelihood of part-time relative to full-time
employment by 6 percent.
As the probability of Medicaid eligibility at zero hours of work
increases, single mothers are more likely to work part time relative to
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full time. Each percentage point increase in eligibility results in an
increase of no employment by 0.3 percentage points and of part-time
employment by 0.7 percentage points. Although only marginally significant, a one-point increase in the probability of employment-related
health insurance exerts an18-percentage-point decrease in part-time
work relative to full-time employment.
Education mitigates the reduction in labor supply from full-time to
part-time hours, and its influence is greater for black women than for
other single mothers. The same is true for young children where the
effects on the interactive influence on part-time work and full-time
work are again mitigated by race.
Chronic child health problems also affect employment decisions of
married mothers, as shown in Table 4. The odds of not working
increase by 8.1 percentage points relative to full-time work if children
experience pulmonary or cardiac problems. For mothers of children
with metabolic digestive disorders, the odds of part-time work over
full-time increase by 8.2 percentage points, with the effects of no work
versus full-time work even stronger at 13.3 percentage points. Infectious diseases in children leading to inordinate bed days raise the odds
of no work by almost 10 percentage points.
Health insurance on the job matters as well. Women will opt for
full-time work versus not working if their own chances of being
offered insurance increase. This effect is on the order of a 50-percentage point reduction in the odds of no work. There are no discernible
effects of insurance on full-time versus part-time work, however.
A working husband with insurance appears to substitute well for
own insurance. When the husband holds insurance, the mother typically more often chooses part-time work over full-time work or no
work. These marginal effects are 0.093 for no work versus full-time
work, but less than 1 percentage point on the choice of part-time versus
full-time employment.
Finally, education is a significant determinant of work; as years of
schooling increase, the odds of either part-time or no work decrease
relative to full-time work. Education and race interact significantly to
reinforce the work decision in the case of full-time over part-time
work. Interestingly, race and the presence of older children shows a
significant interaction effect on the decision to work. Its coefficient in
the model predicting no work versus full-time work is significantly
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negative. Black mothers of older children tend to work full time more
often than their white counterparts.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The artifact of combining employment and health insurance in the
United States has certain deleterious consequences, especially for
women’s employment. Madrian (1994) has found job lock, for example. Similarly, Moffitt and Wolfe (1990) found a relationship between
health care needs, employment-based insurance, and Medicaid.
Women would be likely to reduce their Medicaid attachment by 6 percent and increase their workforce attachment by 12 percent if one-third
more jobs offered health insurance. Wolfe and Hill (1992) simulated
the effects of mandated benefits under different health states and varying hours of work. Health insurance created a stronger effect on work
than either child care or wages if either the woman or a dependent child
was in poor health.
This chapter addressed a related phenomenon—the rigidity in the
work schedule created when essential health benefits are tied to the job.
Data on mothers of children with disabilities were used to test for the
competing effects on time use: the need to work full time to obtain
insurance versus the need for time caring for the child. The research
considered two new areas of inquiry: the insurance-employment rigidities of the system and the effects of specific health conditions on single
and married mothers. Unlike much previous research, we found a linkage between child disability and time allocation for single women as
well as married women. With regard to insurance, husband’s coverage,
the odds of own employment-based coverage, and the odds of Medicaid coverage all affected labor supply predictably. Finally, the results
confirmed racial effects on labor, even in the presence of insurance.
These effects interacted with education and number/age of children to
increase black female supply relative to other mothers. To the extent
black women are either disproportionately low-wage workers or heads
of households in on near poverty, they are subject to the double risks of
the erosion of private health insurance from employers as well as
restrictions imposed by states on Medicaid expenditure growth if they
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are currently eligible. Even if they maintain health insurance on the
job because they tend to work longer hours than their white counterparts, they are in danger of robbing time that would otherwise be
devoted to monitoring and caring for special health needs of their children.
There are many reasons why health insurance tied to jobs is inefficient or inequitable.
The zero-sum alternative of Medicaid, available primarily to lowincome single parents, has its own set of disadvantages. Lifetime
income and wealth must remain low to maintain health care coverage,
and market skills may depreciate with limits on work. Women would
appear to suffer worse from the problems created by the employment/
insurance nexus because they routinely provide a large part of the nonmarket time to their families.

Note
My sincere thanks to Alice Nakamura, participants in the W.E. Upjohn/Statistics Canada
Joint Conference on Changes in Working Time in Canada and the United States, and
workshop participants of the Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown
University, for helpful comments. This paper arose from earlier research conducted
jointly with Alan Monheit. At the time this paper was written, the author was Associate
Professor, Georgetown Institute for Health Care Research and Policy. Errors, of course,
belong solely to the author.
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The aging population is a common phenomenon in many countries
(Henretta 1997). In Canada, for instance, the median age of the population has increased from 17.2 years in 1851 to 33.5 years in 1991. It is
estimated to be 37.5 years in 2001 (Singh 1998). At the same time,
though, Canadian men over 65 years old have participated in the labor
force at lower rates. In 1921, 70 percent of men from the 65+ age group
participated in the labor force; by 1996, only 10 percent of them were
doing so. Women from the 65+ age group have also participated at lower
rates (e.g., 19 percent in 1921 and 3.5 percent in 1991), but recently,
older women (65+ years) have participated at slightly increasing rates,
with 3.6 percent in 1992 and 3.7 percent in 1993 (Singh 1998).
Ruhm (1991) concluded that the aging population and lower participation rates among workers above 65 years old have resulted in an
“explosion” of interest in later-life labor force behavior. Another trend
that has attracted widespread attention is related to a period of employment between career employment and full retirement (Herz 1995),
known as bridge employment (Ruhm 1990; Doeringer 1990). Initial
research on bridge employment has shown that it is primarily part-time
in nature, it is often in a different sector and industry than career
employment, and it is frequently characterized by lower wages than
career employment (Doeringer 1990). In addition, bridge employment
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has many implications for institutional and public policies. For example, a public-pension scheme which “clawbacks” benefits as a result of
earned income is a clear deterrent to work after early retirement (Singh
1998). The implication is that bridge employment is increasingly
becoming an important phenomenon which warrants further investigation (Doeringer 1990; Marshall 1995).
The purpose of this chapter is to propose and test a model of work
after early retirement. In the next section, we review past research on
the labor force behavior of older workers, bridge employment, and
nonstandard employment. We then use the information provided by
the literature to build a model of work after early retirement. The
model consists of three basic elements. First, we propose that many
individuals experience a period of bridge employment between career
employment and full retirement. Second, those who return to work
after early retirement are likely to accept nonstandard employment for
both supply and demand reasons. And third, standard/nonstandard
employment is hypothesized to be related to a multitude of factors,
including health status, financial resources, work history, macroeconomic conditions, and individual and demographic characteristics. The
next section outlines the research methods used to test the elements of
the model. The last two sections provide the results and contain discussion and implications.

PAST RESEARCH
Labor Force Participation of Older Workers
The study of older workers’ labor force behavior dates back to the
1940s, when descriptive studies were used to show a positive relationship between retirement and poor health (Wentworth 1945; Steckler
1955). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, economists examined work
disincentives contained in Social Security (in the United States). Evidence indicated a positive relationship between retirement and the
receipt of Social Security benefits (Boskin 1977; Boskin and Hurd
1978). At the same time, the emergence of private pension plans
prompted investigations of the impact of the structure of such plans on
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retirement. It was found that private pension plans subsidized early
retirement and penalized delayed retirement, and once the subsidies
were removed, older workers tended to postpone the age at which they
left the labor force (Mitchell and Fields 1984).
In addition to poor health and inadequate financial resources, other
factors were also seen as driving the retirement decision. First, Beck
(1985) found that workers in high-status occupations and those who
were employed in core industries were more likely to retire at or near
their expected age. In addition, Hayward and Grady (1986) and Hayward and Hardy (1985) reported that individuals in occupations that
require low physical demands and are characterized by high growth
rate and substantively complex work were more likely to participate in
the labor force. Second, Peracchi and Welch (1994) and McDonald
and Wanner (1984) showed that the probability of leaving the labor
force was highest during a recession. Finally, a small number of studies have shown that the retirement behavior of women and minorities is
different from that of white men (Gustman and Steinmeier 1986; Ward
and Dale 1992; Pienta, Burr, and Matchler 1994). For example, Pienta,
Burr, and Matchler (1994) found that women who were more “familyoriented” (i.e., took time off to raise a family) were less likely to participate in the labor force in their later lives than those who were “workoriented” (i.e., continuous attachment to the labor force).
Bridge Employment
Research on retirement has assumed that the retirement decision is
a permanent and complete withdrawal from the labor force (Marshall
1995). Contrary to this assumption, Doeringer (1990) argued that a
small but significant number of older workers return to work after their
initial retirement. In Canada, Monette (1996) reported that 13 percent
of individuals over 50 years old returned to work after their initial
retirement. In the United States, Ruhm (1991) showed that 60 percent
of the respondents from the Retirement History Survey ended their
career jobs before the age of 60 years, but fewer than 20 percent were
retired before the age of 60 years. Herz (1995) used three waves of the
Current Population Survey to confirm that the level of bridge employment has increased over time.
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Research on work after early retirement parallels that on retirement
in terms of the factors that were investigated. Health status and financial resources received detailed attention. In this regard, Parnes and
Sommers (1994) showed that work after early retirement was deterred
by poor health. Ruhm (1990) reported that individuals with higher
earnings or those who were receiving a pension were less likely to participate in postretirement work than those with lower earnings or no
pension. Similarly, Boaz (1987) argued that work during retirement by
both men and women is a response to low and moderate levels of nonwage income at the beginning of retirement, and for men work is a
response to a decrease in the real value of nonwage income during
retirement.
In addition to good health and inadequate financial resources,
occupational characteristics were shown to affect postretirement
employment. Myers (1991) reported that managers were more likely
to participate in work after retirement than nonmanagers. Similarly,
Beck (1985) showed that professionals, managers, proprietors, and
farmers were more likely to reject retirement than other occupational
groups. In addition, Holden (1988) found that men who performed
more physically demanding jobs were less likely to work in retirement
than those who performed less physically demanding jobs.
Nonstandard Employment
On one hand, it is clearly shown that many older workers return to
work after their initial retirement. They are likely to do so for a number of reasons: 1) health, 2) financial resources, 3) work history, 4)
macroeconomic conditions, and 5) other individual characteristics. On
the other hand, there is evidence to show that nonstandard forms of
employment have increased over the years. While there is no precise
definition for nonstandard employment, it is generally accepted to be
any form of employment other than full-time, full-year employment
with an employer (Polivka and Nardone 1989; Cordova 1986; Bronstein 1991). Within this boundary, it is reported that nonstandard forms
of employment account for 30 percent of the Canadian labor force
(Betcherman et al. 1994). It is also argued that nonstandard employment is likely to become the norm with the institutionalization of flexibility in the allocation of labor (Lerner 1994; Rifkin 1996; Smith
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1994). This is supported by Betcherman et al. (1994), who showed that
nonstandard employment has increased from 24 percent in 1975 to 30
percent in 1993.

MODEL OF WORK AFTER EARLY RETIREMENT
Based on the literature reviewed above, we propose a model of
work after early retirement that comprises three basic elements (Figure
1). Element 1 of the model proposes that many individuals return to
work after early retirement for a period of bridge employment (Marshall 1995; Herz 1995; Ruhm 1990; Doeringer 1990; Singh 1998).
Returnees are likely to face a different labor market than the one
which existed at the time they initially entered a phase of career
employment. The “new” labor market is characterized by less demand
for workers on the whole (i.e., organizations seek to “do more with
less”). More importantly, there exists a tendency against the employment of older workers (Hutchens 1988). This behavior may stem from
negative stereotypes which employers entertain about older workers
(Mazerolle and Singh 1999). For example, employers often assume
that older workers are less likely to retrain, to remain for a long period
of time in the labor market, to be regular, and to be productive (CARNET 1995). In fact, research has shown that bridge employment is
characterized by part-time employment (Monette 1996; Iams 1987;
Ruhm and Sum 1988; Ruhm 1991) and lower wages (Doeringer 1990;
Ruhm 1991). Hence, Element 2 of the model proposes that as retirees
return to the labor market, they are more likely to be found in nonstandard employment such as part-time employment and self-employment.
Element 3 of the model proposes that standard/nonstandard
employment is related to 1) health status, 2) financial resources, 3)
work history, 4) macroeconomic conditions, and 5) individual and
demographic characteristics. Individuals in good health have stronger
desire and ability to return to work (Quinn 1977; Anderson and
Burkhauser 1985; Breslaw and Stelcner 1987; Parnes and Sommers
1994; Morrow-Howell and Leon 1988; Holden 1988), and those in
good health, who return to work, are more likely to do so in standard
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Figure 1 A Model of Work after Early Retirement
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employment. The reservation wage for individuals who have fewer
financial resources is likely to be lower than those who have greater
financial resources. As such, those who have fewer financial resources
are more likely to return to work. They are also more likely to do so in
standard employment (Burtless and Moffitt 1985; McDonald 1994;
Ruhm 1990). Life course theorists argue that it is important to examine
later-life labor force behavior in terms of work history because of the
interrelationship between the main life course events of school, work,
and retirement (Marshall 1995). High levels of unemployment can
reduce the likelihood of labor force participation (i.e., the discouragedworker effect). Periods of high unemployment are also characterized
by fewer standard employment opportunities. Individuals who left
career jobs during periods of high unemployment are less likely to
return to work, and if they do so they are more likely to occupy nonstandard employment (Peracchi and Welch 1994; McDonald 1994).
Individual and demographic characteristics can also affect the decision
to return to work. For example, women follow different retirement patterns than those of men (Honig 1985).
In summary, we propose three basic elements of a work after early
retirement (return-to-work) model.
1) For many early retirees, we expect a period of bridge employment
between career employment and full retirement.
2) For those who return to work, we expect them to do so primarily
in nonstandard employment (i.e., part-time employment and selfemployment).
3) We expect the standard/nonstandard employment decision to be
related to health status, financial resources, work history, macroeconomic conditions, and individual and demographic characteristics.
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RESEARCH METHODS
Data
The data for this study are taken from the Survey of Work and Lifestyle Activities (SWLA), conducted among 6,846 Bell Canada employees who left the company between 1985 and 1995. Questionnaires
were sent by mail to a sample of 3,614 of the 6,846 individuals in July
1995. This sample was arrived at by enumerating the 45–50 age group
and randomly selecting 50 percent of the remaining group (above 50
years old).1 Enumerating the 45–50 age group was done to ensure
enough respondents from the “younger retirees” group. From the 3,614
potential respondents, 38 did not reply due to poor health, death, or
relocation. Two thousand one hundred forty-seven individuals returned
completed or partially completed questionnaires, resulting in a 60 percent response rate. Of the 2,147 respondents who returned the questionnaire, 1,772 provided complete information to examine their
patterns of employment and working time after early retirement.
The SWLA has many advantages. It was conducted among retirees of Bell Canada, Canada’s largest telecommunications firm. The
sample includes respondents who voluntarily retired from a long-term
career job. The majority of them left with a special financial settlement, and they were all entitled to a private pension from Bell Canada
at the time of the Survey. The data allow us to distinguish standard
from nonstandard forms of postretirement employment. The data also
contain health, financial resources, work experience, and other individual and demographic characteristics. Macroeconomic conditions at the
time of the transition were available from secondary sources, thus
allowing for a comprehensive analysis of work after early retirement.
The SWLA also has some limitations. The respondents are not
representative of the general Canadian population, in that SWLA
respondents were generally more wealthy than the Canadian population (CARNET 1995). The data set does not contain important information on race and the size of private pensions, which are important
explanations of older workers’ labor force behavior. And it is not
explicitly known whether the respondents prefer their chosen work patterns. Nevertheless, we conclude that the advantages far outweigh the
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disadvantages. Further, the data provide a good window to examine
patterns of employment and working time among a selected set of early
retirees.
Variables and Measures
Dependent variable
We created a nominal-category variable with three mutually exclusive groups as the dependent variable. The respondents were asked to
state either “yes” or “no” to the following question: “Have you ever
worked for pay since leaving Bell?” Those who returned to work were
asked to report the following information on their four most recent
postcareer jobs: 1) “Were you working for someone else or were you
self-employed?”, 2) “Was this job full-time or part-time work?”, and 3)
“Was this a full-year job or part of a year?”, with one to six months
being part year. We then used the information from these questions to
allocate the respondents into three groups: 1) retired (i.e., did not work
for pay since leaving Bell Canada); 2) returned to standard employment (i.e., full-time full-year); and 3) returned to nonstandard employment (i.e., part-time and self-employment).
Independent variables
Individuals were asked to report either “yes” or “no” to the following question: “Are you limited in the kind or amount of activity you
can do because of a long-term condition or health problem; that is, one
that is expected to last six months or more?” We consider those who
responded “yes” to the question to be in “poor health.”
Six financial-related variables were examined. Entitlement to a
full and immediate pension, the receipt of public pension benefits
(Canada/Quebec Pension Plan and Old Age Security), the ownership of
investments, and a mortgage-free home all indicate greater financial
resources. The ownership of a debt over $5,000, on the other hand, signifies fewer financial resources.
Six work-related variables were also investigated. Tenure at Bell
Canada was measured in years. Occupations were separated into four
groups based on union membership—managers, white-collar workers,
blue-collar workers, and union members who were either from the
white-collar or blue-collar group but did not provide information to
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categorize them into either group. Career mobility followed four different patterns: 1) upward, 2) upward and lateral, 3) lateral, and 4)
downward. We used 10 questions to distinguish intrinsic job satisfaction from extrinsic job satisfaction.2 And we created a measure for the
centrality of work to individuals.3
The post-1990 period was characterized by higher levels of unemployment than the 1985–1990 period. As such, we created a dummy
variable with 1 representing the post-1990 period and zero otherwise.
Seven individual and demographic variables were also examined.
Gender, postcareer training, marital status, working status of spouse,
and male with a working spouse were all defined by a dummy variable
with one representing respectively female, undertook postcareer training, married, has a working spouse, and is a male with a working
spouse. Education was divided into three categories: below high
school, between high school and university, and university education.
Age at leaving was measured in years.
Data Analysis Techniques
In order to test the first two elements of the model, we examined
the frequency distribution for the sample to detect retirement, return to
standard employment, or return to nonstandard employment. We then
used multinomial logistic regression analysis to simultaneously control
for the effect of health status, financial resources, work history, macroeconomic conditions, and individual and demographic characteristics
on standard/nonstandard employment. Multinomial logistic regression
analysis is the most appropriate technique given that the dependent
variable is defined as a nominal-category outcome with three mutually
exclusive categories (Singh 1998). This analysis shed light on the third
element of the model.

RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive results. The first row of Table 1 shows
the distribution of the sample in terms of retirement, returning to standard employment, or returning to nonstandard employment. It pro-
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Table 1 Descriptive Statisticsa
Dependent variable
Retired

Percentage of the sample
61

Returned to standard employment

7

Returned to nonstandard employment

32

Independent variables

Means

Health limitation

0.19
(0.39)

[Full and immediate pension]b

0.18
(0.38)

Reduced pension

0.72
(0.45)

Deferred pension

0.10
(0.30)

Canada/Quebec pension plan

0.50
(0.50)

Old age security

0.23
(0.42)

Investments

0.66
(0.45)

Mortgage-free home

0.73
(0.44)

Debt over $5,000

0.20
(0.40)

Tenure

32.1
(6.22)

[Managers]

0.49
(0.50)

White-collar workers

0.17
(0.38)

Blue-collar workers

0.26
(0.44)

Unknown union member

0.08
(0.28)

[Upward career mobility]
Upward and lateral career mobility

0.15
(0.36)
0.49
(0.50)
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Independent variables

Means

Lateral career mobility

0.20
(0.40)

Lateral and downward career mobility

0.16
(0.37)

Intrinsic job satisfaction

21.17
(3.96)

Extrinsic job satisfaction

8.91
(1.56)

Work attachment

0.24
(0.43)

Left after 1990

0.54
(0.50)

Female

0.36
(0.48)

Age at leaving

55.72
(4.17)

[Below high school education]

0.64
(0.48)

Between high school and university

0.28
(0.45)

University education

0.08
(0.27)

Postcareer training

0.15
(0.36)

Married

0.83
(0.38)

Working spouse

0.30
(0.46)

Male with working spouse

0.22
(0.41)

Number of observations
a

1,772

Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b Square brackets represent reference category for subsequent multivariate analysis.
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vides strong support for the first element of the model. The first
element of the model proposes that, for many older workers, a period
of bridge employment exists between career employment and full
retirement (Herz 1995; Marshall 1995; Doeringer 1990). Thirty-nine
percent of the respondents returned to either standard or nonstandard
employment after early retirement.
The results also provide strong support for the second element of
the model. The second element of the model proposes that postretirement employment is likely to be characterized by nonstandard employment (Hutchens 1988; Mazerolle and Singh 1999; CARNET 1995;
Monette 1996; Iams 1987; Ruhm and Sum 1988; Ruhm 1991). Of the
39 percent who returned to work, 83 percent of that group returned to
nonstandard employment. Retirement was the most likely choice (61
percent), followed by nonstandard employment (32 percent) and standard employment (7 percent).
Standard Employment
Multinomial logistic regression of standard employment, relative
to retirement holding nonstandard employment constant, provides
strong support for the third element of the model (Table 2). The third
element of the model hypothesizes that standard/nonstandard employment significantly relates to health status, financial resources, work history, macroeconomic conditions, and individual and demographic
characteristics. Individuals who reported a health limitation were less
likely to return to standard employment than those who did not report a
health limitation. Although this relationship is consistent with a priori
expectation (Quinn 1977; Anderson and Burkhauser 1985; Breslaw
and Stelcner 1987; Parnes and Sommers 1994; Morrow-Howell and
Leon 1988; Holden 1988), it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
But the results show strong associations between standard employment and the financial-related variables. Individuals who were entitled
to a deferred pension relative to a full and immediate pension as well as
those who owned a debt over $5,000 were more likely to become
employed in standard employment. In contrast, the ownership of a
mortgage-free home was associated with a lower probability of standard employment. Clearly, the results provide strong support for the
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Table 2 Multinomial Logit Estimates of Standard and Nonstandard
Employmenta

Independent variables
Health limitation

Standard
employment/
retirement

Nonstandard
employment/
retirement

–0.23
(0.15)

–0.12
(0.27)

Reduced pension

0.25
(0.24)

0.69
(0.48)

Deferred pension

1.16
(0.32)***

0.32
(0.60)

Canada/Quebec pension plan

–0.04
(0.17)

0.73
(0.32)**

Old age security

0.21
(0.22)

0.38
(0.46)

Investments

–0.21
(0.14)

–0.23
(0.25)

Mortgage-free home

–0.34
(0.15)***

0.22
(0.25)

Debt over $5,000

0.57
(0.16)***

0.10
(0.25)

Tenure

0.02
(0.01)

–0.01
(0.03)

White-collar workers

–0.16
(0.23)

0.07
(0.53)

Blue-collar workers

–0.58
(0.18)***

0.38
(0.38)

Unknown union member

0.31
(0.24)

–0.03
(0.41)

Upward and lateral career mobility

–0.01
(0.17)

–0.60
(0.36)*

Lateral career mobility

–0.26
(0.21)

–0.89
(0.42)**

[Full and immediate pension]b

[Managers]

[Upward career mobility]
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Independent variables
Lateral and downward career mobility

Standard
employment/
retirement

Nonstandard
employment/
retirement

–0.85
(0.25)***

–0.70
(0.56)

Intrinsic job satisfaction

–0.003
(0.02)

–0.04
(0.03)

Extrinsic job satisfaction

–0.02
(0.04)

–0.06
(0.08)

Work attachment

0.56
(0.15)***

–1.05
(0.23)***

Left after 1990

–0.63
(0.15)***

0.43
(0.26)*

Female

–1.10
(0.20)***

0.24
(0.42)

Age at leaving

–0.07
(0.02)***

–0.06
(0.04)

Between high school and university

0.19
(0.14)

–0.10
(0.24)

University education

0.17
(0.23)

–0.15
(0.36)

Postcareer training

0.94
(0.17)***

0.12
(0.25)

Married

0.08
(0.19)

–0.35
(0.40)

Working spouse

0.31
(0.25)

0.87
(0.70)

Male with working spouse

0.03
(0.29)

–0.76
(0.73)

Constant

3.56
(1.53)**

5.22
(2.68)**

[Below high school education]

–2*Log likelihood ratio

2436.70***

Number of observations

1,772

deviations are in parentheses. ***= p ≤ 0.01, **= p ≤ 0.05, *= p ≤ 0.10.
bSquare brackets represent reference categories.
aStandard
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hypothesis that fewer financial resources induce standard employment
after early retirement (Burtless and Moffitt 1985; McDonald 1994;
Ruhm 1990).
The results also show clear associations between standard employment and various dimensions of work history. Blue-collar union members were less likely to return to standard employment (Beck 1983,
1985; Myers 1991; Morrow-Howell and Leon 1988; Hayward, Hardy,
and Liu 1994). Blue-collar union members, it can be argued, have
fewer skills that are applicable in the general labor market (Singh
1998). Lateral and downward career mobility is associated with a lower
probability of standard employment than upward career mobility.
Singh (1998) argued that lateral and downward career mobility reflect
“blocked career goals.” Lateral and downward career mobility recipients are less likely to return to standard employment because they may
see no prospects for career growth. And the respondents who reported
an above average attachment to work were more likely to become
employed in standard employment (Parnes and Sommers 1994).
The macroeconomic environment at the time of the transition from
career employment was also an important factor in the standard
employment decision. The post-1990 period was characterized by
higher levels of unemployment that translated into a lower probability
of standard employment (Peracchi and Welch 1994; McDonald 1994).
And finally, the results show strong associations between standard
employment and many individual and demographic characteristics.
Females were clearly less likely to become employed in standard
employment (Honig 1985). The older one left career employment, the
less likely he or she was to become employed in standard employment
(Hardy 1991). Postcareer training activities were positively correlated
with standard employment after early retirement (Hill 1995; Myers
1991).
Nonstandard Employment
Multinomial logistic regression of nonstandard employment, relative to retirement holding standard employment constant, also provides
support for the third element of the model (Table 2). Receiving Canada/Quebec Pension Plan benefits was associated with a higher probability of nonstandard employment. Canada/Quebec Pension Plan
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recipients are more likely to explore part-time employment (nonstandard employment) where they are allowed to earn approximately
$7,000 before earned income is used to “clawback” Canada/Quebec
Pension Plan benefits (Singh 1998). Respondents who experienced
upward and lateral as well as lateral career mobility were less likely to
return to nonstandard employment than those who experienced upward
career mobility. According to Singh (1998), there is no room to
explore “blocked career goals” in nonstandard employment. Interestingly, respondents who reported an above average attachment to work
were less likely to become employed in nonstandard employment. For
these workers, it was either standard employment or retirement, not
nonstandard employment. And periods of high unemployment (post1990) were clearly associated with a higher probability of nonstandard
employment.
Summary of the Results
The results show strong support for all three elements of the work
after early retirement model. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents
returned to work after early retirement. A large majority (83 percent)
of those who returned to work had done so in nonstandard employment. And the standard/nonstandard employment decision was
affected by a number of factors that include financial resources, work
history, macroeconomic conditions, and individual and demographic
characteristics.
Perhaps the only surprising result is the relationship between the
return-to-work decision and poor health. Although the sign on the
health-limitation variable is negative as expected (Quinn 1977; Anderson and Burkhauser 1985; Breslaw and Stelcner 1987; Parnes and
Sommers 1994; Morrow-Howell and Leon 1988; Holden 1988), the
relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Many
reasons can account for this result. Potentially, poor health plays a less
important role in the labor force participation decision among Canadian workers who do not have to “carry” the cost of health care. Also,
the accommodation of health limitations engendered in Ontario’s statute may work to diminish work disincentives. And finally, selfreported health status may contain biases. Stated differently, older
workers may justify the retirement decision on poor health.
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DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In the traditional life course, individuals progressed through the
main life course events of school, work, and retirement in an orderly
sequence. Moreover, the transition from one event to another was
often irreversible. For instance, an individual who made the transition
from work to retirement did not go back to work. Retirement was construed as an event in which an individual made a complete and a permanent withdrawal from the labor force (Singh 1998). The model
proposed and tested in this chapter provides an alternative to this
widely conceived view. Our results clearly show that 39 percent of the
respondents returned to a period of bridge employment after early
retirement. Hence, the results of our chapter are consistent with an
“emerging” view of the life course (Marshall 1995; Singh 1998). Individuals often “juggle” two or more of the life course events (e.g.,
school and work, work and retirement, or school, work, and retirement). Moreover, the orderly sequence of the traditional model is no
longer applicable for many individuals.
Nonstandard employment has become increasingly important in
the labor market (Polivka and Nardone 1989; Cordova 1986; Bronstein
1991; Betcherman et al. 1994), perhaps because of the institutionalization of the flexible allocation of labor (Lerner 1994; Rifkin 1996;
Smith 1994). Our results show that 83 percent of the respondents who
returned to work had done so in nonstandard employment. Two possible scenarios emerge from this relationship. If nonstandard employment accords with the preferences of early retirees, then they may
become an invaluable source of labor in a market which “fosters flexibility.” But if nonstandard employment does not match the preferences
of early retirees, then the situation reflects a “suboptimum” use of older
workers. Our results imply support for the second scenario. Individuals who were more “attached” to work were more likely to become
employed in standard employment relative to retirement. At the same
time, though, these same workers were less likely to become employed
in nonstandard employment relative to retirement. In addition, periods
of high unemployment were more likely to lead to nonstandard
employment. Nevertheless, our evidence only implies that early retir-
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ees would prefer standard employment after career employment. This
relationship clearly warrants further investigation.
Research on the labor force behavior of older workers has shown a
clear link between the retirement decision and poor health as well as
adequate financial resources. This perhaps relates to the assumption
that retirement means a complete and a permanent withdrawal from the
labor force. More importantly, the factors that surround the work-toretirement transition (such as poor health and adequate financial
resources) are most important. Our results indicate that in addition to
the “conventional determinants” of later-life labor force behavior, there
are other important factors. Work history clearly affected the decision
to become employed on a standard/nonstandard basis. Blue-collar
union membership and lateral and downward career mobility deterred
standard employment, while above average work attachment promoted
standard employment. An investigation of the relationship between
later-life labor force behavior and work history must continue for one
important reason—the world of work has undergone a significant
transformation (Kochan, Katz, and McKerzie 1994). Changes such as
the “end of the psychological contract,” technological advancement,
and diversity are likely to change work behavior. And changes in work
behavior can subsequently affect the ways in which an individual
decides to divide his or her time in terms of labor market activities and
leisure (Singh 1998).
The return-to-work decision runs counter to the assumption that
retirement means a permanent and complete withdrawal from the labor
force. This assumption is the basis for many public and institutional
policies. In Canada, for instance, an individual cannot accrue partial
pension benefits for work after early retirement. Annuities are calculated at the “retirement time,” and subsequent employment spells are
not the basis for additional pension benefits (Singh 1998). In addition,
our results show that nonstandard employment is positively related to
the receipt of Canada/Quebec Pension Plan benefits. We argue that this
relationship may be driven by the fact that an individual is allowed to
simultaneously receive Canada/Quebec Pension Plan benefits and
income from employment up to about $7,000. Unemployment rates
are also directly related to standard/nonstandard employment. It is also
noteworthy that postcareer training activities are positively related to
standard employment. The implication is that the Canada/Quebec Pen-
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sion Plan, macroeconomic policies, and training initiatives can all be
used as policy instruments to promote either standard or nonstandard
employment.
The results also have implications for human resource management. The decision to return to standard/nonstandard employment
after early retirement is affected by both extrinsic and intrinsic reasons.
Inadequate financial resources clearly underlie the standard employment decision, but so does work attachment. Compensation practices
must reflect this reality. One of the most important challenges in terms
of compensation is associated with the deferred compensation model.
This model of compensation assumes that a worker is entitled to a lifetime income that is tied to his or her productivity. In the first half of the
employment period, the individual is paid below his or her productivity
level. In the latter half of the employment period, the individual is paid
above his or her productivity level. The crucial question for employers
is whether to treat returnees as “new” entrants and restart the deferred
compensation model. Currently, work after early retirement is characterized by lower wages (Ruhm 1990; Doeringer 1990). This may be a
powerful deterrent to a committed and motivated older workforce, but
this is an untested assumption that warrants further investigation.
Beginning in the year 2011, the front end of the baby boom generation will approach the conventional age of retirement (65 years old).
Issues of when and how they decide to make the work-to-retirement
transition are likely to become increasingly important. Our results
indicate that they do not have to follow the traditional model of a permanent and complete withdrawal from the labor force. Many of them
are likely to gradually withdraw from the labor force. This means
rethinking the issue of retirement and public and institutional policies,
which are increasingly becoming outdated.

Notes
The authors are grateful to Human Resources Development Canada for financial assistance and the Centre for Studies of Aging, University of Toronto, for access to data collected in a survey financed by Human Resources Development Canada under the
“Issues of an Aging Workforce” project.
1. The results presented in this study are based on weighted data which corrected for
the initial stratification by age.
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2. A factor analysis (extraction = principal component, number of factors = 2, and
rotation = varimax) of the following 10 items—1) there was a lot of freedom to
decide how I do my work; 2) I did the same thing over and over; 3) the pay was
good; 4) my chances of promotion for career development were good; 5) I like my
job; 6) I enjoyed the people I worked with; 7) the work I did was one of the most
satisfying parts of my life; 8) some of my main interests and pleasures in life were
connected with my work; 9) to me, my work was just a way of making money;
and 10) the benefits were good. These resulted in the identification of two underlying factors: Items 1), 2), 5), 8), and 9) loaded onto one factor, and items 3), 4),
and 5) onto the other. The first factor is interpreted as intrinsic job satisfaction,
and the second factor as extrinsic job satisfaction. Scales using the respective
items were subsequently constructed. The Cronback Alpha for intrinsic satisfaction was 0.75 and that for extrinsic satisfaction was 0.46.
3. Work attachment is measured with a multidimensional scale. Respondents were
asked to indicate (on a four-point likert-type scale, with 1 being “never” and 4
being “often” how often did they: “miss the feeling of doing a good job”; “feel
that [they] want to go back to work”; “worry about not having a job”; and “miss
being with other people at work.” The responses to these items were added
(Cronback Alpha = 0.79).
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Working Time over the Life Cycle
Do Public Pensions Matter?
Michael Baker
University of Toronto
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University of Toronto

The steady reduction of the labor force attachment of older workers is one of the most significant changes in working time in the past
half century. Over the same time period, governments in Canada and
the United States have enhanced their public pension programs. An
obvious policy question is whether these two trends are causally
related: Has the increased generosity of public pension programs led
to rising retirement rates? This possibility is the topic of lively debate
with few conclusions. While some researchers suggest it is no coincidence that retirement patterns mirror key features of public pension
plans, others point out that the trend in retirement appears invariant to
periodic reform of program parameters, and thus attribute only a minor
role to public pensions. A resolution of this disagreement is important
for a variety of reasons. First, some view the progress of the baby
boom through the labor market as an emerging policy concern. As the
“employment hierarchy” becomes increasingly top heavy, there is a
perceived need to draw older workers into retirement to make room for
younger cohorts. Public pension plans are potentially an important
means through which the government could affect such a policy. Second, people are increasingly aware that the fiscal health of “pay-asyou-go” public pension plans is quickly deteriorating.1 Again, information on the behavioral effects of system rules must be a building
block of the therapy needed to restore financial stability. Finally,
retirement behavior can potentially shed light on important questions
of labor supply and life-cycle behavior. For example, part of the
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expanding literature on liquidity constraints focuses on the decision of
many workers to exploit the “early retirement provisions” available in
some pension plans.
The principal difficulty facing previous researchers is the lack of
exogenous policy variation with which to identify the effect of pensions on labor supply. The greater part of these past studies focus on
the U.S. Social Security system. This research has been spurred by the
availability of (panel) data sets such as the Retirement History Survey
that provide a good view of the labor market behavior, wealth, and
Social Security entitlements of older Americans. Yet the very structure
of Social Security is a hindrance to these efforts. It is a federally mandated program with rules that apply uniformly to all parts of the country. Therefore, evaluation of program changes must rely on time-series
variation in retirement behavior, and it can be difficult to distinguish
secular trends from the effects of a policy intervention. An alternative
is to exploit cross-section variation in Social Security entitlements.
While everyone faces the same program parameters at a point in time,
differences in earnings histories, for example, will translate into different Social Security entitlements, and hence different potential retirement benefits. Unfortunately, because earnings histories are probably
correlated with other important determinants of labor market outcomes, this source of variation may not be reliably exogenous to the
retirement decision.
Short of a pure natural, or real, experiment, the next best alternative would be cross-jurisdictional/time-series variation in program
parameters that provide a number of “natural” control groups for any
policy given variation. As long as differences in the timing of changes
can be treated as exogenous, we could use the cross-jurisdictional variation to identify possible behavioral effects. One strategy would be to
pursue a cross-national, comparative approach, for example, comparing Canada with the United States. Unfortunately, there are too many
differences in the pension plans in the two countries to isolate the effect
of a specific program parameter. An alternative exists within Canada.
While it is a curse in many other dimensions, a benefit of constitutional
wrangling to social scientists is that it has led to two distinct pension
programs. The Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) covers those working in
the province of Quebec, while the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) covers
workers in the rest of the country. These plans are virtually identical in
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most respects, but there have been significant differences in the timing
of reforms of certain key parameters. These reforms can be used to
isolate the effect of the policy change by comparing the behavior of
older workers in the two otherwise identical jurisdictions, before and
after the policy change in each jurisdiction.
For example, in 1975 the CPP eliminated the earnings test (or
retirement test), whereby CPP benefits were reduced in proportion to a
pensioner’s employment income. The QPP did not eliminate its earnings test until 1977. Thus, for two years there was a divergence of this
pension parameter in the two jurisdictions. Another episode occurred
in 1984, when the QPP introduced early retirement provisions, permitting workers to initiate their (actuarially reduced) pensions at age 60
instead of 65. It was not until 1987 that the CPP allowed early retirement. Again, there is a three-year window through which one can
compare retirement behavior in the two jurisdictions under different
rules.
The cross-jurisdictional variation has recently drawn the attention
of researchers. For example, in Baker and Benjamin (1999a) we examined the possible consequences of the removal of the earnings test on
the labor force attachment of men over 65. In Baker and Benjamin
(1999b) we investigated the impact of early retirement provisions on
the labor force decisions of men between 60 and 64 years old. Finally,
Gruber (1996) exploits a CPP/QPP divergence in disability pensions.
In 1987, the CPP increased its disability insurance (DI) benefits (not
retirement benefits) to match those in the QPP. Gruber estimates
whether this relative increase in DI benefits affected the labor force
behavior of men younger than 60 outside Quebec.
In this chapter we focus on the divergence of early retirement provisions between 1984 and 1987, extending the results in Baker and
Benjamin (1999b). Here we use time-series Labour Force Survey
(LFS) data to determine whether the change in pension policy was
associated with a change in retirement behavior: Did Canadians take
advantage of the new early retirement provisions? In fact, we find little
evidence that retirement age was affected by this significant policy
change. While many men between the ages of 60 and 64 certainly
began collecting public pensions, few appear to have changed their
labor force behavior in order to do so; most of the new pensioners had
weak labor force attachment, or would probably have retired anyway.
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To follow up on this hypothesis, we employ the Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) individual-level panel data to examine the previous
labor force attachment of the 1987 retirees. The results from this exercise provide some confirmation of the evidence provided by the timeseries data.

TRENDS IN RETIREMENT
In this section we review trends in the labor force attachment of
older workers in Canada using census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990.
Sample sizes are large enough to allow relatively precise estimation of
the association between age and work over the life cycle. Our main
objective is to document the change in employment rates for men and
women over this 20-year period. Since “working time” has many
dimensions, however, we also investigate the degree to which older
men and women appear to be moving into part-time work.
In Figure 1 we plot age profiles of employment–population ratios
for men and women. Looking first at the results for men, we can see a
strong association between age and the probability of working. In
1970, for example, the probability of working begins to fall slightly at
age 55, then declines much more steeply at age 65. Most significantly,
the position of this profile has shifted over time, with the drop in
employment rates beginning much sooner, falling most steeply
between ages 60 and 65. In terms of timing, 1970 to 1980 saw an especially large drop in employment for those men older than 65, while
between 1980 and 1990, the greatest drop was for men between 60 and
65, precisely the age group affected by the introduction of early retirement to the CPP/QPP. The results for women are more ambiguous,
mostly because of the secular increase in women’s labor force attachment at all ages. Thus, there has only been a small net decrease in the
number of 60- to 65-year-old women working over this period.
Clearly, disentangling the secular increase in women’s employment
from possible changes in their retirement behavior would require a
careful accounting of age and cohort effects—something that would be
difficult to do with available data.
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Figure 1 Age/Employment Profiles for Men and Women

NOTE: The graphs are plots of the average proportions of the population employed
(reporting positive weeks worked) in the previous (reference) year, calculated for single age groups. The data are from the Public Use Microdata Files (individual level)
of the Censuses of Canada, 1971, 1981, and 1991.
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Figure 2 Age/Part-Time Employment Profiles for Men and Women

NOTE: The graphs are plots of the average proportions of the population employed
mostly part-time in the previous (reference) year, calculated for single age groups.
The data are from the Public Use Microdata Files (individual level) of the Censuses of
Canada, 1971, 1981, and 1991.

Working Time over the Life Cycle

187

An important question in the retirement literature is whether withdrawal from the labor force is gradual or is characterized by a transition through part-time work. We attempt to look at this question
indirectly in Figure 2. Without panel data that track individuals, the
transition from full- to part-time work cannot be identified; however,
the census data still permit a snapshot of the relationship between age
and the propensity to work part time. For men, we can see that while
part-time work is rare, it is most prevalent among the elderly. The
probability in 1990 of working part time increases from around 0.04
for 45-year-olds and peaks at about 0.08 for 65-year-olds. Over time,
however, the probability of part-time work has fallen, moving in the
same direction as the probability of working at all. In the next panel,
we see that women are much more likely than men to work part time
and that this probability tracks the participation/age profile, so that
women are less likely to work part time as they get older. As with their
overall employment patterns, women are more likely to work part time
in 1990 than they were in 1970.
In summary, these figures suggest that the most important change
in the working time of Canadian men has been the steady decrease in
retirement age. Furthermore, there is no evidence that men are more
likely to work part time along the way from full-time work to complete
retirement. The retirement picture for women is complicated by the
dominant trend toward greater participation over the past 20 years.
Given this additional complication, the remainder of our work
addresses the retirement behavior of men.

THE CANADIAN PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM
Here we provide a brief overview of the Canadian public pension
system as it is currently constituted. At this point, however, we do not
distinguish between the CPP and QPP because they are virtually identical. Instead we highlight comparisons with U.S. Social Security, postponing discussion of the 1984 policy divergence to a later section. The
first distinguishing feature of the Canadian system is that income support for the elderly is comprised of three distinct programs. First is the
CPP/QPP, which are typical public pensions, much like Social Secu-
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rity. Benefits are based on individual earnings histories.2 The other
two programs are age-based transfers. Old Age Security (OAS) is paid
to all Canadians over the age of 65.3 For most of its history, OAS has
been a pure lump-sum transfer; however, OAS benefits are now
reduced through the income tax system if income exceeds a threshold.
The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is an income-tested transfer
program for individuals over 65. These transfers are directed at relatively poor seniors, and the means test has an implicit 50 percent taxback rate for all earnings, including CPP.
In Figure 3, we show the value of monthly benefits for these three
programs for the period corresponding to the census data reported in
Figures 1 and 2. The upward trend in generosity is quite clear: The
maximum monthly CPP and GIS benefits increased significantly
between 1970 and 1990, while OAS benefits remained virtually constant (in real terms). The secular increase in real monthly benefits from
the public pension system has been offered as a possible explanation
for the retirement trends evident in Figure 1.
Figure 3 Real Monthly Benefits of Canadian Social Security Programs,
1967–1991

NOTE: The Social Security programs are CPP (Canada/Quebec Pension Plan); OAS
(Old Age Security); and GIS (Guaranteed Income Supplement). CPP and GIS are
reported as the maximum monthly benefit. Data are from CCH Canadian Limited
(1996).
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The Canadian and U.S. systems differ slightly in terms of the age
at which individuals can begin collecting benefits. In both programs
the normal retirement age is 65, when an individual can collect his full
entitlement of benefits. In the United States, early retirement is an
option for individuals between the ages of 62 and 64, with an actuarial
reduction in benefits of seven percent per year by which the individual
is younger than 65. While collecting Social Security, the usual earnings test (retirement test) applies, whereby benefits are reduced by onethird for every dollar earned above a cut-off. In Canada, the early
retirement age is lower, as CPP benefits can be initiated by individuals
between 60 and 64. The actuarial reduction is similar to that in the
United States, at 0.5 percent per month that the person is under age 65.
For early retirement there is a weak retirement test, and earnings must
be less than the maximum CPP benefit in the month prior to retirement.
After eligibility has been so “established,” no further earnings test is
applied. For the other two old-age transfer programs, early retirement
is not possible, and an individual must be at least 65 years old to collect
benefits.

HOW PUBLIC PENSIONS MIGHT AFFECT
RETIREMENT DECISIONS
Our focus in this section is an evaluation of the likely effects of the
introduction of early retirement provisions on retirement behavior.
Why should the retirement age in a pension plan matter for work decisions?
Theoretical Possibilities
In most circumstances, early retirement provisions should have no
effect on retirement behavior. Consider an individual at age 59 who is
deciding what age to retire. For each year he works, he increases his
lifetime earnings by W (his salary, ignoring discounting). At age 65, he
can retire (if he wishes) and begin collecting his public pension (plus
whatever private pension he has). Given this budget constraint, he
decides how much he wants to work. In the absence of early retirement
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provisions he could still retire at, say, age 62—he merely has to wait
until age 65 to begin collecting his pension. If capital markets are perfect, he could just borrow against this future income stream. The date
he begins receiving a check from the government should not constrain
his labor supply choice. Whether the introduction of early retirement
affects his retirement decision will depend on whether the provision
changes his budget constraint.
There are a few possibilities. If the adjustment of the pension is
actuarially fair—fully adjusting for the implied reduction in pension
contributions of the early retiree, as well as the value of the advancement of pension payments and longer payout period—then, by definition, the average person’s budget constraint should not change. Of
course, for some individuals with private information about shorter life
expectancies, or for those with high discount rates relative to the average in the population, early retirement may now represent a bargain.
Let’s assume that the actuaries can take care (in principle) of these
adverse selection problems on average (which, of course, they cannot).
Our interest is in the effect of early retirement on the “average” person.
The only way that early retirement provision will matter is if the budget constraint changed. One way this can happen is if the actuarial
adjustment is unfair on average. In Baker and Benjamin (1999b), we
showed that the actuarial adjustment in the CPP/QPP was unfair, so
that there is a small subsidy to early retirement, i.e., the penalty for
early initiation of the CPP is too small. This subsidy changes the budget constraint, unambiguously tilting an individual toward earlier
retirement. While the subsidy is small on average (about $3,000 in
present value terms for retiring at age 60 compared to age 65), it is
almost double for lower-income men, since the reduction in CPP benefits is made up in part by higher GIS benefits at age 65. So for poorer
men, the implicit subsidy received from early retirement may represent
a large fraction of household wealth and thus exert a large retirementinducing income and substitution effect.
Another way that early retirement can change the budget constraint
is if there are liquidity constraints, i.e., if individuals cannot borrow
against their social security wealth at the same interest rate that is used
in the actuarial reduction of benefits. For such individuals whose early
retirement is constrained by lack of credit, allowing them to collect
retirement benefits sooner may relax this constraint, facilitating their
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retirement. To the extent that these constraints are important, as might
be the case with lower-income men, then we might see an increase in
retirement as early retirement is permitted.
Previous Evidence
As suggested earlier, there is considerable disagreement in the literature over the link between Social Security and the behavior of older
workers. The most obvious evidence in favor is the spike in the retirement hazard at age 62, the earliest age when individuals can initiate
Social Security benefits. This point is emphasized in Hurd (1990).
Hurd and Boskin (1984) also pointed out that retirement at age 62 is
positively related to individual peaks in social security wealth. Kahn
(1988) emphasized the role of liquidity constraints by showing that
low-wealth individuals are more likely to retire at age 62 than highwealth individuals, though it is difficult to fully control for the fact that
high-wealth individuals also have a greater opportunity cost of retirement. Finally, Ruhm (1995) focused on the change in the spike at age
62 over time. By the process of elimination, he shows that it is difficult
to explain the increased probability of retirement at age 62 with
changes in individuals’ characteristics (such as education) that are
associated with individuals’ opportunity costs. This leaves Social
Security as the remaining explanation.
Counterarguments are based on two types of evidence. First, it is
difficult to formally link changes in Social Security provisions to
changes in retirement behavior. For example, Krueger and Pischke
(1992) examined the retirement behavior of the so-called “notch” generation. The 1977 revisions to Social Security permanently lowered
the social security wealth of all successive birth cohorts relative to previous cohorts. If social security wealth is an important determinant of
retirement patterns, one would expect the “notch” cohorts to exhibit
different behavior. The authors find virtually no effect of these revisions. The second type of evidence points to deteriorating labor market
conditions for older men as a driving force toward early retirement.
Peracchi and Welch (1994), for example, emphasized that characteristics associated with poor labor market outcomes are becoming increasingly important predictors of retirement. In a Canadian context,
Osberg (1993) showed that early retirement decisions bear striking
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similarity to constrained labor supply decisions. An extreme interpretation of these findings would suggest it is thus a pure coincidence that
early retirement has increased while pensions have become more
attractive. Of course, a fairer summary of both perspectives would recognize that both factors may be at play.
Exploiting a Policy Divergence
It is difficult to identify the effects of early retirement provisions
on individual behavior when everyone faces the same program parameters, or when people differ in systematic ways that may cloud the social
security aspects of their labor force decisions. This difficulty is common to countries that have national plans. Policy interventions or
reforms tend to be universal in application and so are perfectly correlated with time. In these cases the effects of any coincident temporal
shock to the labor market can be easily mistaken for the effects of the
reform itself. Ideally, what is sought is a reform that affects only a randomly selected subgroup of the eligible population. In this case, those
individuals who are not affected by the reform serve as a comparison
group to control for any secular trends in and/or shocks to labor market
behavior.
Of course, the strict requirements of a random experiment are
unlikely to be satisfied by the reforms that we observe of national pension plans around the world. These conditions can be approximated,
however, in so-called “natural experiments.” We now turn to a description of the divergence in early retirement provisions in the CPP and
QPP, why we think it can reasonably be viewed as an “experiment,”
and our empirical analysis of the apparent responses of Canadians to
the policy change.
The Introduction of Early Retirement Provisions
The original provisions of both the CPP and QPP allowed public
pensions to be collected starting at age 65. The issue of introducing
more flexible age provisions was debated in the late 1970s, partly in
response to calls for rules that were consistent with those observed in
the pension plans of other countries. The QPP took the lead for reform
in 1984. Starting in January of this year, individuals were allowed to
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initiate pension receipt at any time between the ages of 60 and 70. An
individual’s “full pension,” based on his or her employment and earnings history, continued to be available at age 65 only. Application at an
earlier age led to an actuarially adjustment of a 0.5 percent reduction in
the full pension for each month the age of application preceded 65
(e.g., 6 percent per year). Symmetrically, pensions were increased 0.5
percent for each month the age of application exceeded age 65. A final
provision was that individuals initiating a pension before age 65 had to
have substantially ceased working, as evidenced by a low earnings
requirement in the year of application. There was no further retirement
test for future years, however, so an individual could resume paid
employment at a “regular” salary after the year of application.
These early retirement provisions of the QPP were in effect for
three years before an identical reform was enacted in the CPP. Part of
the reason for the delay appears to be that the province of Ontario was
initially very cool to extending the benefits to individuals younger than
age 65, and this province has effective veto over changes to CPP
parameters. Nevertheless, starting in January 1987 individuals covered
by the CPP had choice over the age at which they initiated benefit
receipt, subject to the same restrictions present in the QPP.4 Because
the reforms of the programs are sequential, for each reform we have
access to a control group to account for any trends in labor market
behavior that might be unrelated to the pension changes. For the QPP
reform in 1984, for example, we can compare the retirement decisions
of Quebecers before and after the introduction the new provisions, relative to the behavior of individuals in other parts of Canada. For the
reform of the CPP in 1987, the two groups trade roles: it is now individuals in the rest of Canada who are subject to the reform and those in
Quebec who serve as the comparison group.
The legitimacy of this strategy is founded on assumptions that any
secular trends in retirement behavior or shocks coincident with the
reforms, are common to individuals in the group affected by the policy
intervention and those in the comparison group. Our confidence in
these assumptions is strengthened by the fact that the variation in the
incidence of the reform in each case is geographical. While geographic-specific shocks are certainly a possibility, this sort of variation
is arguably less problematic than variation based on age or some other
demographic characteristic that is clearly a factor in labor market activ-
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ity. As explained below, we attempt to control explicitly for regionspecific labor market shocks. Furthermore, we observe the reform
twice, so its effects are overidentified. Consistency of our estimates of
the impact of the changes across the two reforms serves as a check that
we are not erroneously attributing the effects of the introduction of
early retirement provisions to a shock.
A Graphical Overview
We begin by examining CPP and QPP benefit expenditures and
“savings” over the period of the reforms. This should provide a direct
view of the popularity of the early retirement provisions. In Panel A of
Figure 4, we plot the 1971–1994 time series of QPP and CPP benefit
expenditures using the population 65 years of age and older as a normalization.5 The series for the two programs follow each other quite
closely until 1983. Entering the period when the early retirement rules
differed between the two programs (1984–1986), a wide gap opens up
between the QPP and CPP series: QPP benefits significantly increase
relative to those in the CPP. The gap then closes in 1987 when early
retirement became possible in the CPP. This symmetric opening and
closing of a gap in the benefits paid out by public pension plans is
strongly suggestive of a policy response. In Panel B, we examine pension program “savings,” defined as the difference between program
expenditures and contributions. As is well-known, both the CPP and
QPP moved from running an annual surplus to an annual deficit over
the 1980s and early 1990s. We can also see some effect of the introduction of the early retirement rules, as the relative rate of decrease in
savings accelerates in the QPP beginning in 1984, and in the CPP in
1987.
While the preceding evidence suggests that the policy intervention
had implications for program finances, it is not yet clear that there is a
labor supply dimension. There are a number of ways to measure retirement, and we adopt a variety of approaches to provide a comprehensive
view of changes in individuals’ labor market attachment over the
period. We focus on the 60–64 age group. Our data are annual averages for the years 1980–1994, taken from the monthly LFS. In panel A
of Figure 5 we plot the employment rates for this age group in the two
jurisdictions. A distinctive secular decline in employment is evident in
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Figure 4 CPP and QPP Benefits Paid Out and Savings

NOTE: The graphs show the average CPP and QPP benefits paid per capita,
calculated as the ratio of total benefits to the population aged 65 and older. CPP/QPP
savings are the difference between revenue and expenses for the CPP and QPP, again
normalized the population 65 and older. Data are from the CANSIM, Statistics Canada.
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Figure 5 Employed Population Rate

NOTE: The graphs show the average proportion of the population employed in the reference week. The proportions are calculated as annual averages from monthly tabulations of the Labour Force Survey. The CPP average is calculated over all provinces
except Quebec, while the QPP average is calculated from Quebec only.
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both series, as suggested by the census data. Also, in the early 1980s a
gap emerges between the rates in Quebec and the rest of the country. It
appears to widen in the middle and particularly the end of the decade,
before narrowing somewhat in the early 1990s. There is no obvious
evidence in this figure, however, that the introduction of early retirement to the QPP leads to an excess decrease in Quebec employment in
1984–1986, nor that there is a complementary effect in the rest of Canada after 1987. In fact, the only prominent deviation in the rates is the
fall in Quebec’s employment in 1989, but this has no simple correlation
with the policy reform.
In panel B we plot the difference in the employment rates between
those aged 60–64 and 55–59 to control for any jurisdiction specific
business cycle effects that might be influencing employment. This
should reduce the possibility that differential business cycle conditions
between Quebec and the rest of Canada will lead to spurious differences in labor market outcomes over the window of the policy divergence. In fact, this picture reveals that the emergence of the Quebec/
rest of Canada (ROC) gap in panel A appears to be due to some wider
influence on the Quebec labor market that affected younger workers as
well. Again, there is no evidence of an effect of the two policy interventions.
Figure 6 contains complementary series of “not in labor force”
(NILF) rates. In panel A we see that there is a distinct increase in the
rates over the period, and a Quebec/ROC gap emerges in 1981 coincident with the gap in employment rates. Also, there is little evidence of
an excess decrease in labor market participation when the QPP early
retirement policy is introduced, although it is not trivial to infer differences in slopes from these figures. In panel B we again use age group
differences, and again the most significant Quebec/ROC deviation
occurs in the late 1980s after the policy intervention has occurred in
both jurisdictions.
In Figure 7 we examine the time-series variation in retirement; the
data are from self-reported activity when not in the labor force. It is
clear that retirement rates in this age group grew over the period. Starting at roughly 11 percent in the early 1980s, they almost double in all
parts of the country over the period. Also, it appears that the rates
move from one plateau to another, with most of the growth occurring
over the period of policy reform. It is also clear, however, that the
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Figure 6 Population Not in Labor Force

NOTE: The graphs show the average proportion of the population out of the labor force
in the reference week. The proportions are calculated as annual averages from
monthly tabulations of the Labour Force Survey. The CPP average is calculated over
all provinces except Quebec, while the QPP average is calculated from Quebec only.
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Figure 7 Retired Population Rate

NOTE: The graphs show the average proportion of the population reporting their main
activity out of the labor force as “retired” in the reference week. The proportions are
calculated as annual averages from monthly tabulations of the Labour Force Survey.
The CPP average is calculated over all provinces except Quebec, while the QPP average is calculated for Quebec only.
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growth occurs simultaneously in Quebec and the ROC. This result is
confirmed in the age 60–64/56–59 differences, again suggesting no
obvious effect of the policy interventions.
A possible indirect effect of the policy intervention is that it led to
a “relabeling” phenomenon; individuals who are not employed may be
drawn out of the labor force as the support of pension benefits becomes
available. They may prefer to report themselves retired instead of
unemployed, or to collect pension benefits when UI benefits are
exhausted. To investigate this possibility, in Figure 8 we graph the
incidence of unemployed among the not employed over the period. At
the beginning of the period the rate is higher in Quebec, but it falls
below the ROC level as the QPP reforms are introduced in 1984. Furthermore, a marginally higher rate is restored in Quebec once the complementary reform of the CPP is completed. In the differenced data
this effect is even clearer, as in Quebec the relative rate falls well below
the ROC level starting in 1984.
Finally, in Figure 9 we examine hours worked in the reference
week, conditional on working. Here again there is little evidence of an
effect of the policy and the series for Quebec display quite erratic
swings.
Regression Results
The graphical analysis documents the effect of the QPP/CPP
reform on the finances of the public pension plans, but it provides little
evidence of corresponding effects on the labor supply of 60- to 64year-olds. It is difficult, however, to construct the cross jurisdiction
“difference in differences” estimates from these pictures. We next turn
to a more formal analysis of the policy reform, which provides a direct
view of these estimates and allows us to control for other factors that
may affect the behavior of this age group.
The LFS data provide quarterly observations on labor market
attachment by province, while the data on CPP/QPP expenditures and
contributions are provided annually. Using annual observations from
both data sets, we estimate the model as
yit = β1 + β2QUEit + β3t + β4Y84it + β5QUEit × Y84it + β6Y87it
+ β7QUEit × Y87it + εit,
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Figure 8 Unemployed Category

NOTE: The graphs show the average proportion of those not working who are classified as unemployed. The proportions are calculated as annual averages from monthly
tabulations of the Labour Force Survey. The CPP average is calculated over all provinces except Quebec, while the QPP average is calculated from Quebec only.
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Figure 9 Average Hours Worked (if Working)

NOTE: The graphs show the average weekly hours worked, conditional on working at
least one hour per week. The means are calculated as annual averages from monthly
tabulations of the Labour Force Survey. The CPP average is calculated over all provinces except Quebec, while the QPP is calculated from Quebec only.

Working Time over the Life Cycle

203

where QUEit is a Quebec effect, Y84it = 1 if t ≥ 1984 and 0 otherwise,
and Y87it = 1 if t > 1987, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, β5 is an estimate
of the Quebec/ROC difference of a “trend break” in the dependent
from 1984 onward, when the QPP reforms were put in place. β7 provides a complementary estimate for the years from 1987 onward, when
the reforms were introduced to the CPP.
Aggregating within years and across provinces (other than Quebec) has the effect of smoothing out much of the seasonal noise in the
data, as is evident in Figures 4–9. To more fully account for this source
of variation, both genuine and sampling-based, we estimate a slightly
different specification, using the quarterly averages of the data, as well
as exploiting variation across provinces in the rest of Canada. In this
specification we add quarterly dummy variables to the equation as well
as a full set of province effects.6
In the first two rows of Tables 1 and 2, we use our measures of
CPP/QPP pension benefits and savings from Figure 4 as dependent
variables. The key coefficients are the Quebec interaction terms. In
both the annual and quarterly data, Quebec experiences a significant
positive trend break (relative to the ROC) in benefit expenditures in
1984 with the advent of the QPP reforms. This confirms the suggestion
in Figure 4 that an additional Quebec/ROC gap in benefit expenditure
emerged with this policy intervention. The ROC makes a complementary shift in 1987, closing the gap with Quebec that opened in 1984.
Again the timing is coincident with the reform of the CPP in this year.
The estimates for savings provide a mirror image on these results. QPP
savings shift downward relative to their CPP counterpart starting in
1984, but there is a corresponding relative decline in CPP savings starting in 1987. Together, these results point to significant effects of the
policy change on the use of public pensions, and a resulting deterioration of program finances.
In rows 3 and 4 of Tables 1 and 2 we examine the employment
rates of 60- to 64-year-olds to see whether there is a corresponding
movement out of the labor force. The point estimate of QUEit × Y84it
suggests Quebec did experience a (relative) negative trend break in
1984. This result is insignificant in the annual data but significant in
the quarterly data. On the other hand, there is no corresponding relative shift in employment in the ROC in 1987. In the next row we use
the 60–64/55–59 difference in employment rates as the dependent vari-
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Table 1 Difference-in-Difference Estimates, Annual Data (Rest of
Canada versus Quebec)a
Y84b

Y87b

Que × Y84c

Que × Y87c

CPP benefits (per 65+)

54.23
(73.00)

519.50
(72.18)

375.35
(87.58)

–684.33
(88.94)

CPP savings (per 65+)

240.34
(128.97)

–277.89
(127.53)

–707.93
(154.73)

149.38
(157.14)

Dependent variable

Employment rate, 60–64

–0.017
(0.017)

0.001
(0.017)

–0.026
(0.021)

–0.019
(0.019)

Difference in employment
rates (60–64 minus 55–59)

–0.036
(0.018)

–0.039
(0.019)

–0.007
(0.023)

–0.026
(0.020)

Retirement rate, 60–64

0.014
(0.011)

0.028
(0.012)

0.021
(0.015)

0.015
(0.013)

Difference in retirement
rates (60–64 minus
55–59)

0.021
(0.013)

0.026
(0.014)

0.009
(0.017)

0.019
(0.015)

Unemployment category,
60–64

0.005
(0.011)

–0.047
(0.011)

–0.033
(0.014)

0.016
(0.012)

Difference in
unemployment category
(60–64 minus 55–59)

–0.007
(0.020)

0.038
(0.021)

–0.022
(0.025)

0.008
(0.022)

NILF, 60–64

0.014
(0.015)

0.022
(0.015)

0.038
(0.019)

0.012
(0.017)

Difference in NILF rate
(60–64 minus 55–59)

0.030
(0.108)

0.033
(0.019)

0.023
(0.023)

0.016
(0.020)

Hours worked (if working)
60–64

0.484
(0.605)

1.309
(0.629)

–0.216
(0.776)

–0.963
(0.688)

Difference in hours
worked (if working),
(60–64 minus 55–59)

0.301
(0.514)

1.102
(0.535)

0.476
(0.660)

–0.867
(0.585)

a

Annual data for labor market variables are annual averages of quarterly tabulations of
the Labour Force Survey, for Quebec and the “Rest of Canada” (ROC), provided by
Statistics Canada, 1980–1994. For the CPP/QPP measures, the data are annual totals
of benefits paid out, or “savings” (revenue less expenses), deflated by the CPI (1994
dollars), expressed on a per capita basis (for population 65 years and older). The CPP
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results compare aggregate payouts to CPP and QPP. The data are based on administrative reports, from Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management System
(CANSIM). The sample covered by the CPP/QPP data is 1975–1993. The labor
force variables are relatively standard: a) employment rate is the employment–population ratio; b) retirement rate is the percentage of the population reporting that they
are retired; c) unemployed category is the share of those not working who are unemployed; d) not in labor force is the percentage of the population not in the labor force;
e) hours worked (if working) are mean weekly hours, conditional on working. The
levels rows show the estimated effects for the 60–64 age group, while the difference
rows are the difference in these rates from a “base” group of the 55–59 age group.
b Y84 and Y87 are coefficients on variables indicating year ≥ 1984 and year ≥ 1987.
c Que_Y84 and Que_Y87 are the interactions of these variables with a Quebec dummy.
Other controls include a linear trend and a Quebec dummy.
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Table 2 Difference-in-Difference Estimates, Provincial Level Dataa
Que × Y84c Que × Y87c

Y84b

Y87b

CPP benefits (per 65+)

36.20
(30.89)

475.06
(29.49)

375.78
(47.09)

–639.13
(48.10)

CPP savings (per 65+)

152.08
(60.92)

–331.54
(58.15)

–713.13
(92.84)

143.41
(94.84)

Dependent variable

Employment rate, 60–64

–0.017
(0.007)

0.001
(0.007)

–0.025
(0.011)

–0.019
(0.010)

Difference in employment
rates (60–64 minus 55–59)

–0.035
(0.006)

–0.037
(0.006)

–0.005
(0.010)

–0.024
(0.008)

Retirement rate, 60–64

0.013
(0.004)

0.025
(0.004)

0.021
(0.006)

0.015
(0.005)

Difference in retirement rates
(60–64 minus 55–59)

0.019
(0.004)

0.022
(0.004)

0.009
(0.007)

0.018
(0.006)

Unemployment category,
60–64

0.004
(0.004)

–0.047
(0.005)

–0.031
(0.008)

0.017
(0.007)

Difference in unemployment
category (60–64 minus
55–59)

0.001
(0.007)

0.043
(0.008)

–0.025
(0.013)

0.012
(0.010)

NILF, 60–64

0.013
(0.006)

0.020
(0.007)

0.037
(0.011)

0.012
(0.010)

Difference in NILF rate
(60–64 minus 55–59)

0.028
(0.005)

0.029
(0.006)

0.022
(0.010)

0.015
(0.008)

Hours worked (if working),
60–64

0.389
(0.333)

1.104
(0.357)

–0.210
(0.587)

–0.926
(0.502)

Difference in hours worked (if
working), (60–64 minus
55–59)

0.127
(0.242)

0.824
(0.259)

0.496
(0.426)

–0.796
(0.364)

a

Labor market variables are quarterly province-level averages based on tabulations of
the Labour Force Survey, provided by Statistics Canada, 1980–1994. For the CPP/
QPP measures, the data are province-level annual totals of benefits paid out, or “sav-
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ings” (revenue less expenses), deflated by the CPI (1994 dollars), expressed on a per
capita basis (for population 65 years and older). The data are based on administrative
reports, from CANSIM. The sample covered by the CPP/QPP data is 1975–1993.
The labor force variables are relatively standard: a) employment rate is the employment-population ratio; b) retirement rate is the percentage of the population reporting
that they are retired; c) unemployed category is the share of those not working who
are unemployed; d) not in labor force is the percentage of the population not in the
labor force; e) hours worked (if working) are mean weekly hours, conditional on
working. The levels rows show the estimated effects for the 60–64 age group, while
the difference rows are the difference in these rates from a “base” group of the 55–59
age group.
b Y84 and Y87 are coefficients on variables indicating year ≥ 1984 and year ≥ 1987.
c Que × Y84 and Que × Y87 are the interactions of these variables with a Quebec
dummy. Other controls include a linear trend, province and quarter dummies.
Regressions are weighted by the provincial population (60–64 for labor market variables, total population for CPP/QPP).

able. Here we try to partial out any region specific business cycle
effects that may be simultaneously affecting employment. In both data
sets, the estimates suggest that any trend breaks experienced in 1984
were shared equally by individuals in Quebec and the ROC. Furthermore, in 1987 Quebec experiences the relative decrease in employment, that has no correlation with our policy experiment. Overall,
consistent with Figure 5, there is little evidence of a policy effect in
these data.
In rows 5 and 6 we conduct a similar analysis of self-reported
retirement rates. In the “simple” results we see a relative upward shift
in retirement rates in Quebec starting in 1984. This effect is accentuated in 1987, however, as the estimate of QUEit × Y87it is both positive
and significant. In the “difference” results there is little evidence that
the different timing of CPP/QPP reform had any affect on the retirement trends.
The next two rows contain the results for unemployment rates
among the population who are not working. The simple results reveal
a coherency with the policy reform. There is a negative (relative) trend
break in Quebec starting in 1984 and in the ROC starting in 1987.
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Once we turn to the differenced data, however, the results are not as
clear, and we now observe a positive trend break in the ROC starting in
1987. This may reflect the fact that as the economic expansion in the
latter part of the 1980s takes hold, the proportion of the unemployed
among those not working for most age groups falls. To the extent that
the old (like the young) are among the last to experience the benefits of
the expansion, the fall in their proportion will lag that of other groups.
An analysis of NILF is presented in rows 9 and 10. In the simple
results (quarterly data) we again find some evidence of a policy effect.
There is a significant positive trend break in Quebec starting in 1984.
We also see an upward shift in the ROC in 1987, although this appears
to be shared by individuals in Quebec. As has been the case for most
of the other variables, however, once we compare 60- to 65-year-olds
to 55- to 59-years-olds (who should be unaffected by the policy
change) there is little evidence of a policy effect.
Finally, in the last two rows we examine hours among those who
worked in the reference week. It is not obvious how the policy change
should affect hours. One possibility is that early retirement leads to
marginal reductions in hours; for example, by a move to part-time
work. However, if the availability of pensions draws workers with
marginal attachment out of employment, we might expect to see average hours actually increase among those who continue working due to
a selection effect. The results, however, display little consistent evidence of either possibility.
These data, therefore, provide little evidence that the policy intervention had a labor supply effect. Moreover, many of the changes in
labor force attachment for the 60–64 age group appear to be common
to all parts of the country, or part of larger trends that affected younger
individuals as well. The strongest evidence is of a relabeling effect, as
individuals who are not working moved out of the labor force (from
unemployment to retirement) in tandem with the policy reforms. Our
results thus suggest that while many Canadians took advantage of the
opportunity to collect early retirement benefits, few changed their labor
supply in order to do so. Whatever forces were driving Canadians to
retire earlier continued to do so, in equal measure, in Quebec and the
rest of Canada. The only difference was that instead of waiting to
receive benefits at age 65, benefits could be started right away.
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A Closer Look at the Elderly
To follow this hypothesis more closely, our final exercise is to use a
panel data set, the 1986–1987 LMAS, to examine the labor market
activity of individuals in the years surrounding the reform of the CPP.
The LMAS has a single variable capturing the receipt of “pension
income” in the calendar year. Cross checking this variable with the
incidence of different types of pensions in the 1987 and 1988 SCFs, the
LMAS variable appears to capture both public and private pension
income. Therefore, we do not obtain a clean measure of individuals
collecting CPP or QPP pension income from this survey. The 1988
SCF data indicate that roughly one-third of individuals, aged 60–64,
collecting private or public pensions in 1987, collected a private pension but not CPP or QPP.
We examine the labor market activity of males in the rest of Canada between the ages of 59 and 63 as of January 1987.7 Summary
means for 1986 and 1987 are presented in Table 3. We focus on two
types of individuals: males who started receiving pension income in
1987 and thus presumably took advantage of the early retirement provisions of the CPP as they became available, and males who had no
pension income in either 1986 or 1987.8 The first three rows indicate
that males who initiated pension receipt in 1987 are much more dependent on transfer income in 1986 than males in the no pension group.
The incidence of UI is seven percentage points higher, and they have
twice the rate of Social Assistance receipt. The higher rate of UI
receipt continues in 1987 as pension benefits are initiated. The picture
here is that some of these individuals are cycling through UI (and presumably unemployment) into a pension.
In the next four rows we examine labor market activity. By weeks
worked, total hours, and the incidence of no weeks, males who initiated pension receipt in 1987 had less labor market attachment in 1986
than those who didn’t. By 1987 the difference is more dramatic, as
nearly one-half of these new pensioners are not employed for the entire
year.
These results suggest that individuals who took advantage of the
early retirement provisions in the public pension plans had a relatively
loose attachment to the labor market. The differences are perhaps less
striking than they might be, but we identify the individuals who initiate
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Table 3 Selected Characteristics of Males in the Rest of Canada
Initiating Pension Receipt in 1987a
1986

No pension
income in
1986 or 1987

Started
receiving
pension
income in
1987

No pension
income in
1986 or 1987

0.16

0.09

0.16

0.09

0.07

0.04

0.03

0.04

0.08

0.02

0.07

0.04

Started
receiving
pension
income in
1987

UI
Social assistance
Workers’ compensation
benefits

Sample

Total hours
Weeks worked if
employed
Weeks worked = 0

1987

907.5

1320.0

502.6

1294.7

44.5

49.6

37.4

50.0

0.31

0.08

0.47

0.10

Retired from a job

0.34

0.04

—

—

Primary school education
or less

0.39

0.33

—

—

SOURCE: 1986–1987 Labour Market Activity Survey.
Sample sizes: males with no pension income in 1986 or 1987, 916; males who started
to receive pension income in 1987, 215. Sample includes males aged 59–63.

a

CPP receipt in 1987 with error. Furthermore, the contamination comes
from individuals who only collect private pension income. This group
is likely to have higher skills and resources than average. For example,
in the 1988 SCF, 19 percent of this group, aged 60–64, has a university
education compared to just 4 percent of individuals who receive public
pension income. They also have twice the employment rate (51 percent versus 25 percent), work more if employed (44 weeks versus 29
weeks), and have a higher rate of labor market participation (55 percent
versus 28 percent; all figures for the reference year). Therefore, the
inclusion of this group in sample implies that the statistics in Table 3
likely overstate the labor market attachment of individuals who initiated CPP receipt in 1987.
Thus, these results show that a good number of the “early retirees”
in 1987 were not simply part of the trend toward early retirement
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sweeping North America, but they were also workers who weren’t
working anyway. Their behavior is not the kind envisioned by those
who designed the early retirement provisions. It appears instead that
the new CPP and QPP recipients that initiated their benefits before age
65 either weren’t working or wouldn’t have worked anyway.

CONCLUSION
In 1980, over 60 percent of men between the ages of 60 and 64
were working; by 1994, this had fallen to 50 percent. In the intervening years, the Canadian government had introduced early retirement
provisions to its public pension plan, making it easier for 60- to 64year-olds to receive pension benefits. Was there any causal relationship
between the change in pension policy and the increase in retirement
rates? In this chapter we exploit a difference in the timing of the introduction of early retirement provisions in the two public pension programs in Canada, the CPP and the QPP. Our results suggest that there
is no obvious link in the timing of these changes and changes in men’s
labor market behavior. However, we find that there was a strongly
associated increase in the collection of pension benefits in each jurisdiction that lines up perfectly with the staggered introduction of early
retirement. Early receipt of pensions was clearly popular. Why don’t
we observe any corresponding change in working time, given the
increase in pension receipt? Our results suggest two explanations.
First, there was a steady downward trend in employment probabilities
that was unaffected by early retirement. The only difference was that
the new retirees could collect pension benefits, whereas their predecessors had to wait until they were 65. Second, many of the new pension
recipients were men who wouldn’t have been working anyway—men
who had only weak labor force attachment. In this dimension, at least,
and looking only at the short-run response to the policy change, it does
not appear that public pensions had much of an impact on working
time over the life cycle.
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1. For a summary of the public finance issues associated with retirement and Canadian public pension plans, see Baker and Benjamin (2000).
2. The details of how benefits are computed and the historical evolution of these
plans are described in Baker and Benjamin (1999), Burbidge (1987), and CCH
Limited (1996).
3. Baker (forthcoming) provides an overview of the provisions of this, and the associated Spouse’s Allowance (SPA), as well as an analysis of their effects on retirement behavior.
4. Some of the legislative and political details of this divergence in opinion are documented in Baker and Benjamin (2000).
5. CPP/QPP benefit expenditures and contributions are available through CANSIM.
6. CPP/QPP expenditures and contributions are only available on an annual basis.
Therefore, for these series we use the annual specification with the addition of the
province effects.
7. We do not use the data for Quebec. The cross check with the Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF) data suggests that in 1986 the LMAS pension variable for this
province captures public pensions or private pensions, but not both. On the other
hand in 1987 it appears that the variable does capture both types of pensions. We
have tried to find an explanation for these inconsistencies such as differences in
the wording of the French and English questionnaires, or any changes in the
French survey over the period. So far our attempts, as well as the efforts of Statistics Canada officials, have failed to uncover an explanation.
8. In our sample, 54.6 percent of males have no pension income in either year, 27.8
percent have pension income in each year, 11.9 percent start to receive pension
income in 1987, and 5.8 percent stop receiving pension income in 1987.
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Part III

8
Self-Employment and Schedule
Flexibility for Married Females
Evidence for the United States from SIPP
Theresa J. Devine
Office of the Public Advocate for New York City

As the employment rate for prime-age married women in the
United States rose through the 1980s, their self-employment rate rose
by more. As shown in Figure 1, 9.4 percent of employed married
women aged 25–55 were self-employed in their primary jobs in 1990,
up from 5.7 percent in 1975.1 Self-employment rates for previously
married and never-married women also rose but stayed relatively low.
Figure 1 Self-Employment of Employed Married Women in the
United States, 1975–1990
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In 1990, married women represented three out of four self-employed
women, versus just over half of all wage-and-salary women.
Self-employed married women report substantially lower earnings
on average than their wage-and-salary counterparts (Devine 1990,
1994). They are also more likely than their wage-and-salary counterparts to work a lot of hours, and they are even more likely to work relatively few hours (Devine 1990, 1994). There is evidence of limited
availability of jobs with either very high hours or very low hours in the
wage-and-salary sector (Altonji and Paxson 1988, 1992; Lang and
Kahn 2001; Blank 1994). Taken together, these findings suggest that
married women’s self-employment could be a way to exercise more
control over work schedules than typically possible in the wage-andsalary sector.
This chapter presents new evidence on this work schedule hypothesis from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).2
The SIPP data are useful for this purpose for several reasons. Each
SIPP interview collects relatively detailed information on job characteristics and work schedules (weeks worked, usual hours, and deviations from usual schedules). SIPP is longitudinal, so changes in usual
schedules and self-employment status can be measured, and SIPP
interviews are just four months apart, which means that short-term
change may be measured quite accurately. SIPP also collects detailed
information on business characteristics (including husband/wife business ownership, legal status, and number of employees). The combination of labor market activity, business characteristics, and household
characteristics data makes SIPP a relatively rich data source for the
study of self-employment in the United States. The following section
describes the SIPP data and sample used here. Since these data are
complex, subject to misinterpretation, and have not been used widely,
this discussion is relatively detailed. The next sections present a summary of the characteristics of self-employed women, relative to wageand-salary women and nonworking women, followed by evidence on
schedules and self-employment. Included here is the evidence on husband/wife business ownership and reported earnings. The last section
concludes with some final thoughts.
Several findings point to a potential relationship between selfemployment and scheduling. First, self-employed and wage-and-salary women report very different usual hours of work. In comparison to
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the distribution of hours for wage-and-salary women, the distribution
of hours for self-employed women exhibits greater mass in the upper
tail and particularly the lower tail. Second, self-employed women tend
to deviate from their usual schedules more frequently. Relative to fulltime wage-and-salary women, full-time self-employed women are
more likely to temporarily cut back their hours to part-time. Third,
both full-time and part-time self-employed women tend to change their
usual schedules more often during a single year. Fourth, self-employed
women are more likely to attribute their part-time hours and schedule
variability to choice, as opposed to insufficient work. Fifth, the data
suggest that self-employment decisions of married women are not
independent of their husbands’ employment and self-employment status. Finally, usual hours of self-employed women exhibit greater correlation with usual hours of their husbands, particularly when their
husbands are also self-employed. All of these findings, while preliminary, provide a basis for future research.

DATA
SIPP is a longitudinal multipanel survey conducted by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census since 1984. Each SIPP panel is a large representative sample of the noninstitutionalized resident U.S. population, with
the household as the basic sampling unit and interviews conducted for
all household members ages 15 and over; the initial 1986 panel consisted of more than 30,000 persons in over 11,500 households.
Approximately one-third of all SIPP interviews are conducted with
proxy respondents, but the likelihood of a proxy interview varies with
demographic characteristics; just 19 percent of the wives studied here
had proxy interviews. SIPP has a relatively short four-month reference
period for each round of interviews (also called a wave), which should
improve respondents’ recall of the incidence, timing, and duration of
events. The detailed SIPP core questionnaire also generates relatively
detailed information about labor market activity, income, personal
characteristics, and household characteristics for each reference period.
Most important for the present study are SIPP’s detailed data on
work schedules, self-employment activity, and business characteristics.

220

Devine

These data, however, are not perfect, and using them accurately takes a
lot of time and care. Most important among limits of the self-employment data is the lack of dates for self-employment within four-month
reference periods. Self-employment status can be measured accurately
only for an entire four-month reference period. In this chapter, a person is categorized as only self-employed or self-employed with wageand-salary employment during the reference period, but the latter does
not mean simultaneous activity.3 In some cases, characteristics are also
reported for a woman’s main job, defined as the job with the maximum
hours reported for the reference period, but uncertainty about the timing of jobs means that the main job label must be interpreted cautiously. In general, one cannot distinguish sequential jobs and
coincident jobs within a four-month SIPP reference period.
A second major limit of the SIPP data is the way that business
information is collected and reported. Information on the legal form of
ownership (corporation, sole-proprietorship, partnership), number of
employees, and other business characteristics is available for up to two
businesses in each wave for each self-employed person—but only if a
respondent expects gross business earnings to be at least $1,000 over
the 12 months following an interview. This might seem like an effective screen for “casual” businesses, but it is problematic in practice.
Expectations change between interviews, leaving gaps in longitudinal
records for some businesses. Even if the $1,000 threshold is passed,
data on business characteristics may not appear on a business owner’s
record. Business characteristics are collected just once per household
business, even if there are multiple owners in a household, and these
data appear only on the record of the person who reports the information.4 The reporting owner’s record has person numbers for up to three
other owners in the household, as reported by this owner, but there is
no pointer on the records of other owners.
If a person is self-employed, his or her record may indicate that
business data have been collected but not from whom, and several factors complicate attempts to find this missing information. There can be
differences in opinion within a household about business ownership
versus work (with or without “pay”) in the family business. Ownership
without self-employment is possible. Self-employed household members can also work in different businesses, even with coownership, so
exact matches of person numbers can be confusing. Industries can be
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used for verification, but this is not foolproof. A single business can
operate in different industries, different businesses can operate in the
same industry, and different descriptions can result in different industry
codes (even at the two-digit level). The data set used below has been
constructed using owner identification information from each interview, additional owner identification information from adjacent interviews (as necessary and available), and industry checks.5
Detailed income information represents one of SIPP’s most attractive features. The most recent hourly wage is collected for each hourly
wage-and-salary job, and total gross earnings in each month is collected for each wage-and-salary job, whether salaried or hourly.
Income data collected for the self-employed depend on expected gross
business earnings. If expected gross earnings are at least $1,000, total
income received from the business as regular salary or other income for
personal purposes is reported by month, accompanied by flags for
receipt of regular salary and receipt of other income. For those expecting low revenue, business earnings net of expenses are collected for the
entire four-month reference period, bounded below by zero.6 Losses
are not reported.
Comparisons of self-employed earnings data and wage-and-salary
earnings data must be made cautiously when using SIPP, like any other
survey. Wage-and-salary earnings may include money that workers
invest, while earnings of the self-employed may exclude business
investment. Wage-and-salary earnings do not include investment
returns, while self-employment earnings may include investment
returns. Nonwage compensation (such as health care and deferred
compensation) differ systematically between wage-and-salary employment and self-employment. The timing of income receipt versus job
performance is yet another issue. Particularly important for the present
study is the distribution of reported earnings among individual family
business owners. A couple may report all business income in one
spouse’s name, for example, which will bias the spouses’ reported individual earnings in opposite directions.
Notwithstanding all of these limitations, the SIPP data have the
advantage of a relatively low nonresponse rate. In the sample used
here, earnings are imputed for just 3.8 percent of wives who report
only self-employment, 3.7 percent of wives who report only wage-andsalary employment, and 5.7 percent of wives who report both.7 Due to
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these low nonresponse rates and the use of reported earnings values for
imputation in the SIPP data set, including or excluding imputed earnings values has essentially no significant effect on earnings distributions. Women for whom imputations were made are excluded only
when earnings data are examined.8
This chapter uses data for a sample of 3,058 women who were
aged 25–55 at the start of 1986, not enrolled in school, not in the armed
forces, married, and living with the same spouse for the first 16 months
of the survey reference period. Much of this chapter focuses on the
wave 1 reference period, which covers four-month intervals spanning
October 1985 to March 1986. The 16 months for waves 1 to 4 extend
through April 1987. 9 As needed, additional variables are defined
below.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIED WOMEN BY
SELF-EMPLOYMENT STATUS
To set the stage for evidence on work schedules, this section first
presents a summary of employment and self-employment activity for
our sample, and then turns to the characteristics of these women, their
jobs, their husbands, and their households.
Self-Employment, Employment, and Work
The first pair of columns in Table 1 summarize employment, selfemployment, and casual work for pay during wave 1 for the entire sample of married women and the subsample with regular employment.
Regular employment is defined in SIPP as an arrangement for “regular”
work for an employer or in a self-owned or family business, but there
are no hours or schedule restrictions in the definition. Overall, twothirds of the women had regular jobs (including a few who reported
unpaid work), and another 2 percent did some casual work for pay in
wave 1.10 Of the women with regular jobs, 1 in 10 reported only selfemployment, more than 1 in 8 reported both self-employment and
wage-and-salary employment, and 1 out of 9 was self-employed in her
main job (using maximum usual hours to assign this label). The sec-
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Table 1 Employment, Self-Employment, and Work of Married Women
Wave 1

Year 1 (waves 1 to 3)

% of
sample

% of
employed

% of
sample

% of
employed

66.6

100.0

72.7

100.0

58.0

87.1

61.4

84.5

8.6

12.9

11.3

15.5

Only self-employed

6.8

10.3

6.9

9.5

Self-employed and wage
and salary

1.7

2.6

4.4

6.0

Self-employed in main joba
(based on usual hours)

7.2

10.8

Casual work for pay when
no regular job

2.4

0.4

4.8

2.7

Some self-employed or
casual work

11.0

13.3

15.7

17.7

Regular job or casual work

68.7

100.0

75.5

100.0

3,058

2,036

3,058

2,223

Activity
Regular job
Only wage and salary
Self-employed in any job

Number of observations
a

Measured only for wave 1 because main job can change.

ond pair of columns in Table 1 presents a comparable summary for the
full first year. More than 1 out of 7 employed wives reported some
self-employment during the year, and nearly 1 out of 10 reported only
self-employment.11 In short, these data indicate that self-employment
represents an important part of married women’s market work activity.
Demographic Characteristics
Table 2 presents demographic characteristics for married women
by wave 1 regular employment, wage-and-salary, and self-employment
status. The age distribution for the women without regular employment (column 1) is bimodal within the 25 to 55 bounds; relatively few
are ages 35 to 44. Relative to employed women, the non-employed
also tend to be less educated, more likely to be Hispanic, more likely to
be immigrants, less likely to be citizens, more likely to be parents or
guardians, and more likely to report a disability. These findings are
generally consistent with previous findings on labor force participation.
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Table 2 Demographic Characteristics of Married Women, by
Self-Employment Statusa,b
Self-employed
No regular
job

Only wage
and salary

Only

With wage
and salary

25–34

38.5

39.1

33.5

34.0

34–44

27.5

34.7

38.3

43.4

45–55

34.1

26.2

28.2

22.6

39.25
(9.17)

38.21
(8.50)

39.08
(8.28)

38.13
(7.73)

20.3

12.3

12.9

11.3

Characteristics
Age (%)

Mean age
Education credentials (%)
None
H.S. diploma/GED

48.0

44.8

47.4

35.9

Some college (no
degree)

13.8

14.7

16.8

17.0

Vocational/technical
certification

1.5

3.5

1.4

1.9

Associate’s degree

3.1

5.3

3.8

11.3

Bachelor’s degree

10.7

13.6

13.4

17.0

Professional degree

0.0

0.6

1.0

1.9

Master’s degree

1.9

4.7

1.9

3.8

Doctorate

0.3

0.5

0.5

0.0

12.19
(2.68)

12.92
(2.55)

12.90
(2.29)

13.40
(2.38)

White – non-Hispanic

84.9

85.2

93.8

96.2

Black – non-Hispanic

4.0

5.6

Other race – nonHispanic

3.5

3.0

3.8

1.9

Hispanic – any race

7.5

6.1

2.4

1.9

Immigrant

10.6

6.9

9.6

3.8

U.S. citizen

93.9

96.7

97.1

96.2

Mean years of school
completed
Race/ethnicity (%)

0.0
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Self-employed
Characteristics

No regular
job

Only wage
and salary

Only

With wage
and salary

Parent/guardian of
children (%)
Under age 1

10.1

4.5

4.3

3.8

Ages 1–5

34.1

23.0

24.9

15.1

Ages 6–14

44.9

41.9

42.6

41.5

Ages 15–17

17.4

21.3

21.5

32.1

Mean number of children

1.5
(1.3)

1.2
(1.2)

1.3
(1.3)

1.4
(1.2)

Work limiting disability
during survey (%)

12.5

5.7

7.7

18.9

Some coverage

87.1

94.6

89.5

92.5

Private health insurance

80.2

93.0

84.7

88.7

1.4

49.4

8.1

26.4

78.5

65.5

72.2

73.6

Military plan
(CHAMPUS or
CHAMPVA)

4.9

3.4

5.3

3.8

Government plan
(Medicaid or
Medicare)

4.3

0.6

1.0

0.0

Health care coverage (%)

Plan through own job
Covered by another
person’s plan

Covered for 12 months

79.0

92.0

84.2

88.7

Number of observations

1,022

1,744

209

53

a

Characteristics in wave 1 reference period unless noted otherwise.
deviations are in parentheses.

b Standard
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Turning our focus to women who report only wage-and-salary
employment versus those who report only self-employment, we
observe that the self-employed women tend to be slightly older, similar
in terms of years of education but less credentialed beyond a high
school diploma, much less likely to be black or Hispanic, more likely to
be immigrants but not less likely to be citizens, and more likely to report
work-limiting disabilities. The self-employed also appear slightly more
likely than wage-and-salary women to be parents or guardians of children under 15.12 These data are also consistent with findings from the
Current Population Survey (Devine 1990, 1994). The small sample size
for women who report both wage-and-salary employment and selfemployment limits what we can say about women in this group. But the
differences between the figures for this group and those for the other
groups of women are notable. The data suggest that these women are
more likely to be between the ages 35 and 44, highly educated, white,
Table 3 Occupations, by Self-Employment Status, Wave 1 (%)

Occupation
Executive, administrative, and
managerial
Professional specialty
Technical and related support
Sales
Administrative support, including
clerical
Household service
Protective services
Other services
Farm operators and managers
Other agriculture
Mechanics and repair
Construction trades
Machine operators, assemblers, and
inspectors
Transportation and material moving
Handlers, helpers, and laborers

Wage and
salary
11.4

Self-employed
With wage and
Only
salary
17.7
7.5

14.6
4.0
10.7
32.1

5.3
1.0
24.9
11.5

17.0
0.0
18.9
18.9

1.2
0.3
12.8
0.1
0.7
0.4
2.1
7.0

3.8
0.0
23.4
3.8
2.4
0.0
3.3
1.9

0.0
0.0
18.9
1.9
3.8
0.0
3.8
7.5

0.7
1.7

0.5
0.5

0.0
1.9
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non-Hispanic, nonimmigrant, parents and guardians of older children,
and to report a work-limiting disability.
Occupations for wave 1 main jobs are shown in Table 3, and these
data exhibit sharp differences by self-employment status. Relatively
large numbers of women who report only self-employment have sales
and service occupations, and relatively few have technical and administrative support occupations. Perhaps most noticeable is the relatively
low percentage of only self-employed women in professional specialty
occupations, but this category includes teachers and nurses in addition
to lawyers and physicians. Women who report only self-employment
are more likely than other women to describe themselves as executives,
administrators, and managers, but it should be borne in mind that these
occupation labels may not have the same meaning for self-employed
and wage-and-salary women. The main job occupations of women
with both wage-and-salary employment and self-employment are professional specialty, nonfarmer agricultural, construction trade, and
operator occupations. These women are also more likely than wageand-salary women to report sales and other services, and they are more
likely than only self-employed women to report administrative support
occupations. In general, the occupation data suggest that self-employment and reported occupation are not independent.
Industries are reported in Table 4. Not surprisingly, relatively more
self-employed women are in agriculture, but the overall percentage is
well under 10 percent; agricultural employment is actually most likely
for women who report both self-employment and wage-and-salary
employment. A large percentage of wage-and-salary women work in
retail trade, but the percentage is even greater for women who are only
self-employed. The same holds for services when considered as a
group, although the distributions over alternative service industries are
quite different. More wage-and-salary women are in professional services, as found in the occupation data. Women who are only selfemployed are more concentrated in personal and business repair services. Women with both self-employment and wage-and-salary
employment are much more likely than wage-and-salary women to be
in personal services, and they are more likely than self-employed
women to be in professional services and finance, insurance, and real
estate. They are also the most likely to be in business and repair ser-
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Table 4 Industry, by Self-Employment Status, Wave 1 (%)
Self-employed
Wage and
salary

Only

With wage
and salary

Agriculture, farming, fishing,
and mining

1.2

6.7

9.4

Construction

1.3

1.4

1.9

Nondurable manufacturing

7.7

1.0

3.8

Industry

Durable manufacturing

7.4

1.4

1.9

Transportation, communication,
and utilities

4.2

1.4

3.8

Wholesale trade – durables

1.7

1.4

0.0

Wholesale trade – nondurables
Retail trade

1.4

1.0

0.0

16.0

31.1

13.2

Finance, insurance, and real estate

9.1

4.3

9.4

Business repair services

4.8

12.9

17.0

Personal services

3.9

26.3

13.2

Entertainment services

0.6

1.4

1.9

Professional services

37.4

9.6

22.6

Public administration

3.2

0.0

1.9

vices. As with occupation, the SIPP data suggest that self-employment
and industry are linked, but causality is unclear.
Household and Husband Characteristics
Household and husband characteristics are summarized in Table 5.
On average, non-employed women live in the households with the lowest total household incomes, which is no surprise. The average
reported income for the household of women who are only selfemployed is the next lowest.
Turning to household income net of wife’s income, however, we
see a different picture. Household income net of the wife’s earnings is
larger, on average, for the self-employed women, particularly those
who are only self-employed. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
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Table 5 Household and Husband’s Characteristics, by Wife’s
Self-Employment Statusa,b
Self-employed
No regular
job

Only wage
and salary

Only

With wage
and salary

Household income
($US 1986)

11,017
(8,977)

14,501
(8,421)

14,076
(11,065)

16,101
(12,770)

Net of wife’s earnings–
regular jobs ($US
1986)

11,017
(8,977)

10,081
(7,359)

11,515
(9,307)

10,740
(9,815)

75.6

78.6

86.6

83.0

Switch to non-owner
over year

4.7

3.8

5.3

1.9

Switch to owner over
year

4.6

5.4

3.3

3.8

42.3
(10.4)

40.8
(10.0)

42.6
(10.0)

40.2
(8.9)

12.7
(3.3)

13.2
(3.0)

13.6
(2.8)

13.3
(2.5)

Some coverage

87.4

93.2

86.1

86.8

Private plan

82.0

91.7

83.7

86.8

Characteristic

Home ownership (%)
Homeowner in month 1

Husband’s demographics
Mean age
Mean years of
completed education
Husband’s health care
coverage (%)

Plan in own name

81.5

76.8

80.9

75.5

Plan through own job

74.5

72.1

64.1

66.0

Covered by another
person’s plan

1.6

31.7

5.7

17.0

Military plan
(CHAMPVA or
CHAMPUS)

2.1

1.5

2.9

0.0

Government plan
(Medicaid or
Medicare)

6.0

2.5

1.9

0.0

(continued)
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Table 5 (continued)
Self-employed
No regular
job

Only wage
and salary

Only

With wage
and salary

Plan through employment
for 12 months

64.9

63.2

54.5

58.5

Plan in own name for 12
months

73.4

68.4

72.2

69.8

Characteristic

Husband’s employment
status (%)
Employed in regular job

90.1

93.5

96.7

96.2

Only wage and salary

74.3

78.8

45.9

50.9

Only self-employed

11.6

11.2

40.2

18.9

4.3

3.6

11.0

26.4

Wage and salary/selfemployed
a

Characteristics measured for wave 1 reference period unless noted.
deviations are in parentheses.

b Standard

the wives of higher earners are more likely to choose self-employment,
since the earnings of their husbands can be used to smooth consumption and provide financial capital for their businesses. The relatively
high level of home ownership and greater age, education, and employment of husbands of self-employed women are also consistent with this
hypothesis. These data suggest that husbands of self-employed women
are relatively secure.
At the same time, however, self-employed women also have relatively greater dispersion in the distribution of their net household
incomes, and their husbands have relatively low health insurance coverage rates (particularly coverage through employment). Moving to
the bottom of Table 5, we find the most striking numbers in the table
and, therewith, a potential explanation for the variation in household
income. More than half of the women who are only self-employed
have spouses who are also self-employed, and four out of five of these
self-employed husbands are only self-employed. In contrast, just about
one out of seven of the husbands of non-employed and wage-and-salary women report any self-employment. The self-employment status
of women’s husbands is seen to be, by far, the most notable difference
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between self-employed women and their wage-and-salary and nonemployed counterparts. This issue is taken up again below.

SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND WORK SCHEDULES
This section focuses on the relationship between self-employment
and work schedules. Several forms of descriptive evidence are considered.
Usual Hours
Usual hours worked per week on all jobs—collected without reference to specific jobs—are summarized by self-employment status in
Table 6. Perhaps most striking is the similarity in mean hours across
Table 6 Usual Weekly Work Hours, by Self-Employment Status, Wave 1a

Mean hours
Usual schedule (%)
Under 20 hr.
20–34 hr.
Less than 35 hr.
35 or more hr.
Exactly 35 hr.
35–40 hr.
Exactly 40 hr.
More than 40 hr.
41–59 hr.
60 hours or more
Usually 35+ hours but some part-time
Any part-time
Number of observations
a

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Only wage
and salary
34.86
(11.40)
10.5
21.1
31.6
68.5
5.6
56.3
43.1
12.1
10.1
2.0
5.4
37.0
1,744

Self-employed
With wage
Only
and salary
34.15
35.83
(17.97)
(16.82)
19.1
28.7
47.8
52.2
3.3
25.4
18.2
26.8
17.7
9.1
6.7
54.5
209

11.3
37.7
49.1
50.9
0.0
24.5
17.0
26.4
17.0
9.4
5.7
54.8
53
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classifications, but nearly as striking are the contrasts in every other
aspect of these hours distributions. Self-employed women are much
more likely than wage-and-salary women to report a lot of hours.
More than 1 in 4 self-employed women report usual hours above 40,
versus less than 1 out of 8 wage-and-salary women. Nearly 1 out of 10
self-employed women reports at least 60 hours, versus just 1 out of 50
of wage-and-salary women. Differences at the low end of the hours
distribution are also large. Nearly 1 out of 5 of the only self-employed
women reports under 20 hours, versus 1 out of 9 wage-and-salary
women. Also note that just 17 to 18 percent of self-employed women
report exactly 40 hours, versus 43 percent of their wage-and-salary
counterparts.
Perhaps most important is the distinction between part-time and
full-time usual hours, because fringe benefits in the wage-and-salary
sector generally hinge on full-time status and evidence of a full-time
wage differential also exists (e.g., Blank 1990; Nakamura and Nakamura 1983). Using the conventional threshold of 35 hours for full-time
status, nearly half of the self-employed women report part-time usual
hours, versus less than one-third of the wage-and-salary women.
SIPP also asks workers with full-time usual hours about cutbacks
to part-time weeks each month. As shown, similar percentages of the
three worker groups report such deviations (about 5 to 7 percent), but
these numbers represent very different percentages of full-time workers. More than 1 out of 8 of the self-employed full-time workers report
such a deviation, versus 1 out of 12 wage-and-salary full-time workers.
Adding these numbers to the percentages with usual part-time hours
add yet another perspective. Nearly 55 percent of the self-employed
worked part time at least part of the reference period, versus 37 percent
of the wage-and-salary women. Women’s explanations for their parttime work (not shown here) also differ by self-employment status.
While 1 out of 10 wage-and-salary part-timers attributes her part-time
hours to insufficient work, just 3 percent of the self-employed part-timers provide this explanation. Reports of part-time work due to insufficient work are actually highest for women with both wage-and-salary
employment and self-employment, suggesting that their self-employment could serve primarily as work between wage-and-salary jobs, or
vice versa. These women also report more time absent without pay
from all jobs.
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In sum, the hours data for wave 1 suggest that self-employed and
wage-and-salary women have very different usual weekly schedules,
that the self-employed are more likely to deviate downward from their
usual schedules, and that the self-employed who work part-time on a
regular or irregular basis are more likely to work these lower hours by
choice.
Self-Employment Dynamics and Usual Hours
Of particular interest is the extent that changes in self-employment
status involves changes in hours, and vice versa. Table 7 presents a
summary of changes in employment and self-employment status
between waves 1 and 2.
Most striking in these transition data is the high level of turnover in
self-employment. More than 1 out of 7 of the women who only report
self-employment in wave 1 changes status in wave 2, versus just 1 out
of 16 wage-and-salary women. Also striking is the incidence of movement in and out of the labor force. Relative to transitions between
wage-and-salary employment and self-employment, direct movement
in both directions between nonparticipation and self-employment and
between nonparticipation and wage-and-salary employment is high.
The right-hand columns of Table 7 present hours changes as shifts
between part-time and full-time status. Sample sizes for most transitions severely limit what we can conclude from these data, but several
patterns are striking and could be used as a start for further research.
First, women who stay self-employed are twice as likely to change
part-time status as women who stay in wage-and-salary employment.
Nearly 17 percent of the women who stay only self-employed report a
change in status between waves 1 and 2, versus 8.4 percent of the
women who stay only wage-and-salary employed. Women who move
from self-employment to wage-and-salary employment also tend to be
either full-time initially and then stay full-time or shift up from parttime status, while women who move in the reverse direction from
wage-and-salary employment tend to be part-time and stay part-time.
Note, also, that more than three-fourths of self-employed women who
leave employment report part-time usual hours in wave 1, versus half
of the wage-and-salary women who leave employment, although about
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Table 7 Self-Employment and Hours Transitions
Hours class

Employment class

Wave 1
Only SEa

Only SE

Only SE

Only SE

Only WS

Only WS

Only WS

Wave 2
Only SE

Only WSb

SE/WS

No job

Only WS

Only SE

WS/SE

Wave 1
employment
class (%)
85.7

Wave 1

Wave 2

Wave 1
and 2
employment
class (%)

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

36.9
10.1
46.4
6.7

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

23.1
15.4
53.8
7.7

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

–
–
100.0
–

PT
FT

–
–

78.6
21.4

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

25.6
4.5
65.9
3.9

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

72.7
18.2
9.1
0.0

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

12.5
18.8
62.5
6.3

6.2

1.4

6.7

93.6

0.6

0.9
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Hours class

Employment class

Wave 1
Only WS

SE/W

SE/WS

SE/WS

SE/WS

No job
No job

No job

No job
a Self-employed.
b Wage and salary.

Wave 2
No job

SSE/WS

Only SE

Only WS

No job

No job
SE

WS

WS/SE

Wave 1
employment
class (%)
4.9
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Wave 1

Wave 2

Wave 1
and 2
employment
class (%)

PT
PT

–
–

51.2
48.8

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

30.8
15.4
46.2
7.7

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

42.9
0.0
42.9
14.3

PT
PT
FT
FT

PT
FT
FT
PT

40.0
40.0
20.0
0.0

PT
FT

–
–

50.0
50.0

–
–

PT
FT

54.5
45.5

–
–

PT
FT

51.7
48.3

73.6

9.4

13.2

3.8

89.3
2.2

8.5

0.0
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half of the newly employed report part-time hours, regardless of selfemployment status.
A similar hours pattern appears when one measures self-employment status for the year.13 On average, women who report any selfemployment have much greater variation in their hours during the year
than women who report only wage-and-salary employment. As found
in wave 1, women who report only self-employment are also less likely
than wage-and-salary women to report any full-time employment during the year. The full-time women who are only self-employed are also
more likely to report part-time deviations than full-time women who
are only wage-and-salary employed but are less likely than women
who report both types of employment. Most noticeable, however, is
the incidence of spells of four-plus months without regular employment—27 percent of the women who only report self-employment,
versus 14 to 17 percent of the women who report wage-and-salary
employment. The self-employed are much more likely to shift their
hours to zero.
In sum, SIPP data suggest that transitions into and out of selfemployment are often transitions into and out of part-time employment. This relationship appears whether the origin state (for transitions
in) or the destination state (for transitions out) is wage-and-salary
employment or no employment. The data indicate that women who
stay self-employed change their usual hours more frequently, sometimes by small amounts and sometimes by large amounts. The selfemployed also appear more likely to take extended leaves from market
work—the biggest kind of schedule change.
Wives’ Work Schedules and Husbands’ Employment,
Self-Employment, and Work
Table 8 presents a summary of husbands’ employment and work
activity during the first year of the reference period, grouped by wives’
employment and self-employment status for the year. As in the wave 1
data, husband activity data for the year indicate that the husbands of
self-employed women have more stable employment and work activity
than other husbands, but their self-employment status and its relationship to wives’ status is even more striking. More than half of the
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Table 8 Husband’s Self-Employment Status and Labor Market Activity,
Year 1a
Wife’s employment status for year 1
Self-employed
No regular
job

Only wage
and salary

Only

With wage
and salary

8.6

5.0

2.8

3.0

91.4

95.0

97.2

97.0

Husband’s labor market time in
year 1 (mean % of weeks in
activity)
Regular job (including paid/
unpaid absence)

86.7
(31.2)

90.9
(25.3)

95.1
(18.8)

93.4
(20.9)

Unpaid absence during
regular employment

1.2
(5.5)

1.3
(5.6)

0.8
(4.2)

1.3
(5.0)

Looking or layoff when not
employed

3.2
(12.6)

3.6
(13.5)

1.9
(10.2)

3.2
(12.5)

No regular labor market activity

10.1
(27.9)

5.6
(20.9)

3.1
(16.1)

3.4
(16.4)

0.6
(5.1)

0.5
(4.2)

0.0
(0.0)

0.9
(6.6)

85.5

89.6

No regular job (%)
Regular job (%)

Casual work if not in regular
employment
Total weeks in paid regular
employment

92.1

Husband’s self-employment
status (%)
Only wage and salary

73.7

78.6

45.0

47.8

Only self-employed

9.5

9.7

33.2

23.9

Wage and salary/self-employed

8.3

6.7

19.0

25.4

835

1,878

211

134

Number of observations
a

Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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women who report self-employment during the year have selfemployed husbands.
On the one hand, this finding on husband self-employment is surprising. We might expect couples to maintain one relatively steady
source of income. On the other hand, self-employed husbands and
wives might be able to coordinate their work schedules more easily and
more effectively. Self-employment of both spouses might represent a
substitution of their time in both market and nonmarket production,
and joint ownership and operation of a single business could further
enhance such opportunities. Of course, husband and wife time could
also be complements in production in business, the home, or both.
Table 9 presents data on the characteristics of self-employed
women’s main businesses in wave 1. As discussed above, we observe
most business characteristics only for women who expect their businesses to gross $1,000 in the following year. As shown, 89.5 percent of
the women who report only self-employment and 71.7 percent of the
women who also report wage-and-salary employment expect to reach
this threshold. All other values in Table 9 pertain to the women with the
$1,000-plus expected earnings. The first two columns present data for
all of the self-employed women who satisfy the expected earnings criterion. The second pair of columns present data for the husband/wife
businesses. The third pair of columns present data for women who do
not list their husbands as co-owners of their businesses, or vice versa.
Focusing first on the data for all self-employed women, we observe
that not quite one out of four of their businesses is incorporated, just
over half are sole proprietorships, and about one-fifth are either
described as partnerships or described by husbands as sole proprietorships. The women who also report wage-and-salary employment
appear less likely to have incorporated businesses and more likely to be
in partnerships. These numbers are roughly consistent with the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) data for legal status of longest jobs.
Also shown is information on the number of employees for the business, information that is not collected in the CPS or other household
surveys for the United States. Here we see substantial heterogeneity.
Nearly one-half of the women who are only self-employed employ
only themselves, but about one-sixth have five or more employees
other than themselves.
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Table 9 Business Characteristics, Husband-Wife Ownership, and
Husband’s Employment, Main Business in Wave 1
All self-employed

Husband/wife
business

Only
self

Self/wage
and salary

Total number of
observations

209

53

Expect revenues for
next 12 months
above $1,000 (%)

89.5

71.7

Number of
observations for
business
characteristics

187

38

65

10

122

28

Incorporated (%)

23.0

10.5

49.2

20.0

9.0

7.1

Unincorporated
(%)

77.0

89.5

50.8

80.0

91.0

92.9

Sole proprietorship

55.6

50.0

0.0

0.0

85.3

67.9

Partnership

17.7

39.5

40.0

80.0

5.7

25.0

3.7

0.0

10.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

1

47.6

42.1

1.5

0.0

72.1

57.1

2

16.0

29.0

33.9

60.0

6.6

17.9

3 to 5

19.8

18.4

33.9

20.0

12.3

17.9

Characteristic

Ownership mix-up
by husband

Only
self

Self/wage
and salary

Wife-owned
business
Only
self

Self/wage
and salary

Number of employees
(including
respondent)

6 or more
Co-owned by husband

16.6

10.5

30.8

20.0

9.0

7.1

34.8

26.3

100.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

42.3

44.7

6.2

10.0

61.5

57.1

Husband’s
employment (%)
Wage and salary
Only self-employed

42.8

21.1

81.5

30.0

22.1

17.9

Self-employed/
wage and salary

12.3

29.0

12.3

60.0

12.3

17.9

2.7

5.3

0.0

0.0

4.1

7.1

No regular job
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Fifty-five percent of the women who are only self-employed and
50 percent of those who also report wage-and-salary employment have
self-employed spouses, but not all of these women operate businesses
that are co-owned by their husbands. Just over one-third of the women
who are only self-employed are self-employed in a husband/wife coowned business. Some of the husband co-owners are not selfemployed at all. Only four out of five of the co-owner husbands report
only self-employment. Thus, although most of the joint ownership
probably involves some joint operation of a single business, as least
some of the joint ownership is simply joint asset ownership. Similar
patterns appear for women in husband/wife businesses who also report
wage-and-salary employment, but this evidence should be regarded as
extremely tentative due to the sample size of 10 observations.
Business characteristics differ dramatically by husband/wife coownership. Among women who are only self-employed, 72 percent in
wife-owned businesses employ only themselves, while 65 percent of
the women in husband/wife owned businesses have three or more
employees. Half of the jointly-owned businesses are incorporated, versus just 9 percent of the wife-owned businesses, and very few of the
wife-owned businesses are described as partnerships with other persons. Overall, the co-owned businesses appear to be more serious
enterprises.
These business characteristics data suggest that we might find differences in work schedules by husband/wife business ownership.
Here, in particular, small samples preclude firm conclusions, but some
patterns may still be worth noting. On average, wives of self-employed
men report more usual hours than either their wage-and-salary counterparts or their self-employed counterparts with wage-and-salary husbands. The latter contrast reflects the very low hours of women in
wife-owned businesses with wage-and-salary husbands; the very small
number of self-employed women with wage-and-salary husband coowners actually report a lot of hours, on average. Women who report
both wage-and-salary and self-employment also tend to report high
hours if their husbands do not have the same status. Employed wives
of non-employed men report higher usual hours than wives of wageand-salary men, but not all wives of self-employed men.
Husbands in nearly every employment category report more hours,
on average, than their wives. The one exception is wage-and-salary
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husbands who co-own businesses operated by their wives. Selfemployed men also tend to report more hours than wage-and-salary
men, and self-employed husbands of self-employed women who coown their wives’ businesses report the most hours, on average,
although one should also note the high variance of hours among the latter group of men in this sample.
Table 10 presents simple correlation coefficients for husband hours
and wife hours by self-employment status. The finding of essentially
no correlation for the hours of self-employed wives and wage-and-salary husbands reflects the contrast in hours between the wife-owned and
husband-wife-owned businesses noted above. In general, these numbers suggest that there is greater correlation between the usual hours of
self-employed women and the usual hours of their husbands, particularly when the husbands are also self-employed.
Earnings and Hours
Tables 11 and 12 present earnings for self-employed and wageand-salary women, respectively. Data on total earnings for the full
four-month wave 1 reference period are presented, due to the lack of
SIPP data on the timing of work on specific jobs. Women are grouped
by expected gross earnings of at least $1,000 versus less, and women
with imputed earnings are excluded.
On average, women who are only self-employed tend to report
much lower earnings than women who work in the wage-and-salary
sector, while women who report both types of employment report the
highest total earnings. Among the self-employed, women in incorpoTable 10 Correlation of Husband and Wife Usual Hours, by Husband
and Wife Self-Employment Status, Wave 1
Self-employed
Only wage
and salary

Only

With wage
and salary

Only wage and salary

0.004

–0.046

–0.342

Only self-employed

0.130

0.313

0.474

Self-employed/wage and salary

0.049

0.165

–0.315

Number of observations

1,774

209

53

Husband’s employment status
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Table 11 Earnings in Wave 1: Self-Employed Wivesa,b
Self-employed
Only

With wage
and salary

Mean business earnings net of expenses ($)

131
(151)

480
(806)

Mean earnings (including net business expenses) ($)

131
(151)

2,475
(2,212)

Median earnings (net business expenses) ($)

87.5

1,629

Household income (%)

1.7

20.5

Number of observations

22

15

Collect a regular salary (%)

33.0

11.4

Other income for personal use (%)

39.1

45.7

No income for personal use (%)

27.9

42.9

2,828
(4,850)

6,814
(9,823)

Median earnings ($)

1,090

4,400

Household income (%)

17.3

38.7

Number of observations

179

35

3,625
(4,531)

8,873
(8,353)

Household income (%)

17.4

57.7

Number of observations

41

4

2,591
(4,932)

6,548
(10,087)

Household income (%)

17.2

36.3

Number of observations

138

31

2,146
(3,687)

4,923
(2,436}

Expect revenues for next 12 months under $1,000

Expect revenues for next 12 months $1,000

Mean earnings ($)

Incorporated
Mean earnings ($)

Unincorporated
Mean earnings ($)

Husband/wife owned
Mean earnings ($)
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Table 11 (continued)
Self-employed

a

Only

With wage
and salary

Household income (%)

13.13

51.8

Number of observations

63

9

Reported earnings sample.
deviations are in parentheses.

b Standard

Table 12 Earnings in Wave 1: Wage-and-Salary Wivesa,b
Wage and salary
Mean earnings ($)

4,375
(3,333)

Median earnings ($)

3,840

Household income (%)

33.2

Number of observations

1,709

a

Reported earnings sample.
deviations are in parentheses.

b Standard

rated businesses report the highest earnings, although some part of this
differential is probably due to accounting practices.
Particularly striking in Tables 11 and 12 are women’s contributions
to household income. The earnings of wage-and-salary women represent one-third of their household incomes, on average, and the earnings
of women who report both wage-and-salary and self-employment represent nearly two-fifths, on average. In contrast, earnings of the
women who are only self-employed represent less than one-fifth, on
average. A key factor here is probably the way that earnings are
reported in husband/wife-owned businesses. On average, women in
husband/wife businesses report earning just 13 percent of total reported
household earnings, while inspection of the data reveals that the husbands of these women are often credited with total business income for
the period.
Table 13 presents these earnings data grouped by self-employment
status and hours. Given all of the issues raised above, interpretation of
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Table 13 Earnings in Wave 1, by Self-Employment Status and
Hours Statusa,b
Self-employed
Wage and salary

Only

With wage
and salary

4,375
(3,333)b

2,532
(4,653)

5,512
(8,508)

Less than 20 hr.

1,193
(1,065)

989
(1,947)

2,626
(2,105)

20 to 34 hr.

2,530
(2,117)

1,672
(2,154)

3,677
(4,932)

35 to 40 hr.

5,089
(2,880)

4,614
(7,241)

4,054
(3,952)

41 to 59 hr.

6,728
(3,531)

2,309
(3,991)

7,891
(5,296)

60+ hr.

8,536
(7,545)

3,037
(4,661)

14,799
(22,895)

Usual hours 35+ and some
part-time weeks

3,574
(2,135)

2,536
(4,074)

2,273
(1,502)

Usual hours 35+ and no
part-time weeks

5,599
(3,345)

3,703
(6,162)

8,124
(11,297)

Number of observations

1,709

201

50

All employed women
Hours class

a

Reported earnings sample.
deviations are in parentheses.

b Standard

these data must be guarded, but a few points stand out. First, women
who are only self-employed have mean earnings below their wage-andsalary counterparts in every hours class, but the reverse holds for earnings dispersion for women with less than 60 hours. Second, mean
earnings of women who are only self-employed versus only wage-andsalary employed tend to be most similar for those who work low hours
(under 20) or standard full-time hours (35–40 per week), but earnings
of the self-employed again exhibit much greater variation. Third,
women who report both self-employment and wage-and-salary
employment tend to earn a lot more than other women. Fourth, mean
earnings of full-time self-employed and wage-and-salary women who
report some part-time weeks are closer than mean earnings of their
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counterparts who report no deviations, although earnings of the selfemployed are again much lower.
On the one hand, these earnings data suggest that self-employed
women may pay a lower part-time penalty than wage-and-salary
women. On the other hand, these earnings data seem to suggest that
self-employed women who work a lot do not earn a premium. These
tentative findings merit further analysis using larger samples than considered here.

CONCLUSION
This analysis of SIPP data stops short of providing direct evidence
on the relationship between desires for work schedule flexibility and
self-employment decisions. But the evidence presented on usual
schedules, deviations from such schedules, changes in schedules, and
general reasons for hours and absences exhibits sharp contrasts
between self-employed and wage-and-salary women.
Self-employed and wage-and-salary women report very different
usual hours of work. Self-employed women rarely report 40 hours as
their usual per week, while 40 is the number reported most often by
wage-and-salary women. Usual hours of the self-employed are more
likely to be very high and even more likely to be very low. Half the
self-employed report part-time usual hours, versus less than one-third
of the wage-and-salary women. Self-employed women also deviate
from their usual schedules somewhat more frequently than wage-andsalary women, either with reduced hours during a workweek or an
absence of at least a week, and they change their usual schedules much
more often during a single year.
SIPP provides little direct evidence on women’s motivation for low
usual hours or breaks from regular employment, but the available evidence tends to suggest that choice plays a more important role for selfemployed women. Women who are only self-employed are less likely
than wage-and-salary women to attribute their part-time hours and
schedule variability to insufficient work. It also appears that selfemployment may serve a role as work between wage-and-salary jobs
for women who report both types of employment; these women are the
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most likely to attribute short hours to lack of work. All in all, these
findings appear consistent with the hypothesis that self-employment
gives women more control over their work schedules than wage-andsalary employment.
The data also suggest that self-employment decisions of married
women are not independent of their husbands’ employment and selfemployment decisions. Usual hours of self-employed women are more
correlated with the usual hours of their husbands, particularly when
their husbands are also self-employed. This correlation suggests that
self-employment of one or both spouses improve coordination of work
schedules within families. Knowledge of business co-ownership
within couples also appears to be important for analysis of schedule
data, and even more important for the interpretation of reported earnings within families, relative to time worked. In general, the data suggest that a household framework should be used to study selfemployment decisions of both married women and married men.
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1. Self-employment rates are based on what workers report for their longest jobs in
the reference years for the 1976–1991 March Current Population Surveys. The
self-employment rate is defined here as the percentage of employed persons who
are self-employed, counting both those with the incorporated and unincorporated
businesses. Note also that this chapter focuses exclusively on activity during
prime-age, which is defined here as ages 25 to 55. The self-employment rate for
prime-age married men also increased during the 1975–1990 period, but only
from 14.1 to 15.3 percent. An increase in the male nonagricultural self-employment rate from 12.1 to 14.8 percent was offset by a large drop in the agricultural
self-employment rate from 62.4 to 51.3 percent. Among prime-age married
women, the agricultural self-employment rate actually rose from 9.8 percent to
33.5 percent, and the nonagricultural rate rose from 5.6 to 9.1. The large increase
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in female agricultural self-employment may partially reflect a change in farm
women’s perception of their contribution to farm production. See Devine (1990,
1994) for discussion of nonagricultural self-employment trends and characteristics of the self-employed. Aronson (1991) also provided a survey of the topic of
self-employment.
See Devine (1992) for a simple but more formal model of household self-employment choice based on this reasoning. Lombard (1996) and Rettenmaier (1996)
presented similar models of individual self-employment decisions.
Dates for wage-and-salary work are also incomplete. In general, side jobs and
sequential jobs, whether or not they involve self-employment, cannot be distinguished for any of the SIPP panels. Like all longitudinal data sets, SIPP also has
“seam” problems—a disproportionate incidence of changes in status between the
last and first days of consecutive reference periods.
The fact that these data may be missing is not clear in either the data documentation or the raw data. If unfamiliar with the interview skip patterns, a user could
easily misinterpret zeros that appear in the data file.
Not too many cases are affected this way, but they represent a significant portion
of the available sample of household businesses and an important part of female
self-employment.
The public use data files include self-employment monthly earnings for these
respondents based on census calculations, as opposed to respondents’ reports.
Imputation rates are much higher in the March CPS. Problems with imputation
flags prevent exact measurement, but a reasonable estimate is about one-third of
self-employment earnings observations and about 20 percent of the wage-and-salary observations (Devine 1995).
SIPP also collects information on profits (as a business characteristic), but only
for unincorporated businesses, only if expected revenues are at least $1,000, only
once per household business, only if the respondent describing the business “can”
provide the information, and only if the respondent wants to report it. These profit
data are not used here.
The present discussion pertains to self-employment data in the public-use rectangular Microdata files. The Full Panel Longitudinal File is used here only for the
measurement of demographic and household characteristics; data on labor market
activity in the Longitudinal File are problematic due to time aggregation and disaggregation, editing, and omitted variables. See Devine (1991, 1993) for additional discussion.
Women who report casual work are not counted as employed if this is their only
work. The distinction between regular work and casual work for pay (as it is
called in the documentation, but not interview) is not clear from the questionnaires or interviewer manuals. We only know that respondents do not mention it
when they are asked if they had “a job or business, either full-time or part-time,
even for only a few days” (Question 1 in the Labor Force and Recipiency section
of the interview). For our purposes, the most important difference is information.

248

11.

12.

13.
14.

Devine

We know which months casual work is performed, but nothing more about this
work. Casual work is ignored beyond this point in the present study.
These self-employment rates are quite close to the self-employment rates from the
March CPS that are presented in Figure 1. The greater amount of labor market
activity data collected in SIPP could be the source of the slightly higher rates in
SIPP.
The children variables used here are not the standard measures based on children
in the household. Parent identification numbers were first used to match children
to their designated parents or guardians, and these family units were then united
with the spouses of the designated parents and guardians. It is possible that some
spouses are not guardians of the children. The assumption here is that these
spouses have at least as much responsibility for the children as the level of responsibility implicitly assumed for standard measures of children in the family or
household.
These tables are available on request.
When preparing tax returns in the United States, most corporation owners treat
their own salaries as explicit expenses for their businesses, while owners of unincorporated businesses generally do not distinguish salaries paid to themselves
from business earnings net of other business expenses. So, for example, business
losses would be reported by a corporation owner as losses for the corporation, but
as negative income for the unincorporated business owner. See Devine (1995) for
additional discussion.
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.
The postwar period has seen a steady, almost inexorable rise in the
labor force participation rates of women, from 32.7 percent in 1948 to
58.9 percent in 1995 (U.S. President 1996, Table B-35). Nonetheless,
women are still largely responsible for the care of family and home.
This “second shift” adds about 20 hours to the total weekly work hours
of women who are in the labor force, in contrast to just seven hours for
comparable men (Hersch and Stratton 1994). The multiple responsibilities of employed women translate into a need for greater flexibility in
all aspects of the employment arrangement. Indeed, in a recent survey
of employees concerning their child and elder care responsibilities,
work flexibility was a factor that significantly reduced the stress associated with performing their dual roles of earner and caretaker (Neal et
al. 1993).
One way women achieve flexibility is by choosing to work shorter
than usual weekly hours (part-time) or fewer than usual weeks per year
(part-year). There are a number of papers that focus on women’s parttime work and on variations in weeks worked (for example, Blank
1988, 1990; Sundt 1989; and Averett and Hotchkiss 1996, 1997).
However, there is another important dimension of flexibility in the
employment arrangement that has not been extensively explored—
work location. Women have the option of choosing to work at home
rather than at another location. In this chapter we analyze the determi-
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nants of a woman’s work site and explore the relationship between her
choice of work site and work hours. In particular, we explore how
labor force choices, work hours, and workweeks differ between women
whose primary place of work is their own home—home-based workers—and women who work at an office or other place of business outside of the home—on-site workers—using data from the 1990 Public
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the Census of Population.
Although there are not at present a large number of people
engaged primarily in home-based work, this type of work organization
has been on the rise and is likely to continue to increase. Contributing
to this trend are the steady improvements in both communication and
computing technology, the continued rise in women’s labor force participation and in two-career families, and the increased popularity of
small business entrepreneurship. Data from the U.S. Censuses of Population show that the declining trend in the number of home-based
workers from 1960 to 1980 was reversed in 1990, from 4.7 million in
1960, to 2.2 million in 1980, to 3.4 million in 1990. This represents an
increase from 2.4 percent of the labor force in 1980 to 3.0 percent in
1990.1
An important reason why this type of work organization is attractive to women who desire greater flexibility is that the fixed costs of
working, such as the time and out-of-pocket costs of commuting to
work, are lower for home-based work than for on-site work. In addition, to the extent that female home-based workers provide their own
child care, the marginal costs of home-based work may also be lower.
These factors imply that both the reservation wage and the reservation
hours for home-based and on-site work will differ, and also that the
responsiveness of women’s labor supply to wage changes and to variations in other socioeconomic factors will differ between home-based
and on-site workers.2
In fact, our estimates of the effects of such fixed costs on the probability of labor force participation do differ dramatically between
home-based and on-site workers. In particular, factors that are associated with higher fixed costs of working on site tend to have a smaller
deterrent effect on home-based labor force participation than on on-site
participation, confirming the importance of these costs. When we
examine equations predicting weekly hours and annual weeks worked
for each work site, we also find significant differences. The net effect
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of these differences is that home-based workers are predicted to work
on average fewer annual hours (both average weeks worked and average weekly hours are reduced) and that the dispersion of their predicted
work hours is greater as compared to what they would be for on-site
workers. This greater dispersion of predicted work hours for homebased workers indicates that they are better able to adapt their work
schedules in response to variations in family circumstances. Overall,
our results affirm the proposition that home-based work is an attractive
and viable alternative for women who need a flexible employment
arrangement to overcome their high fixed-costs of labor force entry.

HOW DO HOME-BASED FEMALE WORKERS
DIFFER FROM OTHERS?
Table 1 presents the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of home-based and on-site female workers and of women out of
the labor force as computed from the 5 percent Public Use Microdata
Sample (PUMS) of housing units from the 1990 Census of Population
of the United States.3 Included in our analysis are all women aged 25
to 55 years who were either employed or out of the labor force, who
did not live in group quarters, who were not in the Armed Forces, and
who were not in school.4 Identification of home-based workers is
derived from answers to the journey to work question (no. 23A), which
asks, “How did this person usually get to work last week?”5 Persons
who responded that they “worked at home” are regarded as homebased workers. This means that our sample of home-based workers
includes only those who worked primarily at home; women who work
mainly on-site but do some work at home (like teachers, for example)
are not classified in this study as home-based workers. We focus on
workers in the prime working years, 25 to 55, so as not to confuse the
work site decision with decisions regarding schooling and retirement.
The majority of those in the 25- to 55-year age-group will have completed their schooling and will not yet have entered retirement. To
obtain approximately equal sample sizes for all three groups, we
include in our analysis all observations of home-based female workers
from the 5 percent PUMS, while for women who are on-site workers or
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Table 1 Socioeconomic Characteristics of Women Aged 25–55, by Work
Status and Work Sitea,b
Home-based
workers

On-site
workers

Out of labor
force

25–34 yr.

34.5

38.2

38.3

35–44 yr.

37.4

36.1

31.2

45–55 yr.

28.1

25.7

30.4

Mean age

39.01
(8.19)

38.25
(8.37)

38.90
(8.95)

Married, spouse present

80.4

63.5

75.9

With children under 6 yr.

29.9

15.1

29.7

With children 6–17 yr.

43.10

30.0

38.6

Not married or married without
spouse present

19.60

36.5

24.1

With children under 6 yr.

1.60

2.9

5.2

With children 6–17 yr.

4.10

8.9

8.6

Variable
Age distribution

White, non-Hispanic

88.40

78.4

73.7

Black, non-Hispanic

3.50

11.7

11.5

Other race

2.90

3.6

4.4

Hispanic origin

5.30

6.3

10.4

Disabled

5.00

2.8

16.5

Urban residence

68.00

76.7

72.8

Rural residence

32.00

23.3

27.2

6.00

1.1

1.6

26.00

22.2

25.6

8.00

9.3

14.1

Farm
Nonfarm
Immigrant
Highest level of education
completed
Eighth grade or less

3.30

2.8

10.0

Some high school

8.30

8.9

19.6

High school degree

32.90

33.7

36.2

Some college

31.50

30.5

22.0

Bachelor’s degree

17.70

16.1

9.4
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Variable
More than Bachelor’s degree
Mean years of schooling
completed
Presence of person(s) over
65 in household
Mean family income ($)
Self-employed (%)
Mean annual earnings, 1989 ($)

Home-based
workers
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On-site
workers

Out of labor
force

4.80

6.1

2.2

13.38
(2.46)

13.40
(2.45)

12.01
(3.03)

5.00

5.2

6.2

46,222
(33,234)

38,804
(39,626)

50,787
(45,623)
62.9

3.3

—

10,273
(14,234)

18,469
(13,970)

—

Weekly hours worked
Fewer than 35 hr.

42.0

20.8

—

35–45 hr.

36.0

69.2

—

More than 45 hr.

22.1

10.1

—

Mean hours worked per week, 1989

35.12
(17.34)

37.93
(10.52)

—

Mean weeks worked, 1989

43.53
(13.23)

46.59
(10.62)

—

Mean hourly wage, 1989c ($)

7.91
(13.38)

10.57
(9.03)

—

Spouse is a home-based worker (%)

11.3

1.0

1.6

Spouse has mobility or personal care
limitations (%)

1.6

2.0

3.5

Number in sample
a

48,181

60,983

25,763

(100%)

(100%)

(100%)

The information in this table is computed from the 5% PUMS sample of the 1990
Census of Population and Housing. Workers in group quarters or institutions are
excluded, as are those who report themselves as home-based during the Census week,
but did not work in 1989. In addition, workers whose earnings information for 1989
was not consistent with their reported class-of-worker status (self-employed v.
employee) in 1990 are excluded. The data for home-based workers are from the full
5% sample; the data for on-site workers are based on 0.04 sub-sample of the 5% sample (yielding a 0.002 sample of the on-site worker population).
b Standard deviations are in parentheses.
c Computed from annual earnings, weeks, and hours worked for 1989.
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who are out of the labor force, we take a 0.04 subsample of the 5 percent PUMS, yielding a 0.2 percent sample of the population of on-site
female workers and women out of the labor force.
Home-based female workers differ from on-site workers in critical
ways. The two most striking differences are with respect to selfemployment and work intensity (hours and weeks worked). Homebased workers are much more likely to be self-employed than are their
on-site counterparts: 62.9 percent of the former are self-employed,
whereas the corresponding value for the latter is 3.3 percent. Homebased workers are also much more likely to choose unusual work
schedules, both with respect to weekly hours worked and weeks
worked per year. The mean weekly hours worked by home-based
workers is about three hours less than for on-site workers, but the distribution of hours differs much more dramatically, as can be seen by
comparing the standard deviations of work hours: 17.34 for homebased workers versus 10.52 for on-site workers. Put differently, about
two-thirds of on-site workers work between 35 and 45 hours per week,
while only about one-third of home-based workers follow this common
full-time schedule. Indeed, our data indicate that over 50 percent of
on-site workers worked a standard 40-hour week, while only about
one-quarter of home-based workers did so. Thus, it is clear that there
is a much greater degree of hours flexibility for women who work at
home as compared to those who work on-site. Home-based workers
also exhibit greater flexibility with regard to weeks worked per year.
As was the case for weekly hours worked, mean weeks worked per
year is lower and the variance is greater for home-based workers as
compared to on-site workers. For example, both on-site and homebased women specify 52 weeks per year as their most frequent choice,
but only 48 percent of home-based workers choose 52 weeks, as compared to 64 percent of on-site workers.
Home-based female workers differ from their on-site counterparts
in other significant ways. Home-based workers are much more likely
to have a spouse who is also a home-based worker and to live in rural
and rural-farm areas. Further, home-based female workers are more
likely than are on-site workers to be married with a spouse present, to
have children under the age of 18 years, and to be disabled. The family
income of home-based workers is higher than that of on-site workers
(whether or not their own earnings are included), though the average
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hourly earnings of home-based workers are lower. Finally, the representation of nonwhites and Hispanics among home-based workers is
less than their representation in the labor force at large.6

MODELING THE LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION DECISION
Theoretical Issues
The most important difference between home-based work and onsite work is that the fixed costs associated with working (time costs
associated with commuting, out-of-pocket commuting expenditures,
clothing costs, and, to some extent, the costs of child [or other dependent] care7) are greatly reduced for home-based workers.8 The model
developed by Cogan (1981), which focuses on the role of fixed costs in
labor force decisions, provides an appropriate starting point. Cogan
shows that the existence of time fixed costs and money fixed costs of
working raise the reservation wage relative to what it would be in the
absence of these costs. The lower fixed costs of home-based work,
therefore, imply that workers will have a lower reservation wage for
home-based work than for on-site work.
Applying this model directly to the case of home-based work,
however, has one important drawback. The model implies that at any
given wage rate, a worker’s utility will be higher in home-based work
than in on-site work, suggesting that most workers would choose
home-based work over on-site work. However, we know from the census data that most workers are not home-based. The likely explanation
for this apparent contradiction is that the demand for home-based
workers is low relative to the demand for on-site workers and relative
to the supply of people who would like to do home-based work, so that
rather than the wage offer for such work being the same as for on-site
work, it is substantially below.
There are several reasons why employers will make lower wage
offers for home-based jobs. First, home-based jobs may simply not be
available in certain types of industries—those that require large
amounts of fixed capital or require workers to be on-site, for example.
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Heavy manufacturing, retail trade, and elementary and secondary
schooling are examples. Second, a worker’s marginal product may be
lower in home-based work because of synergies between workers.
Third, a worker’s marginal product may be lower at home because of a
lack of monitoring or supervision. Finally, employers may simply hold
a belief (or suspicion) that a worker’s marginal product is lower when
she is at home than when she is on site, possibly because of the difficulty in monitoring home-based employees.
Thus, a more appropriate model assumes a lower wage for homebased work than for on-site work, as is illustrated in Figure 1. In this
diagram, V represents unearned income, T represents the total time
available, M represents the monetary fixed cost of working on-site
(e.g., commuting costs), and K represents the time costs of working onsite (e.g., commuting time). The (monetary and time) fixed costs of
Figure 1 Diagrammatic Model of Work Site Choice
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home-based work are assumed to be zero. Wh and Wo represent the
offering wages for home-based and on-site work, respectively, and the
budget constraint is ABCD. Depending on the woman’s indifference
map, she may locate at point B and be out of the labor force, locate on
the segment BC and be a home-based worker, or locate on the segment
CD and be an on-site worker. As in the case with Cogan’s model, the
reservation wage and reservation hours will be lower for home-based
work than for on-site work. However, this diagram makes clear the
role of fixed costs in the choice between home-based and on-site work:
the larger the fixed costs, the further to the left will be the on-site segment of the budget constraint (CD), and the less likely will a person
with a given indifference map find it optimal to be on the on-site segment. Similarly, the lower the on-site wage relative to the home-based
wage, the less likely is one to choose on-site work over home-based
work.
To summarize, the implications of this model are as follows. Fixed
costs of working are directly related to a worker’s reservation wage and
reservation hours. Consequently, a worker’s reservation wage and reservation hours for work arrangements that require lower fixed costs,
like home-based work, will be lower than for arrangements that require
higher fixed costs, like on-site work. Thus, factors that increase a
woman’s fixed costs of working will be positively related to the likelihood that she will be in the labor force as a home-based worker rather
than as an on-site worker. We also expect to observe that for women
with a given set of socioeconomic characteristics, her choice of hours
as a home-based worker will be lower than as an on-site worker. Further, to the extent that home-based female workers—more than half of
whom are self-employed—are less likely than on-site workers to be
affected by institutional constraints on work hours or workweeks, we
expect them to exhibit greater variability in work hours and workweeks.
The Econometric Model
Our econometric model has four components. The first is a labor
force participation equation. The second is a pair of wage equations
that predict the “offering wage” a woman can expect for home-based
work and for on-site work. The third component is a pair of equations
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to predict her hours of work, conditional on her choice of labor force
state. The last component is a pair of equations predicting weeks
worked per year, again conditional on her choice of labor force state. It
is assumed that the choice of work site, obtained by maximizing the
indirect utility function, is predicated on the woman’s having identified
the optimal number of work hours associated with each work site.
The empirical model employed here is similar to that used in
Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz (1989), Blank (1990), and Hill
(1989). The three work states from which women are assumed to
choose are
State number
Description
1
2
3

Out of the labor force
On-site worker
Home-based worker

Following Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz, we assume that a
woman’s utility function can be written as
(1) U = U (C, L, Z),
where C is consumption, L is leisure, and Z is a vector of individual
characteristics that affect preferences. The woman will choose the
state k which maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint of the
form
(2) Ck + WkLk ≤ N + Wk (L* – L*k) – FCk, k = 1,2,3,
where Wk is the wage rate in work state k, N is nonlabor income, L* is
the total time available to divide between work and leisure, Lk is leisure
time in work state k, L*k is the reduction in available time associated
with work state k (the fixed time costs associated with that work state),
and FCk represents the monetary fixed costs of working in state k. Like
Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz (1989), we have normalized the
consumption price to 1. As discussed earlier, Wk, L*k, and FCk are
assumed to vary with work site.
Let Tk ≡ (lnWk, L*k, FCk). The woman’s problem is to choose the
state k which maximizes her indirect utility function, written as
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(3) Vk = V(Tk|Z).
This formulation assumes that an individual’s characteristics, Z,
are constant across work states (for example, her nonlabor income,9
presence of preschool children, race, etc). Again following Hutchens,
Jakubson, and Schwartz (1989), we assume that the indirect utility
function of individual i can be written as the sum of a deterministic part
involving Tk, Z, and a stochastic error term and that the deterministic
portion of the function is linear
(4) Vik = β1k Lik* + β2k FCik + β3k lnWik + Ziαk + uik, k = 1,2,3.
To estimate Eq. 4 directly, we would need, for each work state,
measures of the wage rate and of the monetary and time fixed costs of
working. Since estimates of the latter two factors are not available, we
substitute for them using the following predicting equations:
(5) Lik* = Uiρk + e1ik
(6) FCik = Uiθk + e2ik,
where Ui is a vector of predicting variables, some of which may be
contained in Zi. Substituting these into Eq. 4 gives us
(7) Vik = β3k lnWik + Xiγk + vik,
where Xi is the union of Ui and Zi; γk = αk + β1kρk + β2kθk , αk is redefined to include zero coefficients for the variables in Ui which are not
contained in Zi, and
(7a) vik = β1k e1ik + β2k e2ik + uik.
Further, since we do not have measures of the wage in each labor
force state (women are observed in one state only), we predict these
wages from estimates of the following equation:
(8) lnWik = Yiδk + e3ik, k = 2,3,
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where Yi represents a vector of variables that may overlap Xi. Since Eq.
8 can be estimated only for those women who are actually in the relevant labor force state, the error terms do not satisfy the requirement
that their expected value be zero. We adjust for potential selectivity
bias by including a selectivity correction factor λik as an explanatory
variable in Eq. 8.10 The resulting version of Eq. 8 is estimated with
ordinary least sources (OLS), with the standard errors corrected
according to the procedure outlined in Lee (1983). Using estimates of
Eq. 8, we predict a home-based and on-site wage for each woman in
the sample. We then substitute these predicted wages into Eq. 7 to
obtain the following “structural” labor force participation equation,
(9) Vik = β3k lnWik*+Xiγk + vik,
where lnWik* is the predicted offering wage for woman i in labor force
state k.11
We estimate the model in Eq. 9, as well as the reduced form version of that equation (used to estimate λik), using multinomial logit (see
Maddala 1983). Note that instruments for all labor force states are
included in the equations for each state. In this way, our econometric
model resembles what Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz (1989) refer
to as the “universal logit” model. That is, the entire set of variables
used to predict the fixed costs and the offering wage for both work
states enter the logit function for each work state, and a different set of
coefficients is estimated (on the common set of variables) for each
work state. The resulting estimates of these coefficients are not
affected by the nature of the error structure across labor force states.12
The fundamental assumption required for this approach is that all of
the labor force options are in principle available to all participants.13
Finally, we estimate equations to predict hours worked per week
and weeks worked per year, conditional on the choice of labor force
state. The equation for hours is
(10) hik = Xiηk + ζk lnWik* + ξkλik + e4ik, k = 2,3,
and for weeks,
(11) wik = Xiψk + ωk lnWik* +πkλik + e5ik, k = 2,3.
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Eq. 10 is estimated with OLS using the relevant predicted wage
and including the relevant selectivity correction factor, and the OLS
standard errors are appropriately corrected (Lee 1983).14 Eq. 11 is estimated using a tobit model because of the clustering of observations at
the upper limit of 52 weeks worked per year.15
Explanatory Variables
All of the variables described below are listed in Appendix Table 1
with their precise definitions.
Choice of labor force state
Explanatory variables used in the multinomial logit estimates of
the choice of labor force state (Eq. 9) are similar to those used in other
studies of women’s labor supply,16 but are tailored to fit our focus on
work site. They include unearned income, a set of variables to represent home productivity and tastes, a set of variables to proxy the fixed
time and money costs of working on site, and the predicted wage in
each labor force state.
The variables that represent unearned income and home productivity and tastes are as follows. For unearned income, we use family
income less the earnings of the worker (OTHINC). To proxy differences in home productivity and tastes we include the woman’s years of
schooling (EDUC), her age (AGE), dummy variables that indicate
whether she is married with spouse present (MSP), whether she has
any children under 6 at home (CU6), whether she has any children
between 6 and 17 at home (C617), whether there is someone over 65 in
the household (OVER65), whether the woman has a disability that limits the kind or amount of work she can perform (DISAB), whether she
is non-Hispanic black (BLACKNH), and whether she is a black or
white Hispanic or of another nonwhite race (HISP&OTH) (the
excluded class is non-Hispanic white). One additional measure
included to represent a woman’s home productivity is her husband’s
wage (S_WAGE) (if she has a spouse present). The higher the husband’s wage (which is a measure of his cost of time), the less likely he
will contribute to home production and the higher will be the woman’s
productivity at home.
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The proxy measures that index the fixed costs of working on site
include some of the home productivity variables described above as
well as additional measures. The presence of young children in the
household (CU6) is associated with a higher fixed cost of working on
site, as is the presence of a disability (DISAB). The presence of older
children (C617) or persons over 65 (OVER65) may be associated with
either higher or lower fixed costs, depending on whether the older children or older persons in the household require care themselves or are
providers of care for young children. Additional fixed cost variables
are dummy variables that indicate whether the woman’s husband has a
mobility or personal care disability (if she has a spouse present)
(S_LIM) and whether or not the woman lives in a rural (RURAL) or a
rural-farm (FARM) locality. Women living in rural or rural farm areas
will experience higher fixed costs of working on site because commuting time to work is likely to be greater in these locales than in urban
areas. All of these fixed cost measures are predicted to have a larger
deterrent effect on on-site labor force participation than on home-based
labor force participation.
Two predicted wage measures are included in the labor force participation equations: the predicted log of the woman’s wage in homebased work (LNWPREDH) and her predicted log wage in on-site work
(LNWPREDO).17 We expect LNWPREDH to be positively related to
the odds of being a home-based worker and negatively related to the
odds of being an on-site worker, and we expect the opposite relationships for LNWPREDO.
In addition to the predicted wage, there is another aspect of compensation that needs to be included in the labor force participation
equations: nonwage compensation. An important difference between
home-based and on-site work is that home-based workers—who are
more likely to be part-time and to be self-employed—are less likely to
receive fringe benefits as part of their compensation than are on-site
workers.18 However, the value they will place on any fringe benefits
received on their job will depend on whether or not they already
receive these benefits through a spouse. To hold constant differences in
how women value nonwage compensation we include several proxy
variables. MSP will partially capture the likelihood that a woman is
receiving fringe benefits through her spouse, as will a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the husband received any wage and salary
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income in the previous year (S_EMP), since a husband with wage and
salary income in the previous year is more likely to have received
fringe benefits on the job. In addition, the husband’s wage (S_WAGE)
will be positively correlated with his probability of receipt of fringe
benefits.
Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the
spouse is a home-based worker (S_HW). This variable may be positively or negatively related to the odds that a woman is a home-based
worker. If the couple is engaged jointly in a home-based small business so that there are synergies between the work of the spouses, this
variable will be positively related to the odds of being a home-based
worker and negatively related to the odds that the woman is an on-site
worker. On the other hand, if this variable is a proxy for the husband’s
(non)receipt of fringe benefits on his job, then it will be negatively
related to the odds that the woman is a home-based worker and positively related to her odds of being an on-site worker.
The Conditional Hours and Weeks Equations
The conditional hours worked and weeks worked equations (Eqs.
10 and 11) include most of the same variables discussed above. There
are, however, several differences. First, since these equations are
conditional on the woman’s having chosen the specified work site, we
include only the wage specific to that work site. Second, to adjust for
the potential selectivity bias we include in each equation the
appropriate selectivity adjustment variable (LAMBDAH when the
hours or weeks worked of home-based workers are being estimated,
and LAMBDAO when the corresponding equations are being
estimated for on-site workers), computed from the reduced form logit
estimates of the choice of labor force state. Third, three spouse
variables that are most relevant for choosing work site rather than
hours are excluded from the hours equation: S_LIM, S_EMP, and
S_HW. Finally, to allow for the possibility that the wage/hours and
wage/weeks relationships can be positive, negative, or can vary in sign
over the range of values of the wage, we include in addition to the
predicted log wage variable, a squared term of the predicted wage
(LNWPREDO2 or LNWPREDH2).
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RESULTS
Estimates of the labor force participation equations appear in Table
2, while estimates of the hours worked and weeks worked equations
appear in Table 4. (Estimates of the reduced form logits used to obtain
the selectivity adjustments are shown in Appendix Table 2.) Because
home-based workers are oversampled relative to on-site workers and to
those out of the labor force and because the sampling procedure used in
the PUMS is not simple random sampling, we use weights in obtaining
all of our estimates.19
Labor Force Participation Equations
To make the coefficients easier to interpret, rather than presenting
logit coefficients in Table 2, we present estimates of the marginal
effects of each dependent variable on the probability that an average
woman will be in each of the three labor force states (the logit coefficients from which these marginal effects are computed appear in
Appendix Table 3). These marginal effects are computed at the overall
sample mean values.20 By construction, the coefficients in the three
columns sum to zero (except for rounding error).
In the “On-site employment” column, marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of on-site labor force participation
are very similar to those in other studies of women’s labor force participation (in which estimates are dominated by on-site workers, who
greatly outweigh home-based workers). Women’s on-site labor force
participation is positively related to their education and expected wage,
and negatively related to their age, their being married with a spouse
present, their having children at home, and their having higher
unearned income.
Our focus, however, is on showing how women’s labor force decisions differ by work site, and the estimates in Table 2 illustrate that
these differences are significant in both a statistical and economic
sense. First, there is a significant difference in the set of logit coefficients on which the on-site and home-based employment columns are
based; that is, the factors that affect the labor force participation decision have significantly different impacts on the two work-site choices.
Second, the individual logit coefficients of most of the variables differ
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Table 2 Marginal Effects of the Explanatory Variables on the
Probability of Being on Each Work State—Structural Modela
Out of the
labor force

On-site
employment

Home-based
employment

Constantb

0.148
(11.42)**c

–0.069
(–5.30)**

–0.078
(–14.83)**

AGEb

0.005
(26.35)**

–0.005
(–26.91)**

–0.0002
(–1.95)

–0.011
(–10.09)**

0.012
(10.44)**

–0.001
(–1.76)

MSPb

0.127
(23.71)**

–0.130
(–23.84)**

0.003
(0.87)

CU6b

0.227
(59.39)**

–0.238
(65.57)**

0.011
(2.12)*

C617b

0.039
(14.40)**

–0.042
(–15.45)**

0.003
(3.23)**

BLACKNH b

–0.012
(–2.44)*

0.027
(5.38)**

–0.015
(–7.65)**

Variable

EDUCb

HISPOTH

0.005
(1.14)

–0.004
(–0.82)

–0.001
(–0.95)

DISABb

0.299
(43.25)**

–0.311
(–48.02)**

0.012
(1.74)

RURAL

–0.013
(–3.85)**

0.011
(3.36)**

0.001
(1.36)

FARMb

0.010
(0.92)

–0.020
(–1.70)

0.009
(4.42)**

OVER65

0.016
(2.79)**

–0.017
(–2.94)**

0.001
(0.76)

OTHINCb

0.002
(41.74)**

–0.003
(–45.04)**

0.0001
(2.43)*

S_LIMb

0.016
(2.00)*

–0.010
(–1.17)

–0.006
(–2.20)*

S_HWb

0.058
(5.23)**

–0.094
(–8.33)**

0.036
(19.60)**

S_WAGE

0.000
(2.84)**

–0.0002
(–2.15)*

–0.00004
(–0.53)
(continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
Out of the
labor force

On-site
employment

Home-based
employment

S_EMPLb

–0.076
(–16.94)**

0.082
(17.79)**

–0.005
(–2.54)*

LNWPREDOb

–0.479
(–23.94)**

0.444
(21.53)**

0.035
(2.75)**

LNWPREDHb

0.189
(12.82)**

–0.160
(–10.60)**

–0.029
(–4.59)**

Variable

Log likelihood

–79,280.01

a

t-statistics are in parentheses and are corrected for the preestimated selectivity correction. Marginal effects are computed at the means of the overall sample from the logit
coefficients in Appendix Table 3. Estimates are weighted to adjust for choice-based
sampling and the nonrandom nature of the 1990 PUMS.
b Variable has significantly different logit coefficients between the two work sites at the
5% level.
c * = significant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.
** = significant at the 1% level in a two-tailed test.

significantly between the two work sites (variables with significantly
different coefficients are indicated in Table 2 by the subscript letter
“b”). Further, as was hypothesized, variables associated with the fixed
costs of working on site tend to have significantly greater deterrent
effects on on-site labor force participation than on home-based laborforce participation. Being disabled is associated with a 0.31 reduction
in the probability of being in the labor force as an on-site worker but
does not significantly affect the probability of being a home-based
worker. Having a disabled spouse is negatively related to both types of
labor force participation, but the negative impact is significantly larger
for on-site participation than it is for home-based participation. Having
children under 6 is associated with a 0.24 reduction on the probability
of being an on-site worker, but with a 0.01 increase in the probability
of being a home-based worker. The differential effects of having children aged 6 to 17, while not as great, operate in the same direction, as
do the differential effects of having an elderly person living in the
household. The location variables, RURAL and FARM, do not provide
consistent results. Living in a rural farm area is associated with a
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reduction in the probability of being in the labor force as an on-site
worker as compared to being a home-based worker, but living in a rural
nonfarm area yields the opposite result. Overall, however, these results
strongly support our hypothesis that factors that are positively associated with the magnitudes of the fixed costs of on-site work will tend to
discourage on-site labor force participation in favor of home-based participation.
Although subsidiary to the main focus of this chapter, interesting
differences also emerge for the roles of unearned income, marital status, and age. Unearned income is negatively related to the probability
of on-site participation but has a slight positive relation to home-based
participation. This difference suggests that working at home is preferred to working on-site, and that women use unearned income to
“purchase” this preferred work mode. Or, alternatively, working at
home might be complementary with time spent in consumption. Put
differently, the difference in the marginal effects of unearned income
suggests that from a utility point of view, time spent working for pay at
home is more similar to leisure than is time spent working outside of
the home.21 A similar implication may be drawn from differences in
the marginal effects of marital status and age: the deterrent effects of
both marital status and age are also significantly less for home-based
work than for on-site work.
We also note differences in the effects of race and educational
attainment. Of the two race variables, only BLACKNH has significantly different coefficients for the two work sites. Black non-Hispanic women are significantly more likely than white women to be in
the labor force as on-site workers and significantly less likely than
white women to be home-based workers.22 The education effects for
the two work sites are also significantly different, with an increase in
educational attainment associated with an increase in the probability of
on-site employment and a decrease in the probability of home-based
employment.23
Of the three variables that reflect aspects of the husband’s labor
force status, two have statistically different coefficients between the
two work sites and one does not. Having a husband who is a homebased worker is a significant deterrent to on-site participation but an
encouragement to home-based participation. Clearly the issue of
fringe benefits is outweighed by the possible synergies when both
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spouses are home-based workers, possibly because they are joint participants in the same business. As expected, the husband’s wage has a
negative effect on the odds of working as either an on-site or a homebased worker, versus being out of the labor force. However, the coefficients are not statistically different in the two work sites. The results
for the husband’s receipt of wage and salary income are the opposite of
what we would have expected, but perhaps reflect only the fact that this
is an imperfect proxy for receipt of fringe benefits.
Finally, we consider the own wage effects on the choice of labor
force participation at each work site. Both predicted wage variables
are statistically significant in both labor force sites, but with signs that
differ from what we hypothesized: the predicted log of the on-site
wage (LNWPREDO) is positively related to the probability of both
types of labor force participation, and the predicted log of the homebased wage (LNHPREDH) is negatively related to the probability of
both types of labor force participation. The two predicted wage variables are likely to move together (in fact, the correlation between them
is 0.93), but this fact does not provide a satisfactory explanation for our
results. A more likely explanation is that the predicted wage is an inferior instrument for the actual wage in the case of home-based work
than in the case of on-site work. In fact, the adjusted R2 in the equation
predicting the home-based wage is 0.099, as compared to 0.212 for the
on-site wage. Further, the wage data used to estimate the earnings
function for home-based workers are more likely to be reported with
error than in the case of on-site workers.24 Given these considerations,
it is plausible that these unexpected results with regard to predicted
wages are a result of relatively greater measurement error in the instrument for the home-based wage.25
In order to examine the effects of fixed costs on labor force participation more fully, we compute in Table 3 the effects of changes in
these variables on the probabilities of being a home-based or an on-site
worker for six prototypical women. The table shows for each prototype the percentage change in the probability of being in the labor force
as a home-based or on-site worker associated with a change (from 0 to
1.0) in the value of each of the seven fixed cost proxies. We report the
results of these computations for three women with a high school education and varying marital status and age (women 1–3), and for three
corresponding women with a college education (women 4–6). Overall,

Table 3 Effect of Fixed-Cost Variables on Predicted Labor Force Participation, by Work Site, for
Six Prototypical Women
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Woman 1a
Woman 2b
Woman 3c
Woman 4d
Woman 5e
Woman 6f
HomeHomeHomeHomeHomeHomeOn-site based
On-site based
On-site based
On-site based
On-site based
On-site based
Variable
worker worker worker worker worker worker worker worker worker worker worker worker
Base probability 0.922
0.023
0.905
0.028
0.846
0.042
0.938
0.019
0.923
0.023
0.874
0.034
% change in base
probability
associated with
a change in
CU6
–14
+113
–17
+107
–25
+87
–12
+120
–14
+114
–21
+96
C617
–2
+26
–2
+258
–4
+23
–2
+26
–2
+26
–3
+24
DISAB
–21
+135
–25
+124
–35
+93
–18
+145
–21
+135
–30
+106
RURAL
+0
+6
+0
+6
+0
+6
+0
+6
+0
+6
+0
+6
FARM
–2
+74
–2
+74
–3
+72
–1
+75
–2
+74
–3
+73
OVER65
–1
+9
–1
+9
–1
+9
–1
+9
–1
+9
–1
+9
S_LIM
N/A
N/A
+0
–28
+0
–28
N/A
N/A
+0
–28
+0
–28
a Woman 1: Age 25, high school education, not married, or married without a spouse present, white, urban, no children <17, not disabled,
no one > 65 in household. Income and predicted wage variables set at means for nonmarried women.
b Woman 2: Same as woman 1, except married, spouse present. Wage and predicted income variables set at means for married women.
c Woman 3: Same as woman 2, except age 40.
d Woman 4: Same as woman 1 except with a college education.
e Woman 5: Same as woman 2 except with a college education.
f Woman 6: Same as woman 3 except with a college education.
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the patterns are quite similar for all six women. In all cases but
SP_LIM, proxies associated with higher fixed costs translate into an
increase in the probability of being a home-based worker, and in all
cases except for RURAL and SP_LIM, into a decrease in the probability of being an on-site worker. Although the basic probability of being
home-based is quite low for these prototypical women (between 2 and
4 percent), changes in fixed costs can have a dramatic impact on that
probability. For example, for a married 25-year-old woman with a high
school education, the presence of children under 6 years old increases
the probability of being a home-based worker by 113 percent. For the
same prototypical woman, being disabled increases the probability of
being in the labor force as a home-based worker by 135 percent. For
the comparable woman with a college education, the percentage
increases in the probability of home-based labor force participation are
also large. Overall, Table 3 supports our contention that the fixed costs
of working on-site play a significant role in determining the work site
choice of women.
The Conditional Hours Equations
The first and third data columns of Table 4 contain estimates of the
conditional hours equations for on-site and home-based workers,
respectively. Significant differences in coefficients between work sites
in the hours equations are noted with the superscript letters “b” and “e”
in the table. Factors that had significantly different coefficients in the
labor force participation equations also have, for the most part, significantly different coefficients in the hours and weeks equations, but there
is an important difference. Whereas many of the variables that related
to family structure had significantly greater deterrent effects for on-site
participation than for home-based participation, the sign of the difference between many of these coefficients changes for hours worked.
For example, having a child under 6 was a much greater deterrent to
labor force participation as an on-site worker than as a home-based
worker, but its negative effect on hours worked, conditional on being in
the labor force, is larger for home-based work than for on-site work. A
similar difference is observed for unearned income and having a disability. In contrast, having an older person in the household, having a
child between 6 and 17, and living in a rural farm area all act to
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increase hours of home-based relative to on-site workers. The net
effect of all the coefficient differences is that predicted hours for homebased work are lower on average than for on-site work (as is suggested
by the theory) and are more variable. What this means is that women
are better able to adjust their work hours in home-based work than in
on-site work.
This greater flexibility is most easily demonstrated in Figure 2,
which illustrates the distribution of predicted weekly hours for homebased workers, predicted alternately from the on-site hours equation
and from the home-based hours equation. In generating these predicted distributions of hours worked (and weeks worked, below) in
each work state, we include the appropriate LAMBDA among the
predictors. In this way, we take each individual’s unmeasured characteristics into account. The predicted hours distribution using the
home-based hours equation has a wider spread than the distribution
computed from the on-site hours equation: a greater proportion of
observations are predicted to work fewer than 35 hours per week, or
more than 40. For women who actually work at home, the average
predicted hours as a home worker are 35.2 with a standard deviation
of 4.5, while average predicted hours if the same women were an onsite worker are 36.4 with a standard deviation of 2.7. When we do
the same computations for on-site workers or for women out of the
labor force, the resulting distributions exhibit the same pattern. (For
on-site workers, predicted hours as a home worker would be 36.8 on
average, with a standard deviation of 4.2, while predicted hours onsite are 37.9 with a standard deviation of 2.6.) In all cases, the
greater spread in the predicted hours distribution for home-based
work than for on-site work indicates the greater ability of home-based
workers to choose their desired work hours, even if that choice
involves a nonstandard workweek.
The Conditional Weeks Equations
Estimates of the two conditional weeks equations appear in the
second and fourth data columns of Table 4. The equations are estimated using a tobit specification because of the significant clustering of
values at the upper limit of the dependent variable of 52 weeks.26 Significant differences in the weeks equations are noted with the super-
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Table 4 Estimates of Weeks and Hours Supplied, Conditional on Labor
Force Participationa
On-site employment

Home-based employment

Weekly hours
worked

Annual weeks
worked

Weekly hours
worked

Annual weeks
worked

Constantb,c

51.615
(26.86)**d

18.532
(3.74)**

76.109
(47.08)**

63.623
(27.26)**

AGEb,c

0.050
(–8.04)**

0.074
(4.71)**

–0.107
(–8.90)**

0.124
(7.38)**

0.263
(7.20)**

–0.663
(–7.07)**

–0.308
(–6.35)**

–0.476
(–7.05)**

MSPb,c

–0.928
(–8.67)**

–0.940
(–3.35)**

–4.583
(–18.80)**

–2.306
(–6.80)**

CU6b,c

–2.784
(–14.36)**

–2.512
(–5.07)**

–5.505
(–25.60)**

–6.550
(–22.11)**

C617b,c

–1.946
(–21.52)**

–3.318
(–14.08)**

–1.284
(–7.61)**

–1.130
(–4.83)**

0.887
(6.27)**

–1.446
(–4.16)**

3.866
(8.04)**

1.988
(3.15)**

HISPOTH

1.754
(11.88)**

–2.149
(–5.77)**

1.775
(5.62)**

–1.111
(–2.62)**

DISABb,c

–2.308
(–5.89)**

–1.129
(–1.14)

–3.746
(–9.87)**

–5.754
(–11.30)**

RURALb,c

–0.066
(–0.63)

–0.959
(–3.33)**

–1.029
(–5.38)**

0.531
(1.93)*

FARMb,c

–0.336
(–0.92)

0.587
(0.57)

1.336
(3.34)**

5.396
(8.30)**

OVER65c

0.207
(1.11)

–1.259
(–2.55)**

0.770
(2.10)*

0.643
(1.21)

OTHINCb

–0.037
(–16.43)**

–0.018
(–3.12)**

–0.051
(–25.10)**

–0.014
(–4.80)**

S_WAGE

–0.006
(–2.55)*

–0.0003
(–0.01)

–0.008
(–4.72)**

LNWPREDOe

–11.806
(–7.02)**

48.313
(11.14)**

—

—

LNWPRDO2e

2.798
(7.77)**

–10.399
(–11.25)**

—

—

Variable

EDUCb,c

BLACKNHb

–0.003
(–0.96)
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Home-based employment

Weekly hours
worked

Annual weeks
worked

Weekly hours
worked

LNWPREDHe

—

—

–15.202
(–10.34)**

7.748
(3.67)**

LNWPRDH2e

—

—

3.840
(8.63)**

–1.709
(–2.71)**

LAMBDAbb,c

–0.863
(–2.00)*

–8.701
(–7.84)**

–4.541
(–15.24)**

–2.188
(–9.54)**

Adj. R2/log L

0.05964

–119,438.8

0.06784

Variable

Annual weeks
worked

–118,937.8

a

t-statistics in parentheses and are corrected for the preestimated selectivity correction.
Hours estimates are weighted to adjust for choice-based sampling and the nonrandom
nature of the 1990 PUMS. Weeks equations are estimated using tobit, using the same
weighting, but are not selectively corrected.
b Denotes significant difference in coefficients between work sites in the hours worked
equations at the 5% level.
c Denotes significant difference in coefficients between work sites in the weeks worked
equations at the 5% level.
d * = significant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.
** = significant at the 1% level in a two-tailed test.
e Denotes significant difference in coefficients between work sites of corresponding
wage variables in the hours and weeks worked equations at the 5% level.

script letters “c” and “e”. The results for weeks are similar to those for
hours, although there are fewer variables with coefficients that differ
significantly between work sites. As in the case of the hours equations,
the net effect of the differences in the coefficients is that the mean of
the distribution of predicted annual weeks worked as a home-based
worker is lower than the mean of the distribution of predicted weeks
worked as an on-site worker. Further, the dispersion of predicted
weeks worked is greater for home-based than for on-site work. For
example, using the sample of home-based workers, we find that average predicted weeks worked per year are 43.3 with a standard deviation
of 2.5 for home-based work, compared to 45.6 with a standard deviation of 2.1 for the same individuals evaluated as on-site workers.
Figure 3 illustrates these differences for home-based workers. As
in Figure 2, we show here the distribution of predicted weeks worked
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Figure 2 Predicted Hours for Home-Based Workers

Figure 3 Predicted Weeks for Home-Based Workers
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for home-based workers using alternatively the estimates in columns 2
and 4 from Table 4. The figure illustrates the greater spread of the distribution when the equation predicting weeks worked in home-based
employment is used. When we do the same calculations for on-site
workers or for women out of the labor force, the results are very much
the same as in Figure 3. In all three cases, the predicted mean weeks
worked is lower for home-based work, and the variability is greater
compared to on-site work.

CONCLUSIONS
Home-based work offers women flexibility in work scheduling.
The work-at-home option reduces the fixed costs of entering the labor
market—the time and money costs of commuting, the costs of work
clothing, and the costs of child care while commuting. The lower fixed
costs associated with working at home translate into a lower reservation wage for home-based work, so that women who are likely to have
large fixed costs associated with working outside of the home—women
with young children, women with elderly relatives at home, women
who are disabled, or women who live in rural areas that may require
substantial commutes to an on-site work location—will be more likely
to be in the labor market if they can be home-based workers.
Our estimates are consistent with this hypothesis. When we compute the partial effects of the proxy measures for fixed costs on the
probability of being in each labor force state, we find that three of these
variables are associated with large and significant increases in the probability of being a home-based worker—having children under 6, being
disabled, and living in a rural-farm area. Put differently, the discouraging effect on labor force participation of these fixed costs variables are
significantly greater for on-site work than for home-based work. In
addition, women with higher levels of unearned income were also
more likely to choose home-based versus on-site work, suggesting that
this may be a preferred work option for some women.
Another implication of our theoretical discussion is that the lower
fixed costs of working at home will result in lower reservation hours
and weeks for home-based work. Our estimates provide indirect sup-
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port for this hypothesis: the distributions of predicted weeks and hours
for home-based work have lower means and greater dispersions than
do the corresponding distributions for on-site work. It appears that
home-based workers are better able to adjust their work schedules to
accommodate those family circumstances which generate higher fixed
costs of working. On average, home-based workers choose to work
somewhat less, and they are more likely to choose nonstandard work
schedules.
It is interesting to compare our results from the 1990 Census of
Population with the views of 24 professional and clerical women in the
New York City area who use some type of computer technology in their
home-based work (Christensen 1985b). The advantages of homebased work cited by these workers were the flexibility and autonomy in
structuring their work and the financial benefits associated with not
going to an office. Strikingly, many of the mothers with young children said that they would not be in the labor force at all if they could
not work at home.
Home-based work has its detractors. Many still view this as a form
of work organization that causes workers to be exploited and mistreated. Even the women surveyed above cite some disadvantages,
such as disruption of home and family and an inability to get away
from one’s work. But it is clear from the findings in this chapter that
home-based work has a valuable place in the menu of work options
available to women. Women who otherwise would not be able to enter
the labor force, either because of home care responsibilities, inconvenient location, or physical disability, choose this option. These women
are able to adapt their work schedules to a greater degree than are
women working on-site. We believe that women’s demand for this
work arrangement will continue to grow in the future, especially if the
current public concern about the welfare of children and families
remains strong.
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1. The data for 1960 come from Silver (1989); the data for 1980 come from U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1983, Table 122); and the data for 1990 come from U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1993, Table 148).
2. One aspect of the choice of home-based work—that it often involves the simultaneous choice of being self-employed—is not investigated in this chapter, but it is
treated explicitly in Edwards and Field-Hendrey (forthcoming).
3. The data and sampling procedure are fully described in U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1992).
4. Unemployed women and women with a job but not at work last week are deleted
from the sample because there is no way to determine if their desired labor force
participation is as a home-based or on-site worker. We also exclude women
whose class of worker information is not consistent with their reported earnings—
for example, someone who reports herself as self-employed in 1990, yet reports
wage and salary income for 1989—and women whose hourly earnings exceed
$250.
5. Persons who used more than one mode of transportation were requested to identify the one used for most of the distance.
6. For a more complete discussion of how home-based and on-site workers differ,
see Edwards and Field-Hendrey (1996).
7. Child (or other dependent) care costs are not, strictly speaking, a fixed cost of
working since they vary with the number of hours worked. The component of
these costs attributable to commuting time, however, is a fixed cost.
8. The hourly cost of dependent care may also vary with work site. This possibility
could be incorporated into the model by using a “net” wage rate for each work
site, net of the hourly cost of dependent care.
9. In this chapter, we treat the labor force decisions and resultant earnings of other
family members as exogenous.
10. Our procedure for computing λik follows Lee (1983). First we substitute the
expression for the wage from Eq. 8 into Eq. 7 to obtain a reduced form multinomial logit equation predicting labor force status. We obtain the predicted probability of individual i being in labor force state k, Pik, and use it to compute
selectivity correction factors for each state, λik, by the following procedure:
(A) Hik= Φ–1(Pik)
(B) λik = ϕ(Hik) / Φ(Hik),
where ϕ and Φ are the PDF and CDF of the standard normal distribution.
11. The procedure described here is similar to Killingsworth (1983, pp. 160–161), but
our model has three work states rather than the two considered by Killingsworth.
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Note that since the expected value of the offering wage in each work site is being
predicted, λik is not used as a predictor.
We are indebted to George Jakubson for this insight. The issue of correlated
errors across labor force states was a concern to us because we have reason to
believe that nonzero correlations are likely in our context. For example, Gerson
and Kraut (1988), in a personality assessment test given to members of their sample of clerical workers, found that home-based workers had statistically significantly different values concerning gender roles and careers as compared to on-site
workers. Views on such issues are just the type of unmeasured factor that create
correlations in the errors across labor force states.
Hutchens, Jakubson, and Schwartz point out that the major drawback with this
model is that it does not meet the condition of allowing one to combine existing
estimates with information about a new alternative to make predictions about the
probability of choosing that new alternative. This is not a drawback in the context
of our problem, since we do not wish to make inferences about work arrangements other than those already discussed in this chapter.
We follow this four-step procedure, rather than estimating reduced form equations
for the whole system jointly using maximum likelihood as does Blank (1990), in
order to obtain explicit estimates of the effect of the on-site and home-based
wages on labor force participation, hours, and weeks. This procedure allows us to
separate the direct effect on these variables of factors related to fixed costs from
the indirect effects that operate through the wage equation.
Although λik is included as a regressor, so that the coefficient estimates are unbiased, the error variances are not corrected.
See, for example, Blank (1988, 1990), Averett and Hotchkiss (1996, 1997),
Sorensen (1993), and Zabel (1993).
Variables to predict the woman’s offering wage in on-site and home-based work
are similar to those used by others (see, for example, Blank 1990; Averett and
Hotchkiss 1996, 1997; and Neumark and Korenman 1994): age (AGE), age
squared (AGE2), education (EDUC), education squared (EDUC2), an age and
education interaction term (AGEEDUC), marital status (MSP), number of children (FERT), race (BLACKNH and HISP&OTH), location of residence (RURAL
and FARM), whether the woman is disabled (DISAB), variables representing the
region of the country (SOUTH, WEST, MW), the manufacturing wage in the state
(MFGWAGE), and the unemployment rate in the state (UNEMP). In addition, we
include a set of variables to capture the industrial distribution of employment in
the state (their definitions are self-evident). One might expect offering wages to
be lower in rural areas, at least for on-site work. However, to the extent that one
industry that readily lends itself to home-based work, farming, is more prevalent
in rural and rural/farm areas, it may be that the offering wage for home-based
work will be relatively higher in such areas. Therefore, we include variables representing both residence in a rural area (RURAL) and residence in a rural/farm
area (FARM). Precise definitions of all of these variables appear in Appendix
Table 1. Also included in each wage predicting equation is the appropriate vari-
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able to correct for selectivity bias (LAMBDAH for home-based workers and
LAMBDAO for on-site workers), computed from the reduced form logit estimates of the choice of labor force state. For estimates and a detailed discussion of
these wage equations, see Field-Hendrey and Edwards (2001).
18. Although there is no hard evidence, in the case of home-based employees, it has
been suggested that these workers are less likely to have employer-provided
fringe benefits (Christensen 1985a). In the case of the self-employed, Devine
(1994) documents the much lower proportion of self-employed workers who
received health benefits on their jobs, as compared to employees. Blank (1990)
documents that part-time workers are much less likely to be included in company
pension or health plans.
19. The Census Bureau provides weights to adjust for the nonrandom nature of the
PUMS sample. In addition, we weight to take into account our sampling design,
which results in home-based workers being 25 times more likely to be in our sample than are on-site workers or women out of the labor force.
20. Marginal effects are computed from the logit coefficients according to the following formula:
δj = ∂Pj/∂x = Pj (βj – β),
where β = ΣPjβj.
These marginal effects are actually the derivatives of the probability of being
in the specified labor force state with respect to each independent variable. This
formula is correct for continuous variables, but not for dummy variables, for
which one should compute the effect of a change in the value from 0 to 1.0 by
computing the probability of being in the specified labor force state alternatively
when the dummy equals 0 and when it equals 1.0, and subtracting the two probabilities. Greene (1997, p. 878) shows that the approximation obtained by simply
taking derivatives for dichotomous variables, as we do in Table 2, is “often surprisingly good.” We checked several of our dichotomous variables and found the
results to be quite close to the approximation. In Table 3 we use the correct procedure for computing the effects of the dummy variables rather than the continuous
approximation.
21. Yet another explanation may be that unearned income is an endogenous variable;
that is, husbands and wives make labor force choices jointly, and in families in
which there is a desire for women to do home-based work, men work longer hours
to compensate for their wives’ resultant lower earnings.
22. A possible explanation is that many home-based workers are self-employed, and
it may be more difficult for black women to obtain the necessary capital.
23. Overall, these results are consistent with findings from the 1980 Census reported
by Kraut (1988). He studies only nonfarm white collar employment and estimates
a logistic equation to determine which variables were most important in women’s
choice of home-based work. He finds that the presence of preschool and older
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children, especially for married women, and a work-limiting disability were powerful determinants of the odds of a woman’s working at home. Age, education,
other household income and residence in rural areas were also significant factors.
He also finds that, even after holding these factors constant, black women had a
lower probability of working at home than did white women.
24. The proportion of observations for which earnings are allocated by the Census
Bureau, rather than being reported directly by the woman, is greater for homebased than for on-site workers. Thus, the hourly earnings figure reported in the
census will be more subject to error for home-based workers than for on-site
workers. This error is compounded by the fact that home-based workers are much
more likely than on-site workers to be self-employed, and the earnings of the selfemployed are notorious for errors in reporting (Devine 1992).
25. For example, Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) show that if there is a low correlation between an endogenous variable and a potential instrument, even a small correlation between the instrument and the error in the basic equation being
estimated can produce a larger inconsistency in the IV estimates than in the OLS
estimates.
26. The standard errors in the weeks worked equation estimates are not corrected for
the inclusion of the selectivity adjustment variable. In the case of the hours
worked equations, we experimented by estimating with and without making the
adjustment and found that there was very little difference in result.
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Table A1 Variable Definitionsa
Variable

Definition

AGE

Age

AGE2

Age squared

EDUC

Years of schoolingb

EDUC2

Years of schooling squared

AGEEDUC

Age times years of schooling

OTHINC

Total family income – earned income of individual

MSP

Dummy variable which equals 1 if woman is married with
spouse present

FERT

Number of children

CU6

Dummy variable which equals 1 if one or more children under
6 years old is present in the household

C617

Dummy variable which equals 1 if one or more children
between 6 and 17 years is present in the household

BLACKNH

Dummy variable which equals 1 if woman is black,
non-Hispanic

HISP&OTH

Dummy variable which equals 1 if woman is Hispanic, Asian,
or other non-white race

DISAB

Dummy variable which equals 1 if woman has a disability
which restricts the kind or amount of work she can do

RURAL

Dummy variable which equals 1 if woman lives in a rural area

FARM

Dummy variable which equals 1 if woman lives in a rural farm
area

OVER65

Dummy variable which equals 1 if there are person(s) over 65
years old in the household

S_HW

Dummy variable which equals 1 if the woman’s spouse is a
home-based worker

S_LIM

Dummy variable which equals 1 if the woman’s spouse has a
mobility or personal care limitation

S_WAGE

Spouse’s average hourly earnings computed from 1989 annual
earnings, weeks worked in 1989, and hours worked in the
census week

S_EMPL

Dummy variable which equals 1 if the woman’s spouse reported
wage and salary income in 1989
(continued)
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Table A1 (continued)
Variable

Definition

LNWPREDO

Log of predicted hourly earnings in on-site work

LNWPRDO2

Square of LNWPREDO

LNWPREDH

Log of predicted hourly earnings in home-based work

LNWPRDH2

Square of LNWPREDH

MW

Dummy variable which equals 1 if the woman lives in the
Midwest

SOUTH

Dummy variable which equals 1 if the woman lives in the South

WEST
MFGWAGE

Dummy variable which equals 1 if the woman lives in the West
c

UNEMPd

Average hourly earnings in 1989 of production workers in
manufacturing in the state
Unemployment rate in the state in 1990

Industrial distribution of employment in 1990 by state
(agriculture is excluded industry)d
FORESTRY

Percentage of employment in forestry and fisheries

MINING

Percentage of employment in mining

CONSTRUC

Percentage of employment in construction

MFG

Percentage of employment in manufacturing

TRANS

Percentage of employment in transportation, communications
and other public utilities

WHLESALE

Percentage of employment in wholesale trade

RETAIL

Percentage of employment in retail trade

FINANCE

Percentage of employment in finance, insurance, and real estate

SERVICES

Percentage of employment in services

PUBADMIN

Percentage of employment in public administration

a

All variables taken from the 1990 PUMS unless otherwise indicated.
variable was coded as a continuous variable from the classes provided in the census.
c U.S. Department of Labor (1991, Table C-8).
d U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993, Tables 149 and 151).
b This
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Table A2 Reduced Form Logit Coefficients for Labor Force Choicea,b
Variable

On-site workers

Home-based workers

0.004
(0.01)

–5.046
(–3.11)**

AGE

0.136
(14.33)**

0.195
(6.60)**

AGE2

–0.002
(–15.40)**

–0.002
(–6.82)**

EDUC

0.027
(1.56)

0.021
(0.36)

EDUC2

0.009
(19.35)**

AGEEDUC

–0.001
(–3.31)**

–0.001
(–1.06)

MSP

–0.628
(–23.26)**

–0.163
(–1.97)*

CU6

–1.157
(–61.86)**

–0.334
(–6.27)**

C617

–0.176
(–10.66)**

–0.036
(–0.74)

FERT

–0.143
(–26.03)**

–0.037
(–2.22)*

BLACKNH

–0.034
(–1.48)

–1.024
(–9.32)**

HISP&OTH

–0.159
(–6.67)**

–0.475
(–6.18)**

DISAB

–2.200
(–78.93)**

–1.253
(–13.60)**

RURAL

–0.098
(–5.76)**

0.069
(1.39)

FARM

–0.153
(–2.58)*

0.501
(4.44)**

OVER65

–0.117
(–3.81)**

0.024
(0.25)

OTHINC

–0.012
(–43.94)**

–0.002
(–1.24)

Constant

0.008
(5.54)**

(continued)
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Table A2 (continued)
Variable

On-site workers

Home-based workers

S_LIM

–0.066
(–1.51)

–0.384
(–2.42)*

S_HW

–0.362
(–6.00)**

1.696
(19.58)**

S_WAGE

–0.001
(–3.34)**

–0.003
(–0.75)

S_EMPL

0.412
(17.13)**

0.039
(0.60)

MW

0.142
(4.55)**

0.308
(3.48)**

SOUTH

0.087
(2.24)*

0.119
(0.10)

WEST

–0.076
(–2.35)*

MFGWAGE

–0.016
(–1.51)

UNEMP
FORESTRY
MINING

0.273
(2.94)**
–0.032
(–1.09)

–0.129
(–12.72)**

–0.173
(–6.05)**

0.207
(4.99)**

0.294
(2.64)**

–0.005
(–0.34)

0.047
(1.02)

0.004
(0.27)

–0.050
(–1.24)

MFG

–0.008
(–1.41)

–0.178
(–1.20)

TRANS

0.079
(–6.07)**

–0.180
(–4.90)**

0.034
(1.42)

0.151
(2.17)*

CONSTRUC

WHLESALE
RETAIL

–0.032
(–3.13)**

–0.027
(–0.96)

FINANCE

–0.007
(–0.60)

–0.001
(–0.04)

Work Site and Work Hours

SERVICES
PUBADMIN
a

0.014
(1.71)

0.019
(0.93)

–0.018
(–1.78)

0.033
(1.25)

289

t-Statistics are in parentheses. All logit coefficients refer to the odds of being in the
specified labor force category versus being out of the labor force. Estimates are
weighted to adjust for choice-based sampling and the nonrandom nature of the 1990
PUMS.
b * = Significant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.
** = Significant at the 1% level in a two-tailed test.
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Table A3 Structural Logit Coefficients for Labor Force Choicea,b
Variable

On-site work

Home-based work

–0.684
(–9.98)**

–4.825
(–24.43)**

–0.026
(–27.00)**

–0.007
(–2.25)*

0.059
(10.35)**

0.002
(0.10)

MSPc

–0.684
(–24.30)**

–0.358
(–4.20)**

CU6c

–1.234
(–68.63)**

–0.320
(–6.23)**

C617c

–0.212
(–14.88)**

0.035
(0.86)

Constantc
AGEc
EDUCc

BLACKNHc
HISPOTH

0.082
(3.27)**
–0.026
(–1.06)

DISABc

–1.621
(–49.39)**

RURAL

0.065
(3.75)**

–0.771
(–6.83)**
–0.093
(–1.18)
–0.533
(–4.98)**
0.121
(2.33)*

FARMc

–0.068
(–1.13)

0.451
(3.83)**

OVER65

–0.088
(–2.85)**

0.008
(0.08)

OTHINCc

–0.013
(–46.28)**

–0.002
(–1.40)

S_LIMc

–0.078
(–1.80)

–0.408
(–2.57)*

S_HWc

–0.360
(–6.05)**

1.704
(19.82)**

S_WAGE

–0.001
(–2.97)**

–0.003
(–0.71)

S_EMPLc

0.417
(17.45)**

0.019
(0.30)

Work Site and Work Hours

Variable

On-site work

Home-based work

LNWPREDOc

2.524
(23.75)**

3.829
(11.58)**

LNWPREDHc

–0.974
(–12.39)**

–2.322
(–9.93)**

Log likelihood
a

291

–79,280.01

t-Statistics are in parentheses and are corrected for the preestimated selectivity correction. Estimates are weighted to adjust for choice-based sampling and the nonrandom nature of the 1990 PUMS. All logit coefficients refer to the odds of being in the
specified labor force category versus being out of the labor force.
b * = Significant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.
** = Significant at the 1% level in a two-tailed test.
c Denotes significant difference in coefficients between work sites at the 5% level.
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A Comparative Analysis
of Moonlighting in Canada
and the United States
Jean Kimmel
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Lisa M. Powell
Queen’s University

Moonlighting is a small but significant aspect of labor market
activity of North America. Moonlighting, or multiple job-holding, is
defined by a worker who holds more than one job. The worker may be
job-packaging; that is, adding a part-time job to a full-time job, or the
total hours of work on all jobs may still be less than what would usually
be considered to be full-time hours. The incidence of moonlighting and
the characteristics of moonlighters have been examined periodically by
researchers in both Canada (Webber 1989; Cohen 1994; Krahn 1995;
Pold 1995) and the United States (Sekscenski 1980; Stinson 1986,
1990; Levenson 1995). Researchers have also sought to examine the
determinants of moonlighting, using econometrics to examine hypotheses such as primary job hours constraints, liquidity constraints, and job
heterogeneity (Shishko and Rostker 1976; Krishnan 1990; Lilja 1991;
Abdukadir 1992; Paxson and Sicherman 1996; Powell and Boucher
2001; Conway and Kimmel 1998; Kimmel and Conway 2001; ).
This chapter will analyze moonlighting in a comparative context in
Canada and the United States. Because the United States and Canada
have interdependent economies with such broad similarities, the two
countries serve as a useful basis for comparison. According to Card
and Freeman (1993, p. 191), “. . . few countries offer a more natural
pairing of policies and institutions or for uncovering the reasons for
differences in outcomes than the United States and Canada.”
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The chapter begins by providing detailed descriptive evidence concerning various aspects of moonlighting behavior in both countries.
These descriptive analyses include an examination of differences
across sex, age, education, marital status, occupation, industry, etc.
Within this static comparison we are able to discuss reasons for moonlighting based on information reported by individual workers. We then
seek further information regarding the determinants of moonlighting
and the structure of primary job (PJ) and secondary job (SJ) wages by
using regression analyses. We estimate separate PJ and SJ wage equations for each country and use them to construct predicted wages for
use in a probit model for moonlighting.
The following section of this chapter provides a static cross-country comparison of moonlighting with respect to a variety of characteristics. The next section provides an econometric analysis of the
determinants of moonlighting, and the last section concludes the chapter.

COMPARISON OF MOONLIGHTING BEHAVIOR
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Here we examine the incidence and distribution of moonlighting
across country and sex in 1991. We consider various demographic
characteristics, including age, education, marital status, and the presence of children in the household, and we use a sample of nonmoonlighters as a basis for comparison. Next, we describe the extent to
which moonlighters are self-employed or hold temporary or union
jobs, as well as the incidence and distribution of moonlighting for
occupations and industries. Also analyzed in this section are wages on
both jobs and total hours worked. Then we relate two basic motivations for moonlighting—primary job constraints and heterogeneous
jobs—to reported reasons for taking a second job. Finally, we present
multivariate analyses to explain the structure of primary and secondary
job wages as well as the probability of moonlighting.1
The United States data are drawn from the May Current Population
Survey (CPS), which contains a special supplement with information
on multiple jobs. The CPS is a randomly drawn U.S. sample of house-
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holds. Only those rotation groups eligible for the supplement are
included in these analyses. And, only individuals between the ages of
17–64 are included in our subsample. In the 1991 data, the full sample
is comprised of 14,727 workers, 941 of whom moonlight. Broken
down by sex, the full sample includes 7,896 male workers and 6,831
female workers.
The Canadian data used in this section are drawn from the Survey
of Work Arrangements (SWA) which is a supplement to the November
1991 Labour Force Survey (LFS). While the LFS does flag multiple
job-holders, the SWA provides additional information on work patterns, primary job union membership, occupational and industrial distributions of secondary jobs, secondary job wages, and the reason for
moonlighting. Certain data in the SWA are available only for paid
employees, and these cases are noted in our tables. Our subsample
includes those individuals aged 17–64 and omits unpaid family workers. Thus, our Canadian sample contains 29,875 workers, 13,500 of
whom are female and 16,375 are male. Among all workers, 1,606 individuals are multiple job-holders.
While both survey designs aim for the resulting samples to be
purely random representations of the two countries’ populations, both
samples suffer from some systematic nonresponse and over/underrepresentation of particular segments of the population. Therefore, all of
the summary statistics presented in this chapter are weighted.2
Who Moonlights?
The discussion in this section will relate to data given in Tables 1,
2, and 3. Table 1 shows moonlighting rates; that is, the percentage of
different groups of workers who moonlight. The numbers in Table 2
are distributions, showing the percentage of all moonlighters who fall
in the given subcategory, defined by a characteristic such as educational level or marital status. For example, Table 2 shows that 65.9 percent of all Canadian moonlighters are married. Table 3 is interpreted
just like Table 2, except Table 3 focuses on employed nonmoonlighters.
The incidence of moonlighting in Canada and the United States by
different individual characteristics are given in Table 1. Overall, U.S.
workers are more likely to moonlight than Canadian workers, at 6.01
percent in the United States and 5.04 percent in Canada.3 While female
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Table 1 Incidence of Moonlighting in Canada and the United States,
by Characteristics and Sex (%)
Canada
Both
sexes

Males

5.04

4.82

17–24

5.42

25–44
45–64

United States
Both
sexes

Males

5.31

6.01

6.56

5.34

4.34

6.58

5.43

6.06

4.74

5.15

5.07

5.24

6.57

7.10

5.91

4.61

4.56

4.67

5.14

5.67

4.48

None or elementary

3.37

3.50

3.18

3.10

3.13

3.06

High school

4.29

4.02

4.56

5.03

5.41

4.60

Some postsecondary/diploma

6.07

5.75

6.43

7.22

8.32

6.08

University degree

6.21

5.90

6.63

8.04

8.86

6.93

Married

5.02

5.05

4.97

5.96

7.06

4.43

Never married

5.11

4.34

6.09

5.83

5.75

5.94

Other

5.06

4.31

5.59

6.58

5.38

7.44

5.07

5.06

5.10

6.26

7.89

3.90

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated +
incorporated)

6.60

5.99

8.03

4.89

5.17

4.17

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated)

7.32

6.84

8.22

3.71

4.01

3.04

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated, no
help)

7.16

5.74

9.36

N/Ac

N/A

N/A

Temporary job PJb

7.12

5.54

8.90

N/A

N/A

N/A

Union member PJb

4.52

4.89

4.03

6.99

7.47

6.26

Managerial

5.39

5.62

5.16

6.54

7.56

5.36

Clerical

5.54

5.64

5.51

6.15

6.70

6.02

Characteristics
All individuals

Females

Females

Age

Education

Marital status

Children aged 0–5
a

Occupation PJ
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Canada
Both
sexes

Males

Sales

4.91

4.74

Service

5.33

Characteristics
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United States
Both
sexes

Males

5.11

5.28

6.81

3.92

5.32

5.33

7.35

9.84

5.45

Females

Females

Primary

8.69

7.86

12.32

6.30

5.97

8.45

Processing

4.03

4.18

3.39

4.98

5.10

4.65

Construction,
transportation and
material handling

3.16

2.94

5.49

4.44

4.49

3.97

Agriculture

8.96

9.13

8.53

7.40

7.34

7.66

Other primary

4.33

4.42

3.77

3.58

4.40

0.00

Manufacturing,
nondurable

3.98

3.82

4.26

4.94

4.78

5.20

Manufacturing,
durable

2.33

2.16

3.01

5.32

5.90

3.63

Construction

3.64

2.95

9.59

3.74

3.70

4.30

Transportation

3.89

3.44

5.16

6.32

6.62

5.60

Wholesale trade

4.30

4.47

3.93

7.14

7.25

6.87

Retail trade

5.39

6.04

4.76

4.52

5.28

3.78

Finance

5.26

3.56

6.33

4.82

5.58

4.20

Community services

6.97

8.64

6.20

7.59

9.91

6.55

Personal services

4.50

2.64

5.45

5.00

4.72

5.12

Business services

5.26

5.82

4.52

6.00

6.52

5.06

Public
administration

4.83

5.96

3.40

10.00

12.81

5.95

1,606

877

729

941

536

405

29,875

16,375

13,500

14,727

7,896

6,831

Industry PJ

Number of
moonlighters
Full sample
a

PJ = primary job.
b Available for Canada only for employees on PJ.
c N/A = data not available.

298

Kimmel and Powell

Table 2 Characteristics of Moonlighters in Canada and the United
States, by Characteristics and Sex
Canadaa

United States

Both
sexes

Males

Females

Both
sexes

Males

Females

17–24

16.6

13.2

20.3

13.1

12.8

13.7

25–44

58.7

60.0

57.3

63.3

63.1

63.7

45–64

24.7

26.8

22.4

23.5

24.1

22.6

None or
elementary

15.4

18.3

12.1

6.8

7.2

6.1

High school

20.4

18.7

22.3

33.2

31.6

35.7

Some
postsecondary/
diploma

44.5

42.5

46.8

26.3

25.8

27.2

University degree

19.7

20.6

18.7

33.7

35.4

31.0

Married

65.9

70.8

60.7

60.9

69.0

47.6

Never married

26.5

24.1

29.1

23.7

21.5

27.1

7.5

5.1

10.2

15.4

8.8

25.3

Children aged 0–5
(%)

17.9

20.2

15.3

20.0

24.8

12.8

Family income ($)

N/Ab

N/A

N/A

43,925

46,665

39,834

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated +
incorporated) (%)

18.4

22.3

14.1

9.1

11.5

5.5

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated)
(%)

13.2

15.3

10.9

5.2

6.5

3.3

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated,
no help) (%)

9.2

8.5

9.9

N/A

N/A

N/A

Temporary job PJc
(%)

7.2

6.1

8.3

N/A

N/A

N/A

Characteristics
Age (%)

Education (%)

Marital Status (%)

Other
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United States

Both
sexes

Males

Females

Both
sexes

Males

Females

PJc

33.3

40.7

26.0

20.4

21.6

18.5

Total weekly hours

43.3

48.2

37.9

51.9

56.6

44.8

0–29

15.3

9.3

22.0

7.6

3.8

13.3

30–39

22.6

14.6

31.4

7.6

3.7

13.6

40–49

25.1

25.1

25.2

30.1

24.4

38.6

50+

36.9

51.1

21.5

54.7

68.1

34.5

13.7

15.9

11.8

13.41

14.61

11.71

Under 5.00

3.1

2.4

3.6

15.7

14.8

17.0

5.00–6.99

25.5

21.3

28.4

20.9

14.2

29.9

7.00–9.99

21.4

27.0

17.6

17.9

20.4

14.5

10.00–13.99

22.7

22.3

23.0

14.4

17.9

9.9

14.00–19.99

10.5

12.0

9.5

13.8

12.5

15.6

Characteristics
Union member
(%)

Distribution of total
hours (%)

Mean hourly wage
PJb (C$)
Hourly wage SJd
(C$)

20.00 +
Mean hourly wage
SJc (C$)
a

16.8

15.1

17.9

17.2

20.2

13.2

12.1

12.1

12.1

14.66

16.97

11.58

Canadian information available only for moonlighters who are employees on secondary job (SJ).
b N/A = data not available.
c Available information only for paid employees on primary job (PJ).
d Available information only for paid employees on SJ.
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Table 3 Summary Statistics for Nonmoonlighting Workers in Canada
and the United States, by Characteristics and Sex
Canada

United States

Both
sexes

Males

Females

Both
sexes

Males

Females

17–24

15.4

14.7

16.2

14.6

13.9

15.5

25–44

57.5

56.9

58.2

57.6

57.9

57.2

45–64

27.2

28.4

25.7

27.7

28.2

27.2

None or
elementary

23.4

25.6

20.7

13.6

15.7

11.0

High school

24.2

22.6

26.2

40.1

38.7

41.8

Some
postsecondary/
diploma

36.6

35.2

38.3

21.6

20.0

23.7

University degree

15.8

16.6

14.8

24.6

25.6

23.5

Married

66.4

67.4

65.1

61.5

64.5

58.0

Never-married

26.1

26.9

25.2

24.5

24.7

24.2

7.5

5.8

9.7

14.0

10.8

17.8

Children aged 0–5
(%)

17.8

19.25

16.0

19.2

20.4

17.8

Family income ($)

N/Aa

N/A

N/A

44,248

44,94

43,405

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated +
incorporated) (%)

13.8

17.7

9.1

11.3

14.8

7.1

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorpated)
(%)

8.8

10.5

6.8

8.6

10.8

5.9

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated,
no help) (%)

6.3

7.1

5.4

N/A

N/A

N/A

Temporary job PJ
(%)

4.7

5.0

4.5

N/A

N/A

N/A

Characteristics
Age (%)

Education (%)

Marital status (%)

Other
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United States

Both
sexes

Males

Females

Both
sexes

Males

Females

Union member PJ
(%)

35.4

37.8

32.8

16.7

18.3

14.7

Mean total weekly
hours

35.45

38.65

31.6

39.3

42.2

35.9

0–29

22.3

13.4

32.9

12.8

7.0

19.8

30–39

32.7

28.7

37.5

10.8

6.2

16.4

40–49

32.7

40.3

23.6

61.5

65.3

57.0

50+

12.4

17.6

6.0

14.9

21.5

6.8

14.53

15.92

13.13

12.89

14.53

11.07

Characteristics

Distribution of
hours (%)

Mean hourly wage
PJ (C$)
a

N/A = data not available.

workers in Canada have higher moonlighting rates than their male
counterparts (5.31 percent versus 4.82 percent), the opposite is true in
the United States (5.34 percent versus 6.56 percent). Note, however,
that females in Canada and the United States moonlight at approximately the same rate. The U.S. male moonlighting rate is 1.74 percentage points higher than the Canadian male rate, a 36 percent difference.
The moonlighting age profile also is different across the two countries. For male and female workers combined, Canadian moonlighting
rates peak for the youngest workers, while U.S. moonlighting rates
peak for the middle-age workers (ages 25–44). The moonlighting rates
for young workers (ages 17–24) are essentially identical across the two
countries, at 5.4 percent. This pattern is altered when the sample is
broken down by sex. Canadian male moonlighters are like their U.S.
male counterparts, moonlighting at the highest rates during the middle
ages. It is the Canadian female moonlighters driving their aggregate
age profile: they are most likely to moonlight while they are young.
Female moonlighters in the United States follow the same age/moonlighting profile as their male counterparts, moonlighting at the highest
rates during the middle ages.

302

Kimmel and Powell

Further information regarding moonlighting patterns over the life
cycle can be discerned from Table 2.4 Over half of all moonlighters
are prime-age workers, and in the United States this figure approaches
two-thirds. The life-cycle distribution of moonlighting across sex is
quite similar for both countries. As shown in Table 3, compared with
nonmoonlighters, U.S. moonlighters are somewhat more likely to be
between the ages of 25 and 44.
As seen in Table 1, for Canadian and U.S. workers, male and
female, the incidence of moonlighting rises with higher levels of education. For those with a university degree (16 or more years of education for U.S. workers), 6.21 percent of Canadians and 8.04 percent of
U.S. workers moonlight. For lesser-educated workers, moonlighting
rates are below 4 percent in both countries. Comparing Tables 2 and 3,
nonmoonlighters are considerably more likely to have low levels of
education compared to moonlighters. This implies that moonlighting
is not mostly comprised of the most disadvantaged workers, contrary to
what is often implied by the popular media. On the contrary, because
of the rising marginal valuation of each additional foregone hour of leisure, if the substitution effect dominates, then those who are most
likely to moonlight, ceteris paribus, would be those with the relatively
greatest wage opportunities on the second job. Additionally, highereducated workers are more likely to be salaried on their primary jobs
rather than hourly paid, so extra hours worked on the primary job will
not increase earnings. Overall, moonlighting is undertaken by relatively higher-educated workers. This finding is consistent with Levenson (1995).
One of the characteristics with the most significant differences in
the incidence of moonlighting by sex is marital status. In particular,
U.S. females who are divorced, separated, or widowed (the “Other”
marital status category) moonlight at a rate of 7.44 percent, higher than
the 5.38 percent rate for like U.S. male workers. No single marital status category for males has a moonlighting rate as high as for the
“Other” females. In Canada, two marital status categories for females
exhibit higher moonlighting rates than for any of the three marital status groups for the Canadian males. Females who have never married
have a 6.09 percent incidence of moonlighting, while 5.59 percent of
females who are divorced, separated, or widowed moonlight.
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Table 2 shows that about two-thirds of moonlighters are married,
reflecting the relatively high percentage of married workers in the general working population. In both Canada and the United States, male
moonlighters are more likely to be married, at 66 percent for Canadians and 61 percent for the United States. However, the gender differences are striking for the United States, where 69 percent of male
moonlighters are married but only 48 percent of female moonlighters
are married. The extent to which these numbers are driven by overall
labor market statistics can be seen in Table 3, where the distribution
across marital status is quite similar to that found for the nonmoonlighters. The only substantive difference is for females, where the marriage rate for employed nonmoonlighters is 10 percent higher than the
rate for moonlighters.
As is typical in most standard labor supply issues, the presence of
young children (aged 0–5 years) is associated with less moonlighting
for females but more moonlighting for males. That is, male workers
with young children are more likely to moonlight than male workers in
general, and the opposite is true for females. This pattern holds for
both Canada and the United States, although the sex pattern is stronger
in the United States. For men, the income effect of children is stronger,
but for females the substitution effect is stronger, implying that the relative valuation of work and leisure causes women to work less when
they have young children. Therefore, women with young children are
less likely to moonlight as well. As seen in Table 2, Canadian male
moonlighters are about 20 percent less likely to have young children
than U.S. male moonlighters, while Canadian female moonlighters are
more likely to have young children than their U.S. counterparts. Nonmoonlighters (Table 3) are about equally as likely to have young children overall in the two countries, but there is more of a sex difference
in the United States, where female nonmoonlighters are nearly 50 percent more likely to have young children than female moonlighters.
The distribution of moonlighting across characteristics broken down by
marital status and gender is given in Table 4.
Looking at marital status and the presence of young children combined (U.S. numbers, not shown in the tables), reveals that the bulk of
the higher moonlighting rates for male workers with young children is
associated with the higher moonlighting rates for married or once-married males. In fact, divorced fathers of young children moonlight at
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Table 4 Characteristics of Moonlighters, by Marital Status and Sex
Canada
Characteristics

Never
Married married

United States
Other

Never
Married married Divorced Other

Females
Age (%)
17–24

9.9

48.7

0.9

4.0

42.9

1.0

0.7

25–44

64.9

39.2

63.9

75.9

51.8

54.4

53.4

45–64

25.2

12.1

35.3

20.1

5.3

44.6

45.9

None or
elementary

12.2

12.8

9.8

7.8

3.7

4.1

5.6

High school

25.1

15.3

25.8

33.0

27.0

51.2

50.0

Some
postsecondary/
diploma

46.0

45.6

55.6

28.3

33.1

14.4

18.7

University
degree

16.7

26.3

8.8

30.9

36.2

30.4

25.7

Children aged
0–5 (%)

23.6

0.8

7.6

20.3

4.9

7.2

7.0

Family income
($)

N/Aa

N/A

N/A

45,973

37,253

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated
+ corporated)
(%)

18.7

9.9

8.7

9.0

1.7

1.7

2.9

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated)
(%)

13.5

6.4

7.9

5.5

0.6

0.3

2.0

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated,
no help) (%)

12.0

6.4

7.6

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Temporary job PJ
(%)

5.0

14.4

8.2

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Union member PJ
(%)

30.4

16.4

30.6

19.1

10.0

27.7

26.4

Mean total
weekly hours

37.24

38.62

39.45

41.6

46.4

50.3

49.4

Education (%)

31,932 30,427
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United States
Other

Never
Married married Divorced Other

Distribution of
total hours (%)
0–29

25.0

18.0

14.9

19.4

11.7

5.0

3.6

30–39

29.4

38.8

22.7

16.3

12.6

5.6

9.3

40–49

26.2

19.7

34.7

38.2

34.4

44.0

43.9

50+

19.4

23.6

27.7

26.1

41.2

45.5

43.2

11.61

11.17

11.84

13.04

12.52

Mean hourly
wage, PJ ($)

12.88

9.84

Hourly wage,b SJ
(%)
Under 5.00

2.8

4.2

5.8

13.7

25.6

12.3

12.8

5.00–6.99

19.2

40.3

34.4

31.7

31.2

27.3

25.5

7.00–9.99

16.1

16.5

27.6

16.8

16.2

6.2

8.6

10.00–13.99

25.8

21.6

14.8

6.4

9.0

14.0

16.8

14.00–19.99

15.6

1.4

5.9

17.5

7.0

24.6

21.9

20.00+

20.5

16.1

11.4

14.0

10.9

15.7

14.5

Mean hourly
wage, SJ ($)

13.51

10.77

10.12

11.79

10.14

13.42

12.83

Number of
observations

499

159

71

196

113

62

96

Males
Age (%)
17–24

4.2

42.3

0.0

5.9

40.5

0

0

25–44

62.9

51.2

61.4

64.9

55.9

63.3

66.8

45–64

32.9

6.5

38.6

29.3

3.6

36.7

33.2

20.4

13.1

14.8

6.4

9.7

7.6

8.1

Education (%)
None or
elementary
High school

18.7

19.9

13.8

32.1

31.6

28.1

27.6

Some postsecondary/
diploma

40.5

46.8

48.4

26.1

21.5

36.8

33.4

(continued)
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Table 4 (continued)
Canada
Characteristics
University
degree

Never
Married married

United States
Other

Never
Married married Divorced Other

20.5

20.2

23.0

35.5

37.2

27.5

30.9

Children aged 0–5
(%)

28.1

1.2

1.3

34.6

0.3

8.1

6.8

Family income ($)

N/A

N/A

N/A

51,196

35.444

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated
+ incorporated)
(%)

26.5

9.9

21.7

11.5

12.5

1.4

9.0

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated)
(%)

17.3

9.6

13.1

5.5

9.8

0

5.5

Self-empl. PJ
(unincorporated,
no help) (%)

8.9

7.8

7.0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Temporary job PJ
(%)

3.4

10.8

16.2

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Union member PJ
(%)

42.8

33.1

54.6

25.1

14.7

12.7

10.4

Total weekly
hours

50.27

42.19

47.09

37,979 36,813

58.4

51.4

54.4

54.4

Distribution of
total hours (%)
0–29

5.4

21.3

7.4

7.4

9.4

1.3

6.1

30–39

13.7

15.2

24.1

24.1

9.5

3.6

2.8

40–49

23.4

29.4

28.8

28.8

29.0

21.2

23.8

50+

57.6

34.2

39.8

39.8

52.1

74.0

67.3

17.59

10.74

23.22

15.72

11.22

14.92

14.13

0

15.0

17.3

4.9

7.8

Hourly wage, PJ
(C$)
Hourly wage, SJ
(C$)
Under 5.00

4.1

0

5.00–6.99

10.1

41.8

8.3

10.9

18.4

16.8

25.3

7.00–9.99

26.1

29.8

19.1

20.7

24.3

12.3

9.1
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Characteristics

Never
Married married

10.00–13.99

26.6

15.9

14.00–19.99

14.4

20.00+

18.7

Hourly wage SJ
(C$)
Number of
observations
a
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United States
Other

Never
Married married Divorced Other

18.4

18.3

16.7

14.8

17.7

9.3

3.5

3.1

50.8

14.2

9.1

14.0

10.3

21.0

14.2

37.2

29.9

13.3

9.04

17.54

17.95

13.32

19.58

22.67

691

153

33

365

121

38

50

N/A = data not available.
Canadian dollars.

b In

more than twice the rate of all workers, 12.88 percent. Presumably the
financial pressures of alimony or single-parenting play an important
role here. Relating marital status and the presence of young children
for females in the United States, married women with young children
have the lowest moonlighting rate (3.72 percent), while unmarried
women without young children moonlight at the highest rate, nearly 8
percent.
Canadians who are self-employed are much more likely to moonlight than the typical Canadian worker. However, in the United States,
workers who are self-employed in their primary jobs are less likely to
moonlight. The corresponding rates of moonlighting for those selfemployed in their primary jobs are 6.6 percent for Canadian workers
and 4.9 percent for U.S. workers. Comparing moonlighters to nonmoonlighters (Table 3), the difference across the two countries is striking. While U.S. moonlighters are less likely to be self-employed than
nonmoonlighters, Canadian moonlighters are much more likely to be
self-employed.
Workers in Canada who hold temporary primary jobs moonlight at
a rate greater than the overall moonlighting rate, 7.12 percent versus
5.04 percent. And female temporary workers are 50 percent more
likely to moonlight than the typical female worker. Comparing moonlighters to nonmoonlighters, moonlighters are considerably more likely
to hold temporary primary jobs.
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The patterns of moonlighting for those workers unionized on their
primary jobs differs between Canada and the United States. Unionized
male workers are more likely to moonlight than all male workers, but
this increased moonlighting incidence is only 0.07 percentage points
for male workers in Canada, but equals a 0.91 point difference for U.S.
male workers. Canadian females who are unionized on their primary
jobs have significantly lower moonlighting rates than the overall
female rate, but the opposite is true for U.S. females. This might
reflect the differences in unionization rates and the types of workers
unionized between Canada and the United States. In our 1991 data,
Canadian males and females were unionized at rates of 39.7 percent
and 34.1 percent, respectively. However, in the United States, males
and females were unionized at much lower rates, 18.5 percent and 14.9
percent, respectively.
From Table 2, 33.3 percent of Canadian moonlighters and 20.4
percent of U.S. moonlighters are unionized on their primary jobs; that
is, Canadian moonlighters are more than 50 percent more likely than
their U.S. counterparts to be unionized. In Canada, male moonlighters
are considerably more likely to be unionized than females, but the rates
across sex in the United States are fairly similar. Compared to nonmoonlighters (as seen in Table 3), the differences across sex for Canada
persist. Canadian male workers who moonlight are more likely to be
unionized than their nonmoonlighting counterparts, but the opposite is
true for females. The result for males is somewhat counterintuitive,
given the greater than 20 percent boost to wages associated with holding a union job (Riddell 1993). However, union workers are more
likely to work full time, and female moonlighters are less likely than
males to combine a full-time with a second part-time job. For the
United States, unionization rates for moonlighters and nonmoonlighters are fairly close, but like the Canadian males, moonlighters are more
likely to be unionized.
As one might expect, moonlighting rates vary across occupations
and industries.5 In Canada, by far the highest moonlighting rate for
both men and women is the Primary occupation (7.86 percent and
12.32 percent), which includes farming, forestry, fishing, and mining.
Of course, relatively few workers overall are employed in this occupation. The managerial and professional technical occupation (referred
to as Managerial in the tables) is the most common occupation for
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workers of both sexes in both countries. Male workers in this occupation are a bit more likely to moonlight than workers overall. However,
Canadian female workers in the Managerial occupation are less likely
to moonlight, while the rate for this occupation for U.S. females is
nearly identical to their overall moonlighting rate.
One of the occupations most frequently talked about in discussions
of moonlighting is sales; however, only U.S. males in sales moonlight
at relatively high rates. Sales become more important as the occupation choice for the second job. Approximately 40 percent of female
moonlighters in both countries hold second jobs in sales. For males, 37
percent and 25 percent of moonlighters in Canada and the U.S., respectively, moonlight in sales. A second occupation prevalent in moonlighting jobs is the Professional/Skilled occupation; one-third of U.S.
male moonlighters hold second jobs in Semiskilled/Unskilled jobs.
Turning to PJ industries, relatively high moonlighting rates are seen
in Agriculture and Community Services in all four samples. In fact, 45
percent of U.S. females are employed in primary jobs in Community
Services, which is a broadly defined industry category that includes
professional services and entertainment. And U.S. males employed in
the industry of Public Administration also moonlight at a high rate. For
the second job, by far the most common industry is Services.
The final section in Table 2 shows the percentage of moonlighters
whose second job occupation or industry are the same. Occupationswitching between the PJ and SJ (seen as a relatively low percentage in
the table) occurs with different occupations for men than women. For
men employed in a clerical occupation in their second job, only about
one-fourth were employed in the same PJ occupation. For women,
only about one-fourth of those employed in a Semiskilled/Unskilled
occupation were employed in the same occupation in the primary job.
For U.S. females, about three-fourths of those employed in Sales and
Service second jobs are occupation-switchers. Industry-switching is
most prevalent for those employed in Retail Trade for the second job.
Information concerning wages on both jobs and total weekly hours
is given in Table 2. On average, U.S. male and female moonlighters
work more total hours per week (at 57 and 45 total hours, respectively)
than their Canadian counterparts (at 48 and 38 hours, respectively).
These averages are nearly 10 hours per week higher than the average
hours worked per week for nonmoonlighters. Additionally, moonlight-
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ers have a much greater percentage working more than 50 hours per
week than nonmoonlighters. Approximately 50 percent of Canadian
male moonlighters and two-thirds of U.S. male moonlighters work
more than 50 hours per week. Relatively few nonmoonlighters work
this many hours. These numbers suggest that many moonlighters face
significant time pressures.
Male moonlighters earn on average $15.90 per hour on the PJ in
Canada and $14.60 per hour on the PJ in the U.S.6 Hourly wages for
female moonlighters are nearly equal on average in Canada and the
U.S., with Canadian moonlighters earning $11.80 per hour on average
and U.S. moonlighters earning $11.71. Compared to nonmoonlighters,
moonlighters in three of the four samples earn more per hour on average. Only U.S. female moonlighters earn less per hour on their PJ than
do nonmoonlighters.
Secondary job wages are much higher on average for U.S. males
($16.97 per hour) than Canadian males ($12.10), but the opposite is
true for females. This might explain in part the higher moonlighting
rate for males in the United States. Canadian females earn $12.10 per
hour on their SJ while U.S. females earn $11.58 per hour. Surprisingly,
Canadian males and females earn identical SJ hourly wages on average. However, as is seen from the SJ wage distribution, 32 percent of
Canadian females are low wage (defined as a SJ wage less than $7.00
per hour) while only 24 percent of Canadian males are low wage. In
the U.S., 29 percent of male moonlighters are low wage workers, as
opposed to 47 percent of U.S. females. With respect to earnings capacity on both jobs, U.S. females seem to be at the greatest disadvantage.
Why Moonlighters Take Second Jobs
Why do workers in the United States and Canada moonlight? The
evidence cited so far shows that there are many reasons, reflecting
many factors, including age, education, marital status, and household
composition. As explained by Conway and Kimmel (1998), the reasons for multiple-job holding can be summarized as constraints on the
primary job (insufficient hours or earnings) or heterogeneous jobs (different jobs provide different nonpecuniary benefits to the worker.)
These sorts of reasons for moonlighting can be identified in both the
Canadian and U.S. data sources because individual workers report spe-
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cific reasons in the survey for taking a second job. These findings are
given in Table 5 and include the following responses: to meet regular
household expenses, pay off debts, buy something special, save for the
future, gain experience or build up a business, or enjoys the work of the
second job.
While there are some similarities between the two countries, some
differences can be seen, particularly in how the aggregate figures break
down into their sex components. Combining the first and second categories gives the percentage of moonlighting attributable to financial
hardship. Approximately 45 percent of Canadian moonlighters and 42
percent of U.S. moonlighters report moonlighting due to financial
hardship. And Canadian male moonlighters are somewhat more likely
than U.S. male moonlighters to take a second job due to financial hardship—45.6 percent versus 39.2 percent. The rates for females are similar for the two countries, and U.S. women are more likely to
moonlight due to financial hardship than U.S. men. Combining the
first four categories provides a more comprehensive picture of the percentage of moonlighters who are choosing to take a second job for
financial reasons, or for PJ constraints, as alluded to earlier. Canadian
Table 5 Main Reasons for Undertaking Moonlighting in Canada and the
United States (%)
Canada

United States

Both
sexes

Males

Females

Both
sexes

Males

Females

Meet regular household
expenses

33.7

33.4

33.9

31.2

28.0

36.0

Pay off debts

11.3

12.2

10.5

11.0

11.2

10.7

4.6

4.5

4.7

7.2

6.7

7.9

Save for the future

12.4

12.8

12.1

10.7

11.1

10.1

Gain experience/build
business

10.8

9.7

11.5

7.8

7.1

8.7

Enjoys the work of SJ

15.0

14.6

15.3

13.9

15.2

11.9

Other

12.3

12.7

12.0

18.4

20.8

14.7

Buy something special

NOTE: Canadian information in this table pertains only to moonlighters who were
“employees” in their second job.
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males are more likely than U.S. males to moonlight for financial reasons (62.9 percent versus 57 percent), but the opposite is true for
women (61.2 percent versus 64.7 percent). However, both rates are
fairly close.
The last two specific categories identify those moonlighters who
have taken a second job because there is some characteristic of that
second job that does not exist on the PJ.7 From the two general moonlighting motivations listed earlier, this is the heterogeneous jobs
motive. Canadian and U.S. workers moonlight for this reason at fairly
substantial rates—25.8 percent for Canadians, and 21.7 percent for
U.S. moonlighters. Breaking this down by sex reveals a more substantial discrepancy between female moonlighters—27.3 percent for Canadians and 20.6 percent for U.S. moonlighters. Overall, while financial
motivations are most important in moonlighting, the heterogeneous
jobs motive is important for a substantial percentage of individuals.
In summary, there are several findings of note in this section.
Moonlighting is most prevalent among relatively higher educated
workers, and unmarried females are most likely to moonlight. Also,
the bulk of moonlighting is undertaken for financial reasons. There are
two major differences between moonlighting in Canada and the United
States. First, U.S. workers overall are about 20 percent more likely to
moonlight than Canadian workers, while females in the two countries
moonlight at comparable rates. Second, U.S. moonlighters work on
average more total hours per week than Canadian workers, but moonlighters in all cases work considerably more hours per week than nonmoonlighters.

ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES
In addition to the descriptive analyses using the summary statistics,
we seek further information regarding moonlighting patterns and the
structure of PJ and SJ wages using regression analyses. Previous
econometric studies of moonlighting behavior include Shishko and
Rostker (1976), Krishnan (1990), Lilja (1991), Abdukadir (1992), Paxson and Sicherman (1996), Conway and Kimmel (1998), Kimmel and
Conway (2001), and Powell and Boucher (2001). First, to determine
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what factors are important in determining the level of wages in each of
the two jobs, we estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) wage equations
for both the PJ and SJ wages. Because SJ wages are observed only for
those holding a secondary job, we include an econometric sample
selection term to account for this selection on positive SJ wages in this
equation. We refer to this term as Lambda, and it is the standard Heckman (1979) sample selection correction term.8 The two wage equations are written out in summary form below.
PJ wage = dummy variables for age categories; dummy variables
for education categories; dummy variable for young children; 9
regional dummies; industry dummy variables.
SJ wage = dummy variables for age categories; dummy variables
for education categories; dummy variable for presence of young children;10 regional dummies; lambda.
These specifications reflect a standard human capital model of
wages in which the level of education and years of experience (proxied
by age in our data) are expected to contribute positively to wages.
Additionally, in the regressions for females, an additional dummy variable for the presence of young children in the family is included as a
proxy for intermittent work history (Blau and Beller 1988). And, the
regional dummies are included to control the effect of regional differences in labor market demand conditions. Industry dummy variables
are included in the PJ wage equation but not the secondary wage equation because the industry of the SJ is not available for all workers, so
the results could not be used to predict the SJ wage for nonmoonlighters.
PJ and SJ wage equations are estimated separately by country and
sex. Results from these regressions are given in Tables 6 and 7.
Because the equations are estimated with the natural logarithm of the
wage as the dependent variable, coefficient values reflect percentage
returns to the different characteristics.11 Additionally, for each categorical dummy variable, the coefficient is interpreted in comparison to
the excluded category. Only coefficients with statistical significance of
10 percent or greater are discussed in text.
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Table 6 OLS Log PJ Wage Equations in Canada and the United Statesa,b
Variables

Males

Females

Canada

United States

Canada

United States

2.1808***
(113.256)

1.7012***
(68.907)

2.2388***
(128.569)

1.7278***
(75.602)

Age 25–34

0.2967***
(22.986)

0.2732***
(15.603)

0.1929***
(15.935)

0.2450***
(14.068)

Age 35–44

0.4496***
(33.302)

0.4521***
(25.015)

0.2795***
(22.264)

0.3172***
(17.737)

Age 45+

0.4585***
(32.585)

0.5103***
(28.325)

0.2611***
(19.528)

0.2980***
(17.625)

0.1172***
(9.867)

0.2138***
(13.047)

0.1394***
(11.453)

0.2040***
(11.201)

Some
postsecondary

0.2063***
(19.345)

0.3520***
(19.023)

0.2177***
(19.075)

0.3378***
(17.047)

University degree

0.4382***
(29.444)

0.6215***
(33.000)

0.4950***
(32.077)

0.5772***
(28.110)

Number of
children

—

—

–0.0162***
(–4.389)

–0.0287***
(–4.986)

Region 1c

–0.2427***
(–19.632)

0.1248***
(8.363)

–0.2136***
(–18.076)

0.1179***
(8.274)

Region 2

–0.0557***
(–4.692)

Region 3
Region 4

Intercept

High school

Region 5

0.0261*
(1.755)

–0.0333***
(–2.799)

0.0051
(0.353)

–0.1417***
(–10.200)

0.0982***
(6.485)

–0.1179***
(–9.094)

0.1148***
(7.749)

–0.3537***
(–2.271)

—

–0.0489***
(–3.306)

—

—

–0.0353**
(–2.246)

—

–0.3699***
(–9.460)

–0.1641***
(–2.404)

0.2196
(1.391)

Agriculture

–0.2943***
(–8.736)

–0.3375***
(–7.951)

Other primary

0.2576***
(11.816)

0.2738***
(5.547)

Manufacturing,
nondurable

0.0711***
(4.018)

0.1724***
(7.348)

–0.1733***
(–9.621)

Manufacturing,
durable

0.0888***
(5.091)

0.2351***
(11.449)

–0.0988***
(–3.801)

0.0142
(0.298)

0.1043
(1.235)
–0.0203
(–0.911)
0.0927***
(4.027)
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Females

United States

Canada

United States

Construction

0.1072***
(5.664)

0.2234***
(9.769)

–0.1696***
(–4.490)

Transportation

0.0928***
(5.206)

0.2501***
(11.047)

0.0607***
(2.927)

Wholesale trade

–0.0539***
(–2.533)

0.1052***
(3.740)

–0.2530***
(–9.314)

0.0022
(0.063)

–0.1888***
(–10.481)

–0.0988***
(–4.651)

–0.3979***
(–30.579)

–0.2327***
(–14.796)

0.0848***
(3.074)

0.2162***
(7.681)

–0.0771***
(–4.540)

0.0705***
(3.498)

Personal services

–0.3748***
(–15.913)

–0.1158***
(–2.721)

–0.5313***
(–36.377)

–0.3456***
(–13.048)

Business services

–0.0566***
(–2.622)

0.0526**
(1.983)

–0.1695***
(–9.163)

0.1581***
(8.673)

0.1856***
(7.164)

0.0637***
(3.999)

Retail trade
Finance

Public
administration
R2
Number of
observations
a

0.0471
(0.902)
0.1840***
(7.226)

–0.0191
(–0.696)
0.1675***
(6.604)

0.4026

0.3961

0.4375

0.3425

8,643

6,477

8,846

6,210

* = 10% statistical significance.
** = 5% statistical significance.
*** = 1% statistical significance.
b t-Statistics are in parentheses.
c In Canda, the regions are 1) Atlantic, 2) Quebec, 3) Manitoba and Saskatchewan,
4) Alberta, 5) British Columbia. In the United States, the regions are 1) Northeast,
2) Midwest, 3) West.
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Table 7 OLS Log SJ Wage Equations in Canada and the United Statesa,b
Males
Variables

Females

Canada

United States

Canada

United States

Intercept

1.9828***
(4.939)

2.2316***
(2.906)

1.4408***
(5.998)

2.0342***
(3.467)

Age 25–34

0.1619*
(1.694)

0.1481
(1.128)

0.2741***
(3.733)

0.2042*
(1.886)

Age 35–44

0.4153***
(3.740)

0.3407**
(2.241)

0.3090***
(4.061)

0.2379**
(2.071)

Age 45+

0.2518*
(1.853)

0.5074***
(3.308)

0.1924**
(2.131)

0.1721
(1.333)

High school

0.1535
(1.419)

0.0836
(0.467)

0.1410
(1.587)

0.0556
(0.310)

Some
postsecondary

0.2696***
(2.668)

0.2134
(1.029)

0.3553***
(4.302)

0.2017
(1.039)

University degree

0.4828***
(3.880)

0.3305
(1.536)

0.5535***
(5.350)

0.4641***
(2.399)

0.0139
(0.679)

0.0450
(1.157)

Number of children

—

—

Region 1c

–0.1889
(–1.620)

–0.333
(–0.245)

–0.2143***
(–2.374)

–0.1140
(–1.087)

Region 2

–0.0107
(–0.094)

–0.0593
(–0.481)

–0.0952
(–0.811)

–0.1505
(–1.344)

Region 3

–0.2241*
(–1.905)

0.1868
(1.532)

–0.0792
(–1.095)

0.0731
(0.665)

Region 4

–0.0239
(–0.186)

—

–0.2470***
(–2.837)

—

Region 5

–0.1507
(–1.120)

—

–0.0625
(–0.636)

—

Lambda

–0.0209
(–0.131)

–0.1708
(–0.532)

0.2807

0.1420

0.2503

0.1720

161

223

280

248

R2
Number of
observations

1.2921*
(1.839)

–0.1120
(–0.486)
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a

* = 10% statistical significance.
** = 5% statistical significance.
*** = 1% statistical significance.
b t-Statistics are in parentheses.
c In Canada, the regions are 1) Atlantic, 2) Quebec, 3) Manitoba and Saskatchewan,
4) Alberta, 5) British Columbia. In the United States, the regions are 1) Northeast,
2), Midwest, 3) West.

Starting with the PJ wage equation, as expected, age is positively
associated with wages across the board, with older workers receiving
increasingly larger wage boosts. The one exception to this rule is U.S.
females, where the middle age category receives the highest wage
boost. This could be due to the fact that entry level wages for female
workers have been relatively higher in the past 20 years or so (thereby
shifting up the entire wage profile for these workers), a wage increase
not enjoyed by the older U.S. female workers.
The wage returns to education rise with higher education levels, as
predicted by human capital theory. For men, Canadian and U.S. workers receive 12 percent and 24 percent wage boosts, respectively, for
having finished high school. This is a wage premium relative to workers who have failed to complete high school. See that the returns to finishing high school for U.S. males is twice as high as that for Canadian
males. This reflects a fact of the U.S. labor market that has contributed
to growing wage inequality in the United States. For female workers,
the returns to completing a high school education for Canada and the
United States are 14 percent and 20 percent, respectively. In all cases,
the wage return rises with the higher education levels. So, for males,
having completed some postsecondary education is associated with a
21 percent and 35 percent return for Canadian and U.S. workers,
respectively. Those two returns are 22 percent and 34 percent for
females. Finally, having finished a university degree (or 16 or more
total years of education in the United States) is associated with 44 percent and 62 percent returns for Canadian and U.S. men, respectively,
and 50 percent and 58 percent returns for women. In each case, the
returns to the different level of education is higher in the United States.
The returns across sex are quite close, with the most noticeable being
the returns to men and women in the United States for having com-
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pleted college. Here, men receive a 4 percent larger return than the
women workers.
As predicted by theory, having young children (associated with a
greater disrupted work history) has a negative impact on wages for
both Canadian and U.S. female workers. The negative impact is almost
double for the U.S. females, but the absolute magnitude in both cases is
quite small. And, as expected, region of residence is important. Canadian workers living in Ontario receive the highest wage return, as do
workers living in the Northeast and the West in the United States.
The overall explanatory power of the PJ wage equations is quite
high in all four cases, with R2 ranging in value from 0.34 up to 0.44. The
explanatory power of the SJ wage equations is much weaker, with R2
ranging in value from 0.14 to 0.28. And fewer of the a priori hypotheses
for the specific variables hold in this equation. There is a fairly strong
return to age (the proxy for experience), but the additional proxy for
experience for females (the dummy variable for the presence of young
children) is not significant in either case. Education is not strongly
related to wages for any of the four samples. For Canadians (both males
and females), there is a significant return for having some postsecondary
education as well as a college degree, with the females receiving the
higher returns. For the United States, the only case of a significant education coefficient is for females with a university degree. Here, the
return is 46 percent, but it is not as large as it is for Canadian female
moonlighters. While no U.S. regions are significant, for Canadian
males, living in Manitoba or Saskatchewan is associated with lower
wages (relative to Ontario), as is living in the Atlantic Provinces or
Alberta for females. The only sample for whom sample selection is significant is Canadian females. That is, for this group, the probability of
moonlighting is significantly positively correlated with higher SJ wages.
Results from these two wage equations are used to construct predicted wages for use in a probit model for moonlighting. The probit
equation is written out in summary form below.
Probability of moonlighting = (PJ wage; SJ wage; dummy variables for
age categories; dummy variables for education categories; dummy variable for
young children; total number of children;
dummy variables for marital status).

A Comparative Analysis of Moonlighting in Canada and the United States

319

The probit model transforms a discretely measured dependent variable
(here, a 0–1 dummy variable equaling one for moonlighters) into a
continuous probability.
The results for the probit model of moonlighting are given in Table
8. Probit coefficients are given, then probit derivatives. For the two
wage measures, elasticities are also given.12 Ceteris paribus , one
would expect that higher primary job wages would be associated with a
lower probability of moonlighting. Indeed, in each of the two cases in
which the PJ wage is significant, it is significantly negative. For males
in the United States and Canada, those with higher primary job wages
are less likely to moonlight. The PJ wage elasticity is fairly large in
both cases: –0.81 for males in Canada and –1.18 for males in the
United States. For females, both PJ wage coefficients are positive with
very large standard errors.
As a standard wage employment effect, we would expect that the
coefficient on the SJ wage would be positive; that is, we would expect
those individuals with a higher predicted secondary job wage to be
more likely to take a second job. This coefficient is negative and insignificant in three of four cases, but in the one case where it is significant,
for females in Canada, the coefficient is positive. The corresponding
SJ wage elasticity is 1.26.
For Canadian males, age is not significantly related to the probability of moonlighting. But for Canadian females, older workers are
increasingly less likely to moonlight. (Recall that the coefficient is
interpreted in relation to the excluded category, which is the youngest
age group.) For workers in the United States, the only significant relationship between age and the probability of moonlighting is found with
females, who are less likely to moonlight if they are older than 45 years
of age.
The coefficients for the education variables are interpreted relative
to the excluded category of the lowest education level, fewer than 12
years of education. Having more education increases the probability of
moonlighting for Canadian males and U.S. males and females. Interestingly, having more education is not significantly related to increased
moonlighting probabilities for Canadian females.
Having young children can be expected to have different effects on
men than women, due to traditional family roles. We would expect
fathers to be more likely to moonlight due to an income effect; that is,
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Table 8 Moonlighting Probit Regressionsa,b,c
Canada
Regressors

Males

United States
Females

Females

–0.6243
(–0.777)
–0.0447

1.2681*
(–1.671)
–0.0994

Intercept

–0.3144
(–0.464)
–0.0129

PJ wage

–0.3692*
(–1.809)
–0.0151
[–0.8110]

0.1296
(0.927)
0.0086
[0.2749]

–0.5683***
(–2.846)
–0.0407
[–1.1810]

SJ wage

–0.4555
(–1.213)
–0.0186
[–1.0005]

0.6028*
(1.887)
0.0400
[1.2606]

–0.0998
(–0.304)
–0.0071
[–0.2075]

–0.5245
(–1.530)
–0.0411
[–1.0291]

Age 25–34

–0.1188
(–0.928)
–0.0049

–0.3646***
(–3.117)
–0.0242

0.0423
(–0.342)
–0.0030

0.0194
(0.144)
0.0015

Age 35–44

0.0032
(0.017)
0.0001

–0.4661***
(–3.559)
–0.0310

–0.0387
(–0.209)
–0.0028

–0.0283
(–0.180)
–0.0022

–0.2114
(–1.203)
–0.0086

–0.4991***
(–4.078)
–0.0332

0.0221
(0.096)
0.0016

–0.2805*
(–1.867)
–0.0220

Age ≥ 45

–2.9380***
(–6.575)
–0.1952

Males

0.1102
(0.518)
0.0086
[0.2163]

Education = 12

0.3178***
(2.904)
0.0130

0.0227
(0.237)
0.0015

0.3704***
(3.094)
0.0265

0.2858**
(2.092)
0.0224

Education 13–15

0.3801***
(2.910)
0.0156

–0.0830
(–0.624)
–0.0055

0.6518***
(4.335)
0.0466

0.4909***
(2.957)
0.0385

Education ≥ 16

0.6915***
(3.406)
0.0283

–0.2493
(–1.235)
–0.0166

0.8501***
(4.309)
0.0608

0.6142***
(2.537)
0.0481

Preschool children

–0.0041
(–0.041)
–0.0002

–0.0354
(–0.422)
–0.0023

0.0038
(0.039)
0.0003

–0.2679***
(–2.652)
–0.0210

Number of children

–0.0159
(–0.504)
–0.0006

–0.0034
(–0.129)
–0.0003

0.0258
(0.698)
0.0018

0.1013***
(2.457)
0.0079
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Regressors
Single

Not married/Other

Log–likelihood

Males
–0.0045
(–0.046)
–0.0002
0.1154
(0.746)
0.0047
–776.271
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United States
Females

Males

Females

0.1420*
(1.946)
0.0094

–0.0679
(–0.693)
–0.0049

0.2272***
(2.527)
0.0178

0.3203***
(3.759)
0.0213

–0.0063
(–0.055)
–0.0004

0.3723***
(4.773)
0.0292

–1,208.044

–949.876

–1,008.746

a

These regressions exclude those self-employed on their PJ or SJ. Uses log wages
from log wage equations.
b Presents coefficients first, then t-statistics in parentheses, then derivatives. For the
two wages, elasticities are given in brackets.
c * = 10% statistical significance.
** = 5% statistical significance.
*** = 1% statistical significance.

having young children would be expected to increase the stresses on
the family budget. For women, we would expect that having young
children would raise the opportunity cost of working, implying a substitution effect, therefore reducing the probability of moonlighting.
The only case in which this expectation is upheld is for females in the
United States, where having young children significantly decreases the
probability of holding a second job. But these expectations are not
contradicted in any of the other cases, because the coefficients are not
statistically significant. The number of children would be expected to
have somewhat the same role in the moonlighting choice, with a less
strong negative impact on females. The results show that having more
children actually increases the probability of moonlighting for females
in the United States. This implies that for these women, while the substitution effect dominates in the case of young children, the income
effect dominates for total children.
We already saw in the previous descriptive analyses that marital status is strongly linked to moonlighting behavior. But in a regression
framework we are able to determine the importance of marital status
after controlling for the effect of other factors. Controlling these
effects, the role that marital status plays in the moonlighting choices of
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women is still evident. For both Canadian and U.S. females, being
never-married or once-married both are significantly positively related
to the probability of moonlighting. It is likely that some of this effect
would have been reduced had income been included as a variable, but
still the importance of marital status is clear. Thus, within our multivariate analyses, the wage regressions reveal that the structure of SJ
wages is more ambiguous than PJ wages, because while the expected
wage return to experience is found, no consistent SJ wage return to education can be seen. And, the moonlighting probit equation shows the
importance of PJ wages in the moonlighting choice, with those males
having higher PJ wages being less likely to moonlight. And, ceteris
paribus, those with higher education levels are more likely to moonlight. Finally, unmarried females are more likely to moonlight as well.

CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have described and compared moonlighting
behavior in Canada and the United States. What are the major findings? First, education plays a major role in moonlighting, with higher
educated workers more likely to moonlight. Second, about two-thirds
of moonlighters take a second job for financial reasons. Third, total
hours worked per week are much higher for moonlighters than nonmoonlighters, and hourly wages on the primary job are higher for all
moonlighters except U.S. females. Fourth, unmarried females and
married males are most likely to moonlight. Finally, there is evidence
that workers moonlight due to both primary job constraints and job heterogeneity.
Now, how does moonlighting behavior differ between Canada and
the United States? First, overall moonlighting rates are higher in the
United States than in Canada, although females in both countries moonlight at approximately the same rate. Second, U.S. moonlighters tend to
be older on average than Canadian moonlighters, while Canadian
moonlighters tend to be somewhat more educated. Third, total hours
worked are considerably higher in the United States than in Canada. So
what are the reasons for the differences between Canada and the United
States? One factor contributing to the higher moonlighting rate in the
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United States is higher U.S. divorce rates. Males in the United States
are more likely to be unmarried fathers (custodial or not), and these
fathers moonlight at very high rates. Canadians might moonlight less
overall in part due to the higher unemployment rates in Canada. With
such an excess supply of labor, both primary and secondary jobs are
hard to find.
Finally, what are the implications of all these numbers? Why do
we care about moonlighting? To put it succinctly, moonlighting itself
is not so much a problem as it is a symptom of a broader labor market
problem. Two issues are of most importance here: time pressures faced
by moonlighters and their families, and the degree to which moonlighting reflects perceived financial hardship. First, because total hours
worked for moonlighting are considerably higher than for nonmoonlighters, rising moonlighting rates imply increased time pressures
faced by individuals and families. For children, this implies increases
in nonparental child care. Second, moonlighters clearly face financial
pressures. They do not tend to be lower-income workers, so their
financial concerns extend beyond the basics of minimal shelter and
food to more middle class concerns such as home ownership and saving for retirement and their children’s college educations. While these
pressures are not as desperate as those faced by low-income workers,
they probably reflect for many moonlighters the desire to achieve the
standard of living they enjoyed during their upbringing. For divorced
mothers, they reflect a desire to maintain the lifestyle experienced during the previous marriage. And the plight of moonlighters reflects the
growing frustrations of today’s workers who feel they are working
more for less.

Notes
The authors would like to thank Rebecca Jacobs for superb research assistance and
Claire Black for secretarial support. Also, we are grateful to the Household Surveys
Division at Statistics Canada for kindly providing us with Labour Force Survey data.
1. The primary job is the job with the higher weekly hours. Hereafter we use PJ and
SJ to denote the primary and secondary jobs.
2. The U.S. CPS weight used is the multiple job-holder (supplement) weight. This
weight corrects for nonresponse in general, as well as nonresponse that varies systematically by class of worker.
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3. These rates differ from the rates implied by the raw data, but again, this is due to
the weighting necessary to assure that the summary statistics reflect the populations in the two countries.
4. For example, in Canada, 16.6 percent of all moonlighters are between the ages of
17 and 24 years.
5. U.S. three-digit industry and occupation SIC codes were matched to the broader
categories reported in the Canadian data.
6. Wages are measured in Canadian dollars.
7. This discussion ignores the final category of Other. It is not possible to assign
these individuals to either of the two general categories with any certainty. In fact,
a small percentage of these moonlighters are not truly holding a second job
because they are changing jobs and so probably only hold two jobs during a short
overlapping time period.
8. Lambda is constructed from the results of a reduced form probit in which the
dependent variable takes on the value of 1.0 if the individual moonlights, and
takes the value of 0 otherwise. Any worker self-employed on the primary or secondary job is excluded from all these regression analyses.
9. This variable is included just in the regressions for females.
10. See previous note.
11. Also, recall that the wages are measured in Canadian dollars, using the 1991
exchange rate. According to Card and Freeman (1993), using purchasing-power
parity figures would yield similar results.
12. Note that income is excluded because it is unavailable in the Canadian data.
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11
Large Companies and the Changing
Use of Temporary Workers
Trends and Impacts on
Financial Measures of Performance
Shulamit Kahn, Fred Foulkes, and Jeffrey Heisler
Boston University

Over the past decade, there has been a large increase in the number of people employed in temporary work. For instance, in July of
1996, the number of employees in the Standard Industrial Classification code for “help supply services” (7,363) was estimated in the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Establishment Survey as 2.38 million
people (U.S. BLS 1996)—an increase from 0.6 percent of the labor
force in 1985 to 2.0 percent in mid 1996.1 In the early 1990s, many
analysts believed that this was a phenomenon born of the last recession
that would reverse itself in the subsequent expansion. Instead, this
trend has continued at varying pace throughout the decade. BLS
projects that the somewhat larger category of “personnel supply” will
be the seventh-fastest growing industry between 1994 and 2005, with
growth projected at 58 percent (Staffing Industry Analysts 1996).
This chapter uses the results from a random survey of human
resource executives from large companies around the country to consider why companies are changing their uses of temporary workers.
The chapter then correlates the intensity of temporary use with financial measures of profitability. The sample is quite small, so it is more
suggestive than definitive. Remarkably, some statistically significant
correlations do arise even within this small sample. Although it is
impossible to deduce causality from correlation, the results somewhat
suggest that strategic uses of temporaries may increase operating margins and company value.
The study also considers a case study of two firms in a narrowly
defined manufacturing industry. These firms radically increased their
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use of temporaries, hiring all entry-level production workers as temporaries who then—if successful—transition into permanent employment
after three months. Financial measures of performance after the policy
change indicate that the companies either did equally well or worse
than the previous period, suggesting that this use of temporaries was
either neutral or harmful to the companies’ bottom lines.

DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY
The focus of this section is large companies’ usage of temporary
employees. In the first phase of our research, we conducted in-depth,
open-ended interviews with human resource executives from several
large companies to get a sense of the role of temporary staff within
their organizations. We also spoke to a large number of executives
from within the staffing industry to get their perspectives and insights
into industry trends. We defined temporary workers as those paid by a
temporary agency or temporaries directly hired by their company. We
specifically asked them to exclude all others, including contract workers.2
Although chosen primarily for their accessibility rather than for
aspects of their temporary usage, these preliminary interviews were not
in any way a representative, random sample. To obtain a representative
sample of large companies, we chose companies randomly from the
Fortune 500 Industrials and other Fortune lists (banking, savings,
financial, retail, service, transportation, and utilities) and identified a
senior human resource executive in that company, generally the human
resource vice president.
Through a letter, we solicited these companies’ participation in an
extended telephone interview and asked for a contact within the company most familiar with the company’s use of temporaries. We followed up with telephone calls in June 1995, conducting 35 30-minute
interviews from this sample. This represents a response rate of 22 percent. Of the nonrespondents, 29 refused in writing or over the phone to
participate in the research, generally because of time constraints or
company policy not to participate in surveys.3 In the other cases, we
failed to reach the appropriate person after several phone calls.
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Given the high level of the executives whom we were contacting, a
low response rate is expected. A crucial question is whether there is
any nonresponse bias in the responses. The most likely bias would be
that companies with innovative temporary policies are more likely to
respond. While this is a possibility, the factors arguing against this bias
are the nature of the reasons given for nonresponse and the fact that the
most common case of nonresponse was simply failure to make any
contact with the relevant person.
The actual respondent from each company was a person familiar
with the company’s use of temporaries. When the company’s use of
temporaries was decentralized, we were generally put in contact with
someone who was familiar with only a portion of the company’s temporaries, typically those used at corporate headquarters. Respondents
ranged from senior vice presidents to employment specialists. In the
completed telephone interviews, we followed a seven-page script/questionnaire that included both open-ended and forced-choice questions.4
The small size of this sample means that any hypothesis test is likely to
be rejected unless differences are quite large.
One of the companies surveyed was a southern U.S. fibers/textiles
firm. We discovered that this company had made a sudden shift toward
the exclusive use of temporaries for all entry-level production jobs. In
order to conduct a time-series event study of this firm, we conducted a
telephone survey of seven other comparable firms, i.e., nonunionized,
southern, publicly traded companies in the fiber/textiles industry. This
additional sample was taken from the Compustat listing of companies
in three similar four-digit industry codes. We identified 12 companies
(other than our original one) that had headquarters in southern states.
Of these, we were able to interview seven.

RESULTS: CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF TEMPORARIES
Labor force surveys indicate an increase in the number of temporary workers in the United States. This increase is evident in our sample of large firms as well. Along with the changing numbers of temps,
there were also changes in other aspects of temp usage. As the first
row of Table 1 indicates, the increased usage of temporaries was by no
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Table 1 Percentage of Sample Who Changed Use of Temporaries
Increased
Increased somewhat
>100% (10%–100%)

Small or no
change
(<10% Decreased a
change) lot (>10%)

[Over the past 3 to 5 years, have you
increased or decreased the number of
temporaries that you hire?] Does
this represent a change in the percent
of total employment?

8.6

28.6

37.1

25.7

Has the length of stay of temps
changed over the past 3 to 5 years?

0.0

38.2

52.9

8.8

In the past 3 to 5 years, have there
been changes in the percent of (fulltime regular) hires who began working at your company as a temp?a

9.4

18.8

71.9

0.0

% changed
[In what kinds of situations does
your company use temps?] Has this
changed over the past 3 to 5 years?

44.1

[What kinds of jobs do you use
temporaries for?] Has this changed
over the past 3 to 5 years?

46.8

Have you used this same source of
temps over the past 3 to 5 years, or
does this represent a change?b

50.0

NOTE: Wording in brackets varies from the actual questions used in the survey.
Wording different from actual question, which culminated a series of questions about
the number of temps hired permanently and the number of total employees hired into
comparable jobs.
b This number excluded changes in vendors’ identities that weren’t accompanied by
other changes in the source, such as a change in the number of agencies used.
a

means universal. The proportion of firms that substantially increased
their use of temps (37 percent) is just equal to the proportion with a
small or no change. While each of these categories is larger than the
proportion that decreased their use of temps, fully one-quarter of the
firms in the sample did substantially decrease their use of temps.
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At the extreme, some companies have moved to hiring only, or primarily, temporaries for large numbers of jobs within their companies.
We observed two variants of this policy. In one, temporary workers
may stay only a limited length of time, which in some companies is as
long as two years. In the second variant, temporaries who perform
well transfer over to regular jobs after some period, often specified up
front. Reading the business press and talking to human resource (HR)
executives, we identified quite a few companies that are hiring only
temporaries for large classes of jobs. These include Dell Computer,
Hewlett-Packard, DEC, and Microsoft. At Dell, approximately 3,000
of the company’s 10,000 employees are temporary. At Hewlett-Packard and DEC, 30–35 percent of their manufacturing jobs are being
done by temporary employees. Many of these publicized examples are
at newer, rapidly growing, and changing organizations. What is particularly surprising, however, is that even in a sample of 35 randomly
chosen companies, we found two companies that are hiring only temporaries into a large class of entry-level jobs.
The changing role of temps is evidenced not only in their numbers,
but also in their roles. Other surveys have documented shifts in the
occupational distribution of temporaries. The typical image of a temporary as a “Kelly Girl,” a female secretary, characterized a majority of
temporaries 20 years ago but no longer does. By 1994, only 40 percent
of the payroll for temporary help services went to office/clerical occupations (Steinberg 1994). In our sample, we found that while almost
all companies used temps for secretarial/clerical positions, 80 percent
also used temporaries for other kinds of jobs. One source of growth
highlighted in surveys such as the National Association of Temporary
Service’s (NATS) is in the “light industrial” category, including production work and unskilled manual labor. Forty percent of the companies in our survey use temps for these occupations. In fact, Blank
(1998) found that the temporary help industry has approximately the
same proportion of people in blue-collar occupations as does the general labor force. Given the fact that blue-collar temporaries tend to be
unskilled, we can infer that a much higher proportion of temps are in
unskilled blue-collar jobs than in the general labor force.
Table 1 also shows the number of companies that changed their use
of temps in other ways. Ninety-four percent of our sample changed
their use of temporaries in one of the ways listed in the six rows of
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Table 1. Forty percent changed more than three of these six aspects of
temporary use.
Forty-four percent of the companies indicated that they are using
temporaries in different kinds of situations than they had previously.
Table 2 lists the kinds of situations in which these companies report
using temporaries. The situation that best fits the traditional view of a
temporary is someone hired as a replacement for a temporary absence.
Most companies continue to use temps for this purpose. Several
employers reported expansion of this need due to changing medical
and family leave policies.
The business press has adjured companies to use temps as part of a
“strategic staffing” plan (e.g., Denka 1994). In essence, a strategic
staffing plan is one where employment policies are seen as a part of a
company’s strategic plan and where alternatives to full-time regular
staffing are actively considered at a general level rather than as ad hoc
or reactive decisions. The list of situations in our sample in which
large companies use temporaries suggests that companies are in fact
using “strategic staffing,” or at least claiming to. Practically all (91
percent) use temporaries not just for temporary replacement of
absences but also as a deliberately chosen alternative to permanent
employment designed to further the firm’s profitability. Other than
absence replacement, the other reasons listed in Table 2 suggest that
companies see temporary labor as a solution to two kinds of variance in
labor demand: foreseen variance and unforeseen and uncertain variance.
Table 2 Situations in Which Large Companies Use Temporaries
Reasons for hiring temporaries

% of companies

Replacement or temporary absences, medical leave

88.6

Temporary projects

88.2

To bypass head-count restrictions

51.4

Seasonal fluctuations

50.0

New projects

48.6

To screen for permanent jobs

31.4

Downsizing, termination

25.7

Buffer against layoffs

22.9
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One major source of foreseen variance is temporary or special
projects. The largest use of temporaries reported in the survey is to
staff temporary projects, where “temporary” projects can last as long as
two years or more. Temporary projects include start-ups, e.g., for new
stores or new computer systems. Rather than hiring a regular
employee and, upon completion of the project, either finding them
alternative positions or paying them a severance package, companies
are turning to temporary employees who do not impose the same future
responsibilities.
Many companies with labor demands that fluctuate considerably
over the year are decreasing labor costs by using temporaries seasonally. For instance, temporaries are being used to harvest fruit in Florida
and to process the February rush of annual proxy statements for a large
investment bank. One HR manager explained, “We don’t staff for
peaks any longer.” Half of the sample use temporaries for seasonal
fluctuations. Both the seasonal needs and temporary projects introduce
fully anticipated variance into labor demand. Temps are a logical solution.
When companies face uncertainties about future employment
needs, they also sometimes use temporaries to address these uncertainties. Twenty percent of our sample use temporaries when they are
uncertain whether new products will take off or what their need will be
for a new endeavor. For 23 percent of the companies, temps are being
used to provide a buffer to protect the jobs of core, regular employees
in the event of unforeseen shifts in product demand.
To an economist, these uses of temporaries do not seem surprising.
In fact, it seems more surprising that temporaries were not always used
to solve problems of variance and uncertainty.
Temporary Assignments as a Recruiting and Hiring Mechanism
A final major motivation for the use of temps is the avoidance of
many of the costs of poor job matches. In all jobs, both the employer
and the new employee take time to learn about whether this job is a
good match. Unsuccessful matches tend to be terminated by one party
or the other. There are many costs of mismatches that fall on the
employer, the employee, and society. Some of these costs can be
avoided by having new entrants begin in the company as an employee
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of a temporary agency. First, risk to the employee is lower. If this job
does not work out, the employee is given another placement by the
temporary agency.5 For the employer, severance pay, long dismissal
procedures, and increased unemployment compensation premia are
avoided. Moreover, managers don’t have to be put in the difficult emotional position of firing someone, or of being responsible for someone’s loss of livelihood. Recruiting costs, such as attracting candidates
or conducting drug and criminal screens, are not lost when a particular
match does not work out. Societally, unemployment compensation is
not incurred when the temporary is reassigned. Finally, in some of the
companies we interviewed, it was clear that temporary agencies often
had “economies of scale” in recruiting and could simply attract and
process candidates more efficiently than some companies. On the
other hand, the use of temporaries as a hiring mechanism may be a way
for companies to change the implicit or explicit employment contracts
with potential employees or to evade government policies.6
In our sample, 94 percent of companies responded that they have
permanently hired people who began as temporaries. The survey also
provides some evidence of increasing use of temps as a hiring mechanism. Thirty-one percent of companies reported that their permanent
hiring of temporaries has increased over the past five years. Not a single company responded that their permanent hiring of temporaries has
decreased.
This increased hiring is also being documented by temporary agencies. Manpower reports that in 1993, they themselves transitioned
150,000 temps into regular jobs. One mid-sized temporary agency
with whom we talked has done an informal poll and found that
between 30 and 35 percent of their assignments could change to permanent. In a 1994 National Association of Temporary Staffing (NATS)
survey, more than one-third of temporary employees reported being
offered a regular job by a firm for which they had an assignment
(NATS 1994). In a more recent NATSS survey of former temporaries,
21 percent had found permanent jobs as a result of their temporary
position.7
Permanent hiring of temporaries occurs in two conceptually different ways—temp-to-hire and temp-to-perm. In the former, the hiring is
an unforeseen and unplanned consequence: supervisors are impressed
by a temp, or temps get inside tracks to a job listed within the company.
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This hiring of temporary employees generally tends to be a small but
not inconsequential part of a company’s total hiring. Of companies
that did not do temp-to-perm, on average only 24 percent of new
employees in the jobs comparable to those staffed by temps began as
temps.
In temp-to-perm, companies hire temporaries with the intention of
transitioning them into regular employment if the match is successful.
Thirty-one percent of companies responded that one reason they hire
temps is to screen for permanent employees (Table 2). In these companies, on average more than half of people hired into these specific job
categories began as temps. As one sample respondent put it, “Now,
even low-level supervisors know this is another way to recruit, one of
their bag of tricks. In the past, it was not a concept they knew of or
thought of.”
Temp-to-perm will be a profit-maximizing strategy when temporary agencies are able to attract an ample supply of qualified candidates, and when an extended trial period is a particularly helpful way to
screen candidates. Not surprisingly, then, in our interviews with companies, we saw temp-to-perm most commonly used for “light industrial,” i.e., relatively unskilled blue-collar jobs—where work habits
tend to be of prime importance in determining the success of an
employee—and in white-collar jobs that are based on speed and accuracy, such as billing and telephone operators. For one company, the
supply of light-industrial employees available through temporary companies was greater than the company itself could otherwise recruit.8
The screening aspect of this process is quite clear from the interviews. Only workers who “work out” become regular employees. If
temporaries can provide a way of screening employees that incurs less
mobility costs, it seems clearly Pareto superior. Once again, economists are more challenged to explain why these methods were not used
previously, rather than to explain why they are being used now. The
answer is not to be found in labor market tightness. The unemployment rate at the time was 5.5 percent, neither particularly high nor particularly low.
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Temporaries and Downsizing
The survey provides some evidence that decreased firm demand for
labor, due either to slow sales or to cost-cutting in the face of increased
competition, is correlated with an increased use of temporaries. A test
of the correlation between downsizing and changes in their proportional use of temps is significant at the 20 percent level. Of the 53 percent of companies in our sample that reported some downsizing in the
past five years, fully 78 percent changed their proportional use of temporaries, while only 50 percent of companies that did not downsize
changed their usage. A recent survey by Olsten cited in Business Wire
(1996) found that slightly more than half of firms that report downsizing say that they use temps to address staffing issues.
However, different companies make very different kinds of decisions about temporaries while downsizing. Downsizing companies are
more likely to both increase and decrease their use of temporaries than
companies who did not downsize. Of downsizing firms, 50 percent
increased their use of temps while 28 percent decreased them; among
the other companies, 31 percent increased their use of temps while 19
percent decreased them.9
The small sample that report downsizing does not lend itself to statistical analysis. If we consider these 16 companies as case studies, we
come up with suggestions of the kinds of factors that have led at least
some companies to modify their temporary usage during periods of
contraction. If temps are used to protect full-time employees from layoffs, we would expect the number of temps to fall drastically during
downsizing. While this occurred in some companies, in our small sample the numbers indicate that decreased use of temps was less common
than increased use.
One factor that was repeatedly mentioned for increased use of
temps was the presence of head-count restrictions—limits imposed on
line managers on the number of people allowed on payroll (Table 2).
Head-count restrictions are a common mechanism used by central
management to control costs incurred by line managers. A head count
has the advantage of being an easily measurable cost item that is not
affected by conditions outside the line manager’s control, such as fluctuating market wage rates or materials prices. However, as companies
move to greater usage of temporaries and part-time workers, head-
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count restrictions should adjust to reflect these new institutions. While
it may be profit-maximizing for companies to impose head-count
restrictions on permanent employees to limit their permanent employment, head-count restrictions should not create managerial incentives
to hire temporaries into jobs that are most profitably staffed by permanent employees.
In some companies we interviewed, head-count restrictions
included temps; in others, the restrictions applied only to permanent
employees, and consequently managers used temps to evade these
restrictions. In fact, 53 percent of our sample said that avoiding headcount restrictions (presumably of permanent employees) was a factor
in its use of temps. Of the nine companies that chose to increase their
(proportional) usage of temporaries during a contraction of employment, six attributed the growth in their use of temporaries at least partially to head-count restrictions. An HR manager in one company, for
instance, reported that a hiring freeze has led line managers to hire a
temp when an extra person was needed. In another company, the interviewed HR executive told how line managers had to “play games with
head count when, head-count considerations aside, regular hiring
would have made much more sense.” These examples suggest that
head-count restrictions introduced inefficiencies. However, head-count
restrictions on permanent employees may be optimal for the company
that wanted “to keep their future long-run commitment to new employees low.”
Hourly Labor Costs and the Increasing Use of Temps
The previous sections suggest that temporary workers are increasingly being used to promote efficiency in a variety of ways and thus
raise profitability. An additional way that temporaries might impact
profitability is through their direct costs. Temporaries receive lower
benefits than their “permanent” counterparts. In our sample, all but
two companies say that benefit levels for temps are lower than for regular employees, with the vast majority placing them much lower or
nonexistent.10 Other authors have also documented the low benefit
coverage for temporary workers, including BLS (1995) and Axel
(1995).
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The hourly rates reviewed by the temporaries are sometimes lower
than the regular employees they replace but sometimes higher, both in
our survey and in comprehensive labor force surveys, such as the CPS
data analyzed in Segal and Sullivan (1995). However, companies pay a
large margin to cover temporary agencies’ costs. Totaling the savings
in benefits, different hourly rates, and agencies’ margins, do companies
save on hourly compensation costs when they use temporaries? Sixtythree percent of companies believe that they do, with half of the others
believing that either there is no saving or that temps cost more than regular employees.
Yet, even for many of the companies that save on compensation
costs, respondents volunteer the information that costs do not enter into
their decisions to use temporaries. One executive seemed quizzical
when I asked him about direct cost savings and said, “We don’t look at
it that way.”
Does Productivity and Product Quality Suffer?
Hour for hour, ignoring slack periods when permanent workers
may be underutilized, do temporaries work as efficiently as permanent
workers and produce similar quality products? Only extensive case
studies can really answer this question. Companies differed on their
perceptions of the overall productivity of temporaries. Seventeen percent of the companies listed the temporary’s lack of commitment
among the three biggest problems with temporary employees. One
respondent noted a perception among his supervisors that temporary
employees were not as qualified, but wondered whether this was due to
the fact that the supervisor did not feel “ownership” of these employees.
Yet many employers mentioned the increasing skill and quality
levels of temporaries. In fact, several employers believe that temporaries often worked harder than regular employees because they hoped
thereby to obtain a permanent placement. Both our survey and a recent
Conference Board survey (Axel 1995) found that the most frequently
mentioned difficulty with temporary workers was that they lacked the
skills and training to do the job. In our survey, 23 percent of employers
mentioned this.
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These mixed perceptions suggest a high variation among temporaries, with average quality varying from company to company as well as
from market to market, depending on supply/demand conditions in the
specific occupational labor market, as well as on the skill of the temporary agency in screening applicants.
Have Things Really Changed?
It is instructive to compare our survey with the survey of HR executives conducted in 1986 by Katharine Abraham and the Bureau of
National Affairs (Abraham 1988). That survey included a somewhat
different universe, including some smaller companies along with the
large sample of large firms. In addition, that survey explicitly included
on-call workers. Nevertheless, there are many similar results in the
two surveys. Executives in 1986 also used temporaries for special
projects, seasonal needs, and to provide a buffer for regular staff
against downturns in demand, long before HR executives were using
the term “strategic staffing” for policies regarding temporaries. The
proportion using temporaries for at least one of those purposes was
lower in that earlier survey, although only marginally so.
Twenty-three percent of the companies in the 1986 survey said that
one reason they use temps was to “identify good candidates for regular
jobs,” similar to the proportion in our 1995 sample that use temp-toperm, or the proportion in the recent Conference Board survey (Axel
1995) that respond that they use temps to screen candidates for future
employment.
Since the universes are different, trends can only be suggestive.
Yet it is striking that in these aspects, the two surveys point to little
change between 1986 and 1995, despite claims of the survey’s HR
executives to the contrary. However, there are some significant differences between the surveys that may suggest real differences in temporary usage. Thus, there is a difference between surveys in temporaries
as a proportion of the companies’ total employment. The mean of this
proportion in the 1986 sample was 1.5 percent, while the mean in the
present sample is 2.3 percent. A much larger difference is evident at
the extreme: 2 percent of the companies in the 1986 survey reported
using 10 percent temps or more, while in our sample, 9 percent of companies used 10 percent or more.

340

Kahn, Foulkes, and Heisler

The second major difference seen is the length of stay of temporaries. In the 1986 survey, only 7 percent of the companies reported that
the mean duration of the typical assignment was three months or
greater. In our survey, 40 percent reported typical lengths in this range,
while a recent NATS survey found that 55 percent of temporary assignments last 11 weeks or more (NATS 1994). Thus, the two surveys are
suggestive of a recent shift toward usage of more temporaries and of
temporaries for longer periods, although research on directly comparable samples is necessary to confirm this result.
Finally, we note that although the same number of companies
report that they use temps to identify good candidates for regular jobs
or for purposes like special projects or seasonal fluctuations, it does not
preclude the possibility of major changes in the ways companies conceive and decide both the temp-to-perm and “strategic staffing” uses of
temps. Moreover, the increase in the number and use-intensity of
temps suggest that although the number of companies using temps for
these purposes may not have changed, the extent that they use temps in
these ways undoubtedly has.

RESULTS: THE USE OF TEMPORARIES AND FINANCIAL
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
If temporaries improve a firm’s performance, we should see this
reflected in the company’s profits or other financial measures. This
impact could, at least hypothetically, be measured by a cross-sectional
comparison of the performance of companies that differ in their use of
temporaries. Alternatively, it could be measured by comparing the
financial performance for companies (or industries) before and after a
change in their use of temporaries. In this section, we pursue both
methods.
The cross-sectional analysis will be plagued by two different kinds
of conceptual problems, causality and heterogeneity issues. A positive
correlation between the use of temporaries and financial success might
indicate that the use of temporaries increases a company’s profitability.
However, it could instead indicate that companies that are likely to be
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profitable (e.g., dynamic, growing companies) choose or need to turn
to temporaries for some of their staffing needs.
The great degree of heterogeneity of companies on a wide variety
of other dimensions is likely to make this exercise akin to searching for
a needle in a haystack. Research has shown that it is extremely difficult to detect financial impacts of changes in human resource practices.11 Additionally, temporaries are used in many different ways and
situations, and they are not likely to have similar impacts in all contexts.
A time-series analysis of companies can avoid some aspects of
these problems. First, by comparing periods before and after a change
in policy, we can mitigate the causality issue. Second, by looking at
individual companies (relative to industry trends) we can remove some
of the heterogeneity. Pursuing the analogy, the time-series analysis is
akin to finding a button in a haystack: there are still many confounding
issues, but we have slightly increased the likelihood of finding some
impact.
We have chosen to look at three measures of financial performance. Market price per share (P) summarizes all publicly available
information and expectations for the company. However, the share
price will reflect all of the activities of the firm, such as acquisitions,
making it an extremely noisy series for measuring the impact of temporary policy. We also examine variables that attempt to measure the ongoing profitability of the enterprise: earnings and operating margin
(OPM). Earnings are measured as primary earnings per share (EPS)
before extraordinary items, i.e., one-time events such as acquisitions
and divestitures. OPM is the ratio between operating income and sales.
This ratio measures the impact of cost of goods sold (COGS) and sales,
general, and administrative expenses (SGA), which include labor costs,
on the company’s profitability. Although neither of these measures are
affected by events like acquisitions, they are affected by changes in
accounting practices.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
For the 35 different companies in our sample, we correlated a variety of aspects of temporary usage with the financial variables, the latter
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considered both in 1994 levels and in five-year (1989–1994) changes.12
The results can be summarized succinctly.
1) A seven-value index of changing usage of temps, from large cuts
in the use of temps to large increases, is generally unrelated to all
financial variables with the following exception: companies that
had high earnings per share13 at the beginning of the five-year
period were significantly more likely to increase their temporary
usage (P = 0.02). A two-value index of whether or not a company
substantially increased its use of temps was also correlated with
increasing share prices (P = 0.10).
2) The correlation between temps as a proportion of total employment and the change in share price over the five-year period was
positive and highly significant (P = 0.01); the proportion of temps
was also positively related to the change in EPS over the period at
a lower significance level (P = 0.17). However, it was not correlated with levels of either EPS or OPM, nor with the change in
OPM.
3) We constructed an index for increased use of temporaries as a
strategic staffing plan by counting the number of “strategic”
changes the company made, including increasing use of temporaries, changing sources of temporaries, changing situations in
which use temporaries, increasing the length of temporaries’
stays, increasing hiring of temporaries as permanent employees,
and changing the occupations in which temporaries are hired.
This “strategic temp changes” variable was positively correlated
with various measures of firms’ profitability in 1994, although
only at marginal significance levels (with OPM P = 0.10; with
EPS P = 0.07). However, it was not correlated with the change in
share price, OPM, or EPS.
4) Many specific increases in strategic temp usage may have been
positively correlated with the level of OPM in 1994, although the
significance levels were marginal: changing occupations (P =
0.11); changing situations where use temps (P = 0.22); increasing
permanent hiring through temps (P = 0.28).
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Overall these findings suggest that the use of temporaries, particularly in “strategic” ways, is correlated with positive financial outcomes.
Certain “strategic” changes in policies regarding temps may have led to
high OPMs. High and/or increasing use of temps may have led to
increasing share prices during the early 1990s. Alternatively, the causality may have run in the opposite direction. For instance, companies
with high operating margins may have been more likely to make “strategic” changes in their use of temps.
The latter direction of causality is suggested by the fact that companies with high EPS at the beginning of the period later increased
their temp usage. On the other hand, changes in temp usage is not correlated with other beginning financial values, such as OPM.
Time-Series Case Studies
In our random survey, we identified one company in the South’s
fibers/textiles industry that made a sudden shift towards the exclusive
use of temporaries for all entry level production jobs. These temporaries are moved into permanent jobs after three months if they “work
out.” We then surveyed seven other comparable firms, i.e., nonunionized, southern publicly-owned companies in the fiber/textiles industry.
Of these seven, one company had suddenly increased its usage of temporaries for entry-level jobs.
All of these eight companies faced tight labor markets. In the face
of this tight supply, they were forced to hire poorer quality employees
than they usually did. The temp-to-perm option allowed them to
screen workers in a situation where screening was particularly important. The two companies that chose this option believed that the temporary agencies could do a better job of attracting workers in a tight
labor market than could the company itself. The companies that had
not chosen to use temp-to-perm tended to cite company-culture kinds
of reasons, such as “It builds good will,” and “We have pride in our
people and value long-term relationships.”
We calculated financial measures for these two companies, denoted
A and B, using the other six companies as controls. By studying these
companies with radical changes in their use of temporaries, we
increased the likelihood of the policy having an impact. By narrowly
defining both industry and region, we eliminated some of the variation
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across firms, increasing the likelihood of detecting any effect. For each
company, we estimated time series regressions on quarterly data for the
change in the log of share price and the change in earnings per share
(EPS):
(1) ln(Pt / Pt–1) = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 ln(Pc,t / Pc,t–1) + Σ βI Qi + e
(2) ∆EPSt / St = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 ∆EPSc,t / Sc,t–1 + Σ βI Qi + e
where St is a scaling factor to account for differences in share price,14
Pc,t is the average share price at time t for the six control companies,
EPSc,t is the average EPS at time t for the six control companies, Dt is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for all quarters after the change
in policy, and Qi are seasonal dummy variables.15 The sample period
was from March 1984 through March 1996. However, when the earlier
period fit particularly poorly, estimations are reported for the period of
March 1988 through March 1996. The results are presented in Tables 3
and 4.
Company A’s large change in temporary usage occurred in the
beginning of 1995. The results indicate that this point did not mark a
watershed in either share price or EPS. Thus, the post-change dummy
variable is not distinguishable from 0 in any of the four equations (with
t-statistic always considerably less than 1.0). An F-test of the hypothesis that the pre-change years accurately fits the post-change quarters
could not be rejected (F = 0.39, P-value = 0.85 for the share price
model; F = 0.19, P-value = 0.96 for the EPS model).16
Graphs corroborate that the 1995–1996 quarters look remarkably
similar to previous periods. A model based only on trends in comparable companies and quarterly dummies fits the timing of both share
price and EPS swings.17 The graph of the EPS indicates a slight change
in the seasonality of the series in the mid 1990s: the change in earnings is somewhat less variable than it had been previously and the peak
has moved from the third to the first quarter. However, the change
seems to have occurred in 1994, prior to the specific introduction of
temporaries, and can be traced to a major change in product mix discussed in the company’s annual report.
Company B changed its temping policies in the fall of 1994. During 1995, this company did worse than would be predicted based on
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Table 3 Case Study: Impact of Large Increase in Temporary Usage
in a Large Fiber/Fabric Manufacturing Company’s
Production Workers—Company Aa
Dependent variable
Time period

∆ EPS/Pt–1

ln(Pt / Pt–1)
1984:2–
1996:1

No. of observations

1988:1–
1996:1

1984:2–
1996:1

1984:2–
1996:1

48

33

48

48

Dummy for temp change

0.014
(0.069)

0.039
(0.065)

0.003
(0.011)

0.002
(0.009)

Average for 6 control
companies

0.377
(0.222)

0.607
(0.236)

0.020
(0.072)

–0.010
(0.055)

Constant

–0.030
(0.042)

–0.041
(0.047)

–0.017
(0.007)

–0.018
(0.005)

Q1

0.046
(0.061)

0.035
(0.065)

0.007
(0.010)

0.009
(0.008)

Q2

0.110
(0.059)

0.120
(0.066)

0.031
(0.010)

0.034
(0.007)

Q3

–0.029
(0.058)

–0.053
(0.065)

0.030
(0.009)

0.031
(0.007)

R2 adj.

0.19

0.21

0.21

0.53

Durbin-Watson statistics

1.86

2.05

2.69

1.82

No

Yes

No

Yes

MAb
a

terms?

Standard errors in parentheses.
moving average.

b Three-quarter
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Table 4 Case Study: Impact of Large Increase in Temporary Usage
in a Large Fiber/Fabric Manufacturing Company’s
Production Workers—Company Ba
Dependent variable
Time period

∆ EPS/Pt–1

ln(Pt / Pt–1)
1984:3–
1996:1

1988:1–
1996:1

1984:3–
1996:1

1988:1–
1996:1

47

33

47

33

Dummy for temp change

–0.135
(0.111)

–0.133
(0.074)

–0.007
(0.013)

–0.006
(0.003)

Average for 6 control
companies

0.817
(0.388)

0.224
(0.292)

0.075
(0.095)

–0.004
(0.020)

Constant

0.073
(0.075)

0.100
(0.060)

0.009
(0.009)

0.003
(0.075)

Q1

–0.016
(0.106)

–0.041
(0.071)

–0.027
(0.013)

–0.016
(0.106)

Q2

–0.004
(0.105)

–0.086
(0.082)

–0.013
(0.013)

–0.004
(0.105)

Q3

–0.050
(0.103)

–0.140
(0.082)

0.018
(0.012)

–0.050
(0.103)

R2 adj.

0.05

0.20

0.16

0.59

Durbin-Watson statistics

2.05

1.93

1.32

2.01

Yes

Yes

No

No

No. of observations

MAb

terms?

a

Standard errors in parentheses.
b Three-quarter moving average.

seasonality and the six control companies. Thus, in the best of the
two-share price equations reported in Table 4, the t-statistic of the
postchange dummy variable is –1.79 (significant at the 10 percent
level). The F-test of whether the latter period fits the earlier model is
F = 1.59, which has a P-value of 0.20. Similarly, the actual EPS/Pt–1
is lower than what would be predicted based on industry trends and
seasonality (t-statistic = –2.17). The F-test for the similarity of the
postchange period is 6.94 (P = 0.0003). Annual reports suggest that
the company was being affected by a wide variety of other factors in
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1995, including several major acquisitions and major capital outlays
for modernized production facilities.
Thus, in these two companies, the period of intensive use of temporaries as a hiring device was accompanied by very different profitability. In one, the radical HR change could not be detected in share price
or earnings, except that perhaps we saw a slightly dampened variability
in earnings. In Company B, the radical HR change accompanied other
aggressive changes in the company’s assets and direction. Thus while
Company B fared far worse during the period of increased use of temporaries, it is difficult to attribute this to the HR policy change.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This chapter finds that many large companies surveyed are using
temporaries in different ways than they had previously. Many are hiring more temporaries and are hiring them to serve different purposes
than previously. Temps are being hired not just to replace temporary
absences, but also as a strategic solution to both foreseen and unforeseen variability in labor demand. As a result, temps are being hired to a
wider variety of jobs, and are staying at assignments for longer periods
of time. Moreover, temporary help is being increasingly used as a
recruiting and screening mechanism to find permanent employees.
Additional research is warranted to document these changes among a
larger sample of companies of varying sizes.
Both individual companies and labor market researchers find it difficult to find a measurable impact of HR policies on profitability or
costs. The cross-sectional results here suggest that there may be some
correlation between strategic use of temporaries and positive financial
outcomes. While this is in no way indicative of causality, they provide
a beginning shred of evidence that “strategic staffing” may increase
operating margins and company value.
On the other hand, the time-series case study suggests either no
impact or a negative impact for manufacturing companies choosing to
hire all entry-level production workers as temps. The somewhat contradictory conclusions from the cross-sectional and time-series estimates
are in no way mutually exclusive: a selective use of temporaries might
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be profitable while a more blanket approach might be counter-productive. However, the time-series results for two companies primarily corroborate the general fact that the financial impact of even major changes
in HR policies tends to be eclipsed by other changes occurring within
companies.
Nevertheless, executives at large companies who have increased
their usage of temporaries are convinced that it has increased their
profitability, particularly by giving them additional flexibility. The
overall rising usage of temporaries in a wider variety of jobs and situations is a testament to their conviction in the financial benefits of
temps.
It seems clear that, absent government intervention, this growth of
temporaries in the workforce will continue. Many factors, from global
competition to the need for flexibility and the quick availability of
qualified personnel, drive this change. In light of these changes, both
companies and government should reexamine whether policies written
for more static and permanent labor markets make sense in the light of
these changes. Researchers should assist this process of reexamination
by studying the impact of these changes on companies, on individuals,
and on labor market outcomes.

Notes
1. Alternatively, a February 1995 supplement to the Current Population Survey estimated that 1.0 percent of employed workers were paid by temporary help agencies, while an additional 1.7 percent of the employed were on-call workers and
day laborers, for a total of 2.7 percent of the workforce in temporary work. This
measure, however, excludes direct-hire temporaries but may include some nontemporaries who work for temporary agencies. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
also estimated various definitions of contingent workers. The broadest definition
encompassing all workers who don’t expect their jobs to last, including contract
workers and self-employed, comprised 4.9 percent of total employed.
2. We did not explicitly mention on-call workers, although we did ask respondents to
include people hired for temporary work from in-house listings of available temporary workers.
3. One executive was able to schedule an appointment six months hence but no
sooner.
4. Because of confidentiality agreements, we are not using company names in this
chapter. When company names appear, the information is not from our sample
itself but from public sources.
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5. Owners of temporary agencies have told us that while they do not ignore the
employee’s unsuccessful experience, neither does a single unsuccessful match
lead an agency to drop an employee from its roster.
6. Thus, rather than using temporaries to avoid severance pay or to avoid paying
benefits, companies could change their own policies for the probationary period.
Seen this way, the movement toward using temps as probationary workers may
simply be an expedient way for companies to, in effect, renegotiate the contracts
of new employees. Moreover, the use of temporaries in this way may allow companies to avoid government policies such as unemployment compensation experience-rating or the threat of suit for discriminatory practices if dismissed during
the probationary period. The case law regarding coemployment of temporary
workers is still evolving.
7. Reported in Staffing Industry Report, January 1996. Note that NATSS changed its
name between these two surveys to National Association of Temporary and Staffing Services.
8. This occurred in the textile/fiber company that is the focus of our case study later
in this chapter (Company A).
9. A χ2 test of downsizing versus increasing, decreasing, or keeping temps steady is
significant at the 24 percent level.
10. One of these two companies has a pool of in-house temps that tend, de facto, to be
continually employed.
11. When HR policies have been shown to have impacts, it is usually when many
aspects of management change simultaneously. Similarly, we would be most
likely to find an impact when the firm is simultaneously adopting an entire “strategic staffing” approach.
12. The surveys in the cross-section were all carried out in 1995, and asked about
changes in the previous three to five years.
13. All earnings-per-share numbers are standardized by the share price.
14. Two scaling factors were considered: the share price (Pt–1) and the average share
price of the company over the sample period (Pavg). While reported results use
the former, all results are similar for both measures. Another way to think of these
earnings measures is as a return on equity, where the return is based on actual
share price rather than “book value.” OPM was not available for quarterly data.
15. Quarterly dummies are included in the share price as well as in EPS equations to
capture the January effect. Note also that when Durbin-Watson statistics indicated serial correlation, we included three-quarter moving average terms, which
fit better than autoregressive terms.
16. Results using the alternative EPS measure are similar to those reported here both
in the case of Company A and Company B.
17. Company A’s share price variability is greater than for the six firms’ average share
price, as would be expected, because a portfolio with offsetting idiosyncratic risks
will exhibit lower return variability than a single investment.
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